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Reform and democratic control of the security sector and the joining together of 
security and development have become a major focus of international intervention in 
post-conflict societies since the turn of the 21st century (Malan 2008:6).  
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1 Introduction  
 
The concept of security sector reform1 (SSR) entered the repertoire of international 
development aid in the late 1990s, focusing on civil-military relations and their impact on 
development. SSR is representative of a widening of the traditional understanding of 
security as relating solely to state or regime security. It hence represents a post-Cold War 
approach to security and development assistance and it has grown increasingly influential 
since the turn of the millennium. Security sector reform aims to reform a country's 
security sector in a manner consistent with enhancing both state security and security for 
the communities and individuals it comprises. The underlying assumption is that efficient 
and effective provision of security against external threats to the state does not 
automatically imply that the institutions responsible for protecting society are 
accountable to the needs of individual citizens and communities (Bendix and Stanley 
2008). 
Since the end of the Cold War, warring parties have increasingly targeted 
civilians, and security agents like the police and the army have been recognized as 
potential sources of insecurity and conflict in them selves. The people's safety, wellbeing 
and freedom from fear have thus come to be recognized as fundamental elements of 
security. Professionalization of the security forces to avoid them becoming instruments of 
the political elite, and subjecting security agents to democratic civilian control and 
oversight have thus come to be seen as essential steps towards making them more 
responsive to society’s security needs (Brzoska 2003).  
Security sector reform (SSR) is innovative in the sense that it organizes different 
donor approaches in the intersection of traditional security and development assistance 
under an overarching objective, hence functioning as a conceptual umbrella. The concept 
furthermore seeks to provide them with a common vision - one of a security sector that 
guarantees human rights, promotes human development, contributes to democratization 
and helps reduce poverty (Brzoska 2003). Peacebuilding has increasingly come to be seen 
as the framework under which peace, security, development, rule of law and human 
rights dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country level 
                                                
1 I have chosen to use the term security sector reform throughout the paper because it is the term most 
commonly used by development analysts and practitioners. Alternative terms are security system reform, 
security sector transformation and justice and security sector reform 
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(de Coning 2007), and SSR has become part and parcel of international peace 
interventions.  
The UN Security Council has stressed that reforming the security sector in post-
conflict environments is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting 
poverty reduction, good governance, extending legitimate state authority and preventing 
countries from relapsing into conflict.2 Post-conflict situations offer quite specific 
opportunities for SSR because the need to demilitarize the society by “rightsizing” the 
security sector and restructuring and professionalizing armed forces, police and other 
security actors is almost universally accepted after the end of violent conflict. Post-war 
situations are generally fluid, with far-reaching changes taking place in several areas. 
They hence serve as good entry points to conduct efforts like disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, small arms control, police reform, 
recruiting and training of new armed forces and the transformation of civil-military 
relations to secure democratic monitoring of the armed forces (Møller 2007).  
 
1.1 Research rationale  
Most human geographic research on issues related to armed conflict and civil war has 
been conducted within critical geopolitics, focusing on the production of geopolitical 
knowledge around international crises and interventions (Ó Tuathail et al. 1998). Human 
geographic research on these topics is somewhat partial and uneven, since they fall 
between two traditions: Development Geography and Political Geography. Development 
geographers have traditionally paid little attention to armed conflict despite the relevance 
for development, whereas political geographers mainly have focused on northern 
geopolitical discourses on southern conflict, giving little emphasis to contextual political 
and development dynamics (Stokke 2009).  
The concept of security sector reform (SSR) merges the fields of development and 
security. However, it remains a relatively new and underresearched phenomenon and 
literature on this topic tends to be policy-oriented and largely written by and for 
practitioners. This thesis seeks to address the knowledge gap at the intersection of 
security and development through i) investigating how the liberal hegemony in post-Cold 
War politics has contributed to the transformation of international peace operations, ii) 
investigating how state fragility and underdevelopment in the South have been construed 
                                                
2 www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/PRST/2007/3 (accessed  4/9 2009) 
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as threats to international security, and iii) investigating the practical geopolitics of 
security sector reform. The thesis is hence centered on an interest in the post-Cold War 
security-development nexus’ impact on donor policies towards fragile and post-conflict 
states in the South.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
The internationally endorsed guidelines on security sector reform provided by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD DAC) identify holistic approach, local ownership, local context 
sensitivity, and accountability and transparency as the main procedural principles that 
external actors need to respect to ensure the efficiency, sustainability and legitimacy of 
security sector reform (OECD DAC 2005). Nevertheless, when reviewed, the principles 
are repeatedly found to be marginalized within actual SSR processes. This tendency is 
known as a conceptual-contextual divide (Scheye and Peake 2005). My research agenda 
is prompted by this inconsistency between theory and practice. The main research 
question of this thesis is thus how has the international approach towards fragile and 
post-conflict states changed in the post-Cold War era?  
 
Two related sub-questions function to structure my thesis: How has the merging of 
security and development influenced Western donors’ geopolitical rationale for engaging 
with fragile states? And finally, related to my case: What characterizes the Liberian SSR 
process, and do the elements of the OECD DAC framework inform the implementation of 
the reform process? 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
In the following chapter, I will present the comprehensive theoretical framework I will 
use throughout the thesis. As I see security sector reform as both a discursive activity and 
a practical policy, my framework will draw from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, 
Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, the Copenhagen School’s security theory, as well 
as critical geopolitics.  
Chapter three deals with research design and the thesis’ analytical approach. A 
particular concern is positionality of the researcher and how this impacts on the research 
process and concurrent analytical findings. 
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The fourth chapter takes a closer look at the context wherein the concepts and 
practices discussed throughout the thesis have emerged. It  situates peace operations in 
global politics and contextualizes security sector reform as a post-Cold War approach to 
security assistance. 
Chapter five and six constitute the analysis and answer my research questions. 
Chapter five investigates the post-Cold War merging of security and development that 
provides the backdrop and justification for new policies such as SSR. I argue that the 
security-development nexus has brought about a reinterpretation of underdevelopment 
and state fragility from humanitarian and developmental issues to international security 
issues. As an interface between security and development, SSR is an area of civilian-
military co-operation, and a central divide exists between donors who see physical 
security as the most urgent issue, and those who see good governance and 
democratization of the security sector as the most fundamental task. This chapter 
specifically seeks to answer how the security-development nexus has impacted on 
Western donors’ geopolitical rationale for engaging with fragile and post-conflict states. 
Chapter six turns to the implementation of the SSR agenda by looking at the 
ongoing security sector reform process in Liberia. The Liberian reform has been 
unprecedented in ambition, but the quality of the process is widely disputed. Through this 
case, I will seek to investigate the relation between the OECD DAC framework on SSR 
and the implementation on the ground. Central to the analysis here is hence the question 
of what characterizes the Liberian SSR process and whether the elements of the OECD 
DAC framework inform the implementation of the reform.  
The concluding chapter sums up my analytical findings and points to future 
challenges.  
 15 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
The analytical purpose of the thesis is to investigate the international approach towards 
fragile and post-conflict states in the post-Cold War era. I understand this new 
transformative approach as including both the practice of comprehensive peace 
operations and the theoretical and philosophical foundation underlying and informing it. 
The thesis hence focuses on foreign policy discourses and the relation between 
representations and social practice. As such, it aligns with the so-called constructionist 
approaches. The constructionist school has a common interest in how “(…) textual and 
social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the 
implication of this connection for the way we think and act in the contemporary world” 
(Georg 1994:191, in Milliken 1999:225). The analytical focus is hence on the production 
and reproduction of meaning. This makes discourse analysis suited since it seeks to 
expose the systems through which the world appears meaningful to subjects and enables 
them to understand and interact with it in specific ways.  
According to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999), the combination of elements from 
different analytical approaches can prove fruitful for the analysis of a subject matter, as 
long as these approaches share the fundamental philosophical premises. I follow their 
stand as my theoretical framework draws from and incorporates aspects from different 
perspectives. As my aim is to analyse the transformation of foreign policy discourse and 
the impact on policy, the discourse analysis is combined with the Copenhagen School’s 
security theory as well as geopolitical theory. I will start off by presenting the discourse 
theoretical framework before I turn to the geopolitical framework.  
 
2.1 Discourse theoretical framework 
The following section will account for the production and reproduction of meaning, how 
discourses are limited and transformed, and how the rules of a discourse depend on the 
framing of the subject issue. The theoretical framework draws from scholars like Laclau 
and Mouffe, Fairclough, Foucault, and the Copenhagen School of Security Analysis. 
Although fragmented, scholars writing in the area of discourse analysis build their 
research upon a set of shared theoretical commitments. According to Milliken (1999) 
they can be organized in three analytically distinguishable bundles: discourses as systems 
of signification, discourse productivity and the play of practice.  
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2.1.1 Discourses as systems of signification 
Discourse analysis’ first commitment is to the conceptualization of discourses as 
structures of signification that construct social realities. This stand implies a 
constructionist understanding of meaning; things do not mean – the material world does 
not convey meaning – rather, people construct the meaning of things using sign systems3 
(Milliken 1999:229). Consequently, our knowledge about the world does not mirror an 
external and existent world; it is a product of our categorizations of it. Because “reality” 
only is accessible to us through our representations, discourse analysts share a critical 
approach to common sense of the existence and qualities of phenomena. The approach is 
hence anti-essentialist: as humans are cultural and historical beings, our representations 
of the world are equally historically and culturally specific. They are hence contingent, 
meaning that representations are possible, but not necessary, and that they change over 
time (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999).  
To say that all knowledge about the world is contingent does not imply that 
meaning is completely arbitrary and that everything floats. If that were the case, language 
and communication would have been impossible. Nor does it imply a rejection of the 
existence of a material world. Take the 2003 tsunami as an example; it occurred as a 
material fact, but as it was framed in different ways - as a natural disaster, as a 
phenomena that could have been foreseen and prevented had it been higher on the 
international agenda, or as the revenge of God - it was ascribed different meanings and 
was no longer outside of the realms of discourse. The point is that language is 
ontologically significant - the material world is ascribed meaning through the 
representations we create through language.  
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (2001) builds on an understanding of 
language that derives from structuralism, post-structuralism and Marxism. According to 
Saussure’s structural linguistics, the relation between language and reality is arbitrary. 
The theory emphasizes the relationships in which things are placed in a sign system, and 
the relations by which objects are distinguished from each other in that system (Milliken 
1999). The understanding of meaning can in a structuralist tradition be illustrated with the 
allegory of a fishnet. Things or signs attain their meaning by being different from each 
other and are located on specific places, like nods, in a structure of other signs. Laclau 
and Mouffe (2001), however, follow Derrida’s post-structural critique, which modifies 
                                                
3 Predominately, but not exclusivly linguistic 
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this allegory. According to this tradition, signs still obtain their meaning through their 
reciprocal difference, but they attain different meanings according to the relation they are 
placed in. Discourses are established as meaning crystallizes around certain nodal points; 
privileged signs that other signs attain their meaning in relation to. Nodal points are 
nevertheless not signifiers with a pre-determined meaning. Nodal points are floating 
signifiers; signs which are given different content in different articulations. They are 
hence subjected to discursive struggle. A moment is a sign with a fixed meaning in a 
specific discourse, while an element is a sign which holds no determined meaning 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 1999).  
Every statement within a discourse constructs the relation between signs, and tries 
to turn elements into moments to establish meaning within its specific field. A discourse 
can hence be understood as the fixing of meaning within a particular domain. But because 
a sign can hold several different connotations, all articulations challenge or reproduce the 
discourse. Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) thus replace the fishnet allegory with that of the 
Internet: every word or sign is connected to other signs, but links are constantly added or 
removed, changing the underlying structure. In this conceptualization, structures of 
meaning still exist, but only as temporary fixations and not necessarily without inherent 
contradictions. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001), the social production of meaning 
is hence about fixing the floating signifiers as if a Sausurrian fishnet structure existed. 
This means that discourses strive to fix meaning around a closed structure, but in the end 
neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible. Such an interpretation opens up 
for explaining change, traditionally a problem for structuralists.  
Drawing from Derrida’s philosophical work, discourses are furthermore expected 
to be structured in terms of binary oppositions which establish relations of power through 
a series of juxtapositions where one element is privileged in relation to the other 
(Milliken 1999). As an example, women in nineteenth century Europe were considered to 
have a political identity different and inferior to that of men, making female political 
influence inappropriate. Meaning is here constructed along two dimensions; through a 
positive process of linking female identities (motherly, reliant and emotional), and at the 
same time juxtaposing them to a male series of links (rational, intellectual, independent) 
through a negative process of differentiation. These processes can be distinguished 
analytically, but are enacted simultaneously in the process of identity construction 
(Hansen 2006:19).  
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As stated earlier, the nature of language is inherently ambiguous as it is both 
highly structured yet unstable. The construction of “women” in nineteenth century 
discourse was not solely negative as it was seen as an essential part of society, but they 
were in Derrida’s terms a supplement; secondary to the privileged male, but 
simultaneously necessary for societal completion and survival (Hansen 2006). Over time 
this “objective account of woman’s nature” came under attack from woman’s movements 
and went from being a widely accepted construction to one which was politically 
contested. This development shows the possibility for destabilization: the link between 
some of the “positive signs” might become unstable, or a negatively valued term might be 
constructed as positive within another discourse. I shall return to the construction of 
identities in international relations in more depth in the geopolitical framework.  
 
2.1.2 Discourse productivity 
Discourse analysis’ second theoretical commitment is to discourses as being productive 
of things defined by the discourse. Beyond giving a language for speaking about 
phenomena, discourses prescribe specific ways of being in, and acting towards, the world 
(Milliken 1999:229). Discourses operationalize specific regimes of truth which present 
different actions as relevant, possible or impossible in a given situation. Language should 
thus be understood as political, a site for production and reproduction of particular 
identities, which simultaneously excludes other. Language is not a neutral channel 
through which information and facts are communicated, rather, it is a “machine” which 
constitutes the social world (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999).  
Even though the meaning of things in principle is contingent and thus always 
could have been different, not all representations are considered equally relevant or valid. 
Importantly, discourses limit the range of possible identities and actions and lay out rules 
for what statements are accepted as meaningful and true in specific historical periods 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). According to a foucauldian understanding, power is both 
productive and limiting. Contrary to defining power as repressive and as something 
agents like states hold and practice in relation to passive subjects, Foucault sees it as the 
positive condition of possibilities4 for the social. Power is hence that which creates the 
social world and that which enables it to be represented in specific ways, while 
simultaneously excluding other representations (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Because 
                                                
4 Jørgensen and Phillips use the term “mulighedsbetingelse” 
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power and knowledge are understood as intimately connected, it is consequentially 
impossible to speak of an objective Truth. This is always a representation produced in 
discourse. 
While most discourse analytical approaches follow Foucault’s conceptualization 
of discourses, they break with his monoism. Foucault tends to identify only one regime of 
truth within every historical epoch, but this view is largely replaced by one in which 
several different discourses coexist and compete over the definition of the truth. 
Discourses constitute themselves in relation to its outside, and Laclau and Mouffe (2001) 
use the term field of discursivity to refer to all the possible meanings excluded by a 
discourse. The field of discursivity is a reservoir of meanings that signs or elements can 
hold, but which are ignored and silenced within the relevant discourse to create 
unambiguousness. A discourse which is so established that its contingency is forgotten is 
in the discourse theory known as objective. A discourse moves from being political and 
contested to objectivity through hegemonic interventions; articulations which through 
force5 re-establish unambiguousness (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999:60). Hegemony thus 
resembles discourse in that both terms fix elements into moments, but the hegemonic 
intervention work across competing discourses. Because hegemonic discourses are 
accepted as objective and exclude alternative meanings, they are moreover understood as 
ideological (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999).  
Laclau and Mouffe’s system of concepts cannot, however, fully explain why some 
representations are more likely to occur than others, or why some representations are 
disputed while others are accepted as objective within a given period. Jørgensen and 
Phillips (1999) hence propose the incorporation of Fairclough’s (1995) term order of 
discourse to distinguish between all meanings excluded by the discourse versus the 
limited number of relevant discourses that compete over meaning within the same 
domain. The order of discourse can be understood as a social space of discursive conflict, 
limiting the range of representations that are likely to be accepted as truthful and relevant 
within a particular domain. Fairclough (1995) uses the term interdiscursivity for the 
articulation of different discourses within and across different orders of discourse. 
Creative articulations move the borders between different discourses and within the 
                                                
5 “Force” means the repression of alternative and present meanings 
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specific order of discourse, whereas conventional articulations sustain the dominant order 
of discourse and hence the social order.6  
As productive structures, discourses define and restrict subjects authorized to 
speak and to act, in addition to knowledgeable practices by these subjects towards the 
objects that the discourses define. In international politics these “authorities” or “experts” 
typically include foreign policy officials, defence intellectuals and development 
professionals. Foreign policies need an account of the problems and issues they are trying 
to address, since any intervention is dependent on a description of the local in which 
intervention takes place as well as the peoples involved in the conflict. Neither can there 
be an understanding of development policies “without a description of who the 
underdeveloped are, where they differ from the developed West, and how they can 
transform their identity” (Hansen 2006:xvi). Through discourse, certain interventions, 
practices and disciplining techniques are rendered as logical and appropriate, while others 
are disqualified and excluded. In this process, people and social space are controlled, 
organized and disciplined; in other words, places and groups are produced as those 
objects (Milliken 1999).  
 
2.1.3 The play of practice 
Discourse analysis’ third theoretical commitment is to discourses as being (re)produced 
by practice. As discourses are unstable grids, they require work to articulate and 
rearticulate their knowledge and identities so as to fix the “regime of truth” (Milliken 
1999:230). As stated, discourses produce different thoughts and actions as relevant, 
possible and appropriate, while at the same time excluding others. When subjects act 
based on discursive knowledge, certain social consequences are created which again 
contribute to uphold the subject’s discursive identity. It is therefore through the 
enactment of the policies prescribed by the discourse that the discourse comes into being. 
Accordingly, discourses on the one hand function as the legitimization of practice and are 
on the other hand (re)produced through these practices; they are hence simultaneously 
foundation and product (Hansen 2006).  
                                                
6 Interdiscursivity is a form of intertextuality, which refers to the reciprocal influence of history on text and 
text on history. All texts can be read as parts of an intertextual chain, as they draw from previous texts and 
contribute to historical development and transformation (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999) 
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Discourse analytical perspectives shares an understanding of discursive practice 
as social practice, and that the struggle over meaning characterizes the social. They 
however differ when it comes to the issue of whether or not all social practice is 
discursive. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (2001) does not distinguish between 
discursive and non-discursive social practices – they merge Marxism’s categories of 
structure and superstructure7 in one field produced by discursive processes. 
Consequently, all practices are seen as discursive, and as constituted by discourse. 
Importantly, this does not mean that only text and speech exist, but rather that discourses 
are materiel. Take children as an example; they are understood as a group which is 
different from other human beings, with the distinction being more than linguistic since 
they are materially constituted as a group in physical space through institutions like 
kinder gardens, schools, and playgrounds (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). These spaces 
and institutions are hence seen as part of the societal discourse about children.  
In Fairclough’s critical discourse theory (1995), a distinction is made between 
discursive practice and other social practices, with the term “discourse” reserved for 
semiotic practices like text and speech. Discursive practice and other social practice exist 
in a dialectical interplay, and are therefore mutually constitutive of each other. Fairclough 
uses the family as an example of how social structures impact on discursive practices. 
The family is indeed a real institution with concrete identities, relations and practices. 
These identities, relations and practices are originally discursively constituted, but have 
over time been established in institutions and non-discursive practises. Both social and 
discursive structures thus lay the foundation for how the family functions (Jørgensen and 
Phillips 1999). Discourse is hence understood as both constitutive and constituted, 
making critical discourse theory less post-structural than Laclau and Mouffe’s theory. 
Since some social phenomena function according to other logics than discourses, such as 
economic logics or institutionalizations of social practices, they have to be investigated 
with other tools than discourse analysis. Fairclough’s critical discourse theory hence 
opens up for interdisciplinary combination of textual analysis and social analysis, aiming 
to elucidate the relations between linguistic practices and societal and cultural processes 
and structures. As this thesis seek to say something about the relation between foreign 
policy discourses and the practice which takes place on the ground, it becomes relevant 
not just to look at the discourses articulated by elites, but also the implementation of these 
                                                
7 In historical materialism the superstructure (i.e. state, church, rule of law, media and school system) is 
determined by the structure (economy, ownership of the means of production) 
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policies. The thesis hence follows Fairclough’s understanding of discourses as being both 
constitutive and constituted. 
 
2.2 Security as discourse  
In constructionist theory, there is no extra-discursive realm from which material objective 
facts assert themselves. All phenomena have to be located within discourse to have an 
effect on policy and identity. This is also the case for military or other forms of threats. 
For issues to become questions of security, they have to be successfully constructed as 
such within political discourse (Hansen 2006).  
 
2.2.1 Copenhagen School of security studies 
The Copenhagen School of security studies is a school of academic thought within 
international relations that focuses primarily on the social aspects of security. It questions 
the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security, and 
seeks to widen the security agenda by allowing non-military issues to achieve security 
status. This implies that the referent object is kept analytically open, dependent on the 
specific discourse (Hansen 2010). The school seeks to construct a conceptualization of 
security that is more specific that just any threat or problem - to count as a security issue, 
issues have to meet certain criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the 
political. This effectively means that they have to be presented as existential threats to a 
referent object by a securitizing actor (Buzan et al. 1998). The concept of securitization is 
hence central to the school: Drawing on Wæver (1997), Buur, Jensen & Stepputat (2007) 
defines securitization as the process by which a particular issue is presented as a security 
concern, thereby “moving politics beyond the established democratic rules of society” 
and framing the issue within a “special kind of politics” were a special right to use the 
means necessary exists (2007:12). 
 According to the Copenhagen School, security is thus a speech act with specific 
political consequences. Security discourses grants certain issues heightened priority, but 
also bestows a particular legitimacy on those handling the policies in question. By 
arguing that something constitutes an existential threat to a referential object - 
traditionally but not necessarily the state – an emergency condition is declared which 
justifies and legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures. This situation constructs the 
responsible actors with responsibility for answering the threats: they cannot easily turn 
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their backs on the issue without de-securitizing it first; rearticulating it in such a manner 
that it is no longer an issue of security (Hansen 2006).  
 A discourse that presents something as an existential threat to a referent object 
does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move. Securitization 
happens when and if the relevant audience accepts it as such. Securitization can thus be 
understood as the construction of a shared understanding of what is to be understood as a 
threat and collectively responded to as such (Buzan et al. 1998). Emergency measures do 
not have to be adopted to represent a securitization process, but the argued existential 
threat has to gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to 
legitimize actions that would not have been possible prior to the formation of the 
discourse (Buur et al. 2007).  
According to the security theory, any public issue can be placed on the spectrum 
ranging from non-politicized, through politicized to securitized. A non-politicized issue is 
not dealt with by the state and is not part of public debate and decision; a politicized issue 
is part of public policy and requires government decision and resource allocation; and a 
securitized issue is one which is conceptualized as an existential threat requiring 
emergency measures (Buzan et al. 1998:23). Because “security” elevates politics above 
the established rules of the game and strengthens the role of the state, securitization is a 
more extreme version of politicization. The essential difference is how the issue is 
framed; politicization presents issues as open and negotiable, matters of choice which 
entails responsibility, whereas securitization in contrast presents issues as urgent and 
existential, and important enough to legitimize secrecy and disregard for democratic 
procedures (Buzan et al. 1998). The Copenhagen School takes a normative stand by 
seeing security as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics and advocating for de-
securitization – a move out of securitization and the danger mode.  
 Because the theory’s main focus is on security, non-politicized issues tend to 
appear less relevant than politicized and securitized issues, located as they are on the 
opposite range of the spectrum. Non-politicized issues, however, follow other logics and 
imperatives than security, which can be very powerful. I will thus follow Lene Hansen’s 
conceptualization of de-securitization as “a move out of securitization, which not 
necessarily implies a move into the political” (Hansen 2010). Leaving the idea of theory 
as a specter, opens up the possibility of issues moving directly from securitization into 
technicization and the non-politicized. This implies that the former securitized issues 
continue to be outside the political domain, as the non-politicized areas are dominated by 
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their own “experts” like religious leaders, jurists, the family or the private sector. I 
therefore propose the term technicization referring to this specific process.  
Rearticulating issues as non-political can be used for political ends. A recent 
example is the attempt by Danish politicians to establish the Mohammad caricature 
conflict as belonging within the legal and hence non-politicized domain (Hansen 2010). 
What this specific case furthermore shows, is that one and the same issue can be 
contested and framed differently within different discourses. In contrast to the politicians 
who framed the conflict as belonging within the legal and non-politicized, Muslim 
communities interpreted the “offence” or “attack” as politicized or even securitized. 
Because the Copenhagen School conceptualizes the securitization process as one 
movement, it fails to shed light on the discursive struggle underlying the processes. 
Following Hansen’s critique however, allows one to see issues as contested and 
simultaneously securitized, politicized or non-politicized within different discourses. 
Securitization can hence be seen as one discourse within a broader order of discourse. 
Having laid out the thesis’ discourse theoretical framework, the next section will 
account for the geopolitical framework.  
 
2.3 Critical geopolitics 
The central point (…) is that human history is made by human beings, and [s]ince the 
struggle for control over territory is part of that history, so too is the struggle over historical and 
social meaning. The task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from the other, but 
to connect them… (Said 2003:331-332).  
 
Geopolitics can be divided into the practical geopolitics of state leaders and foreign 
policy bureaucracy, the formal geopolitics of strategic institutions, think tanks and the 
academia, and lastly the popular geopolitics of transnational popular culture (Dalby et al. 
1998). This thesis focuses primarily on the practical geopolitics of foreign policy, as it 
focuses on the relation between geopolitical representations and foreign policy 
implementation. The following section will discuss the geopolitical function of 
discourses, meaning how representations of space guide actions towards geographical 
areas and groups of people. Discourses designate agents and threats through the 
establishment of geopolitical identities, and hence direct geopolitical practices and 
contribute to (re)produce the geopolitical order (Sletteland 2008).  
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2.3.1 Classical geopolitics and the critical turn 
Geopolitics has traditionally been defined as “the (scientific) assessment of geographic 
conditions underlying either the power (security) underlying a particular state or the 
balance of power in the global configuration of continents and oceans” (Dijkink 1996:3). 
Rudolf Kjellén first coined the term “geopolitics” in 1899. Other central theorists 
included Friedrich Ratzel, Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder, which emphasized the 
natural advantages of certain locations in terms of land and sea power, or the “biological” 
necessities in the spatial form and growth of states. This latter tradition fell into disrepute 
after German geographers and politicians used it to justify Nazi expansionism during the 
1930s, and the term “geopolitics” was hence avoided for decades (Dijkink 1996).  
Yves Lacoste and his French school of political geography started articulating a 
new type of critical geopolitics during the 1970s, which was followed by an American 
counterpart ten years later. Scholars like Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Donald Campbell 
proposed a constructionist approach to geopolitics and sought to deconstruct the 
ideological presuppositions of geographical practice and knowledge. Leaving behind a 
scientific explanation of the geographical foundation of power and security policy of 
states, the approach sees national identity as being continuously rewritten on the basis of 
external events, and foreign policies not as responding mechanically to real threats, but to 
constructed dangers (Dijkink 1996).  
The critical turn in geopolitics can be understood as a theoretical adjustment to a 
new reality of increasing permeability of borders and independency of states. 
Importantly, the ongoing process of globalization has brought about changing spatialities 
which has forced a rethinking of long established concepts like geographical scale (Ó 
Tuathail et al. 1998). Concepts such as the national, regional and global are essentially 
social products and the relations between and across different scales are understood as 
increasingly complex in the contemporary world, evident in new terms such as 
“glocalization”. 
 
2.3.2 The dialectics of geopolitical practices and representations  
Dijkink (1996:11) defines geopolitical visions as “any idea concerning the relation 
between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage 
(and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy”. A 
geopolitical vision requires at least a them-and-us distinction and emotional attachment to 
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a place. A typical aspect of national identity is a “historic territory”; a narrative of 
conquest, defence, liberation and loss in which certain “Others” play a role. Feelings of 
national identity and geopolitical visions are thus difficult to separate, but geopolitical 
visions are according to Dijink (1996) more the concrete translations of national identity 
into models of the world.  
As implied in the definition above, a geopolitical vision is organized around a 
distinct geopolitical subject, often but not necessarily the state. According to Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory (2001) the individual is not an autonomous subject. Rather, it 
is understood as structured by discourses. Drawing from Lacan, the individual is seen as 
fragmented and constantly seeking to “find itself” through discourses. The subject is 
assigned identity by letting itself be represented by certain master-signifiers; nodal points 
of identity (man, woman, Western), which are ascribed different meanings in different 
discourses. Through chains of equivalence or difference, subjects are inscribed with 
meaning based on what it is and what it is not. Identity is hence understood as socially 
constructed - as identification with the various subject positions appointed by discourses 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 1999).  
Processes of subject-formation always occur somewhere and always occur 
relationally (Ó Tuathail et al. 1998), and the identity construction of groups and other 
entities, such as states, follow the same logic as the one described above. Territorial 
borders are justified by its “naturalness”, often involving an exaggeration of homogeneity 
within borders compared with dissimilarities beyond them (Dijink 1996). The state’s 
identity, or Self, is hence defined in relation to its external world, the Other. As described 
earlier, discourses are furthermore structured in terms of binary oppositions where one 
element is privileged in relation to a devalued other. In geopolitical discourses, 
classifications like First World/Third World, West/non-West and North/South are not 
simply referring to geographical or spatial realities; they are just as much social as 
territorial and represent charged categories with sedimented meanings (Duffield 2001).  
The West has traditionally been constructed as a model and measure of social 
progress for the world as a whole, granting a primary identity to the West and a 
secondary and dependent identity to the non-Western other. This geopolitical 
categorization of the world is closely related to Euro-Americanism. Euro-Americanism 
portrays the West as the essential motor of progress, civilization, modernization and 
development, and the non-West as a stagnant and passive recipient. The basis for Euro-
American representation can be summed up in three elements: the primary or the special, 
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the internally independent and the universal (Slater 2004). The special or primary feature 
of the West’s inner socio-economic, political and cultural life is considered to be its 
leading civilizational role. Max Weber depicted the West as the “distinctive seat of 
economic rationalism”, Gramsci stated that it was the “only historically and concretely 
universal culture”, and contemporary political theory portrays the West as the primary 
haven of democracy, human rights and enlightened thought (Slater 2004:10). These 
attributes are seen as intrinsic and internal to European and American development, and 
importantly, as constituting universal steps forward for humanity as a whole.8 This 
representation of the West tends to go together with a negative essentialization of the 
non-Western other. Slater (2004) points to how the image of the South’s stagnation, 
pervasive hardship, conflicts, lack of knowledge and political participation represents a 
negative sameness, ignoring the different realities in developing countries. In Western 
narratives, political and social problems to development in the South are not treated as 
specific and separate problems. They are viewed as inherent to the countries and 
combined to question the Southern societies as a whole.  
The implication of understanding identities as socially constructed, is that there 
are no objective identities; they exist only insofar as they are continuously rearticulated 
and remain uncontested by competing discourses. The West’s geopolitical identity is 
traditionally intimately related to its perceived civilizational role, and foreign policy 
makers aim to construct a link between policy and identity that makes them appear 
consistent with each other and hence legitimate to the relevant audience. The implications 
of geopolitical visions for practical geopolitics will be accounted for in more depth in the 
following chapters.  
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the thesis’ theoretical framework, which draws on Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory, Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, the Copenhagen 
School of security studies, as well as critical geopolitics. Throughout the thesis, this 
framework will be utilized to explain how discursive representations direct geopolitical 
practices and how different discourses struggle over the definition and response to the 
issue in question. How a discourse frames an issue importantly affects the “rules of the 
                                                
8 Rostow’s notion of the ”stages of economic growth” captures the idea of the West showing the non-West 
its future development 
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game” in dealing with it. The unfolding of this discursive struggle relates to Fairclough’s 
concept of order of discourse, which together with the Copenhagen school’s security 
theory will provide a structuring foundation for the forthcoming analysis. 
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3 Analytical Approach 
 
This chapter draws on the previous chapter as it accounts for the analytical choices I have 
made when approaching my object of analysis. Constructionist approaches recognizes 
that the researcher and her positionality necessarily determine the choice of empirical 
data, theories, analytical strategies and research questions. These are the fundamental 
elements of the research process, and they ultimately influence the research findings and 
conclusions. Aiming to make the research process more transparent, this chapter will 
therefore account for the route I have taken in writing the thesis.  
 
3.1 Research design 
I first became interested in the post-Cold War approach to fragile and post-conflict states 
after following a seminar on security sector reform (SSR) at the Free University in Berlin. 
I found SSR interesting because it represents a state of the art concept that brings together 
security and development thinking and provides a framework for the implementation of 
policy. I was, however, puzzled by the lack of debate on the theoretical fundament of the 
approach. Paris (2004:44) has argued that the study of peacebuilding is suffering from a 
“cult of policy relevance”, where the broader macrotheoretical questions about the nature 
and significance of these operations are neglected, causing the intellectual development 
of the field to be stunted. As I later started my own research process, I found that the 
literature on SSR tends to be self-referential and policy-oriented, largely written by and 
for practitioners. Generally speaking, there is a lack of external evaluation of the actual 
reform processes undertaken, and even when critical evaluations do occur, the concept of 
SSR attracts little critical investigation in it self. I was struck by the extent to which new 
and politically sensitive policies were presented as a priori, necessary and as requiring 
very little justification. Central concepts such as “underdevelopment” and “fragile states” 
were furthermore taken for granted. Typically, the so-called security-development nexus 
was presented as the underlying rationale for the new approach to fragile and post-
conflict states, but its broader implications were not touched upon. How did the texts 
achieve this effect?  
The policy orientation in SSR literature initially represented a huge challenge as it 
provided little direction for further theoretical investigation. However, as the nature of 
my research questions essentially was about the production of meaning and its impact on 
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social practice, I decided to adopt a discourse analytical approach. Discourse analysis can 
in principle be applied to any research field as a method of analysis, but because theory 
and methodology are intrinsically connected, it cannot be incorporated in any theoretical 
framework. Contrary to other social science approaches, discourse analysis focuses less 
on ontology; the study of the existence and the description of the basic categories of 
being, and more on epistemology; the study of the nature and scope of knowledge. In 
other words, the focus is on how and why objects exists as an object of knowledge, rather 
than what exists (Neumann 2001).  
 
3.2 Analytical strategy 
The thesis focuses on the international approach towards fragile and post-conflict states 
in the post-Cold War era. More specifically, it is a study of how Western foreign policy 
discourse has been affected by the security-development nexus. Although my analytical 
interest in the post-Cold War approach to fragile states was of an ontological nature, it 
did not emerge from a purely theoretical standpoint. Rather, I was interested in the 
interplay between discursive representations and social practices. A discourse analysis 
about social signification, should be based upon a set of texts by different actors 
presumed to be authorized speakers of the dominant discourse or representative of 
alternative discourses (Milliken 1999). This analysis takes security sector reform (SSR) 
policy papers from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) and the United Nations (UN) and as 
its starting point. The UN and OECD DAC both functions as forums for coordination of 
international aid efforts. OECD DAC aims to be the “the venue and voice of the world’s 
major bilateral donors”,9 and has been the main driver of the SSR agenda. As the policy 
papers are internationally endorsed, they reflect the international community’s official 
approach to fragile and post-conflict states. Importantly, they provide a set of guidelines 
for implementation of the concept, and I therefore decided to look at the ideas and 
assumptions informing the policy framework and how they impact on donor efforts on 
the ground.  
To contextualize SSR as part of broader social and political trends, I have 
supplemented these documents with policy papers from influential bilateral donors such 
as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK 
                                                
9 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/38/1896808.pdf (accessed 04.09.2010) 
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Department for International Development (DFID) as well as a collection of broader 
policy and academic texts on development and international peace operations. To better 
enable theorization, I have made sure that my selection reflects different positions and so 
can be used as a basis for an analysis of discursive struggle. The decision to use specific 
policy papers is also in line with Fairclough’s (1995) critical discourse theory, which 
advocates concrete texts as the foundation for analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Data collection and analysis  
As I previously had followed a seminar on security sector reform (SSR) at the Free 
University, I already had basic knowledge about writings on the topic as I started my own 
research. This provided an excellent platform from which to start the process of 
identifying and selecting data. As I already knew what actors constituted the main policy 
drivers on SSR, I started my research process by trying to identify key texts to base my 
analysis on and to further guide my research. Extensive reading confirmed that the OECD 
DAC and the UN’s approach to SSR overlapped and consistently mirrored each other. I 
accordingly decided to base my analysis of the international community’s approach to 
fragile and post-conflict states on a selection of policy papers provided by these two 
organizations.  
As stated, SSR is a relatively new and underresearched field and writings on it are 
predominantly policy-oriented. Accordingly, it is a body of literature that gives you little 
direction about how to approach them in a wider sense. My approach was thus to utilize 
online sources such as the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-
SSR).10 The GFN-SSR is an online source founded by the UK Government’s Department 
for International Development, which aims to promote a better understanding of security 
sector reform through the provision of information, advice and expertise to practitioners, 
academics and policymakers. Through this Internet source, I conducted extensive 
document searches and was able to identify literature that was of a more critical nature. 
Surprisingly little of this literature would, however, question the underlying foundation of 
security sector reform. Typically, the critique would be directed at the efficiency or 
quality of actual SSR processes.  
Writing my thesis at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
meant that I had access to their library and expertise, something that helped me 
                                                
10 www.ssrnetwork.net/index.php 
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immensely in the process of identifying relevant literature and contextualize SSR as a 
post-Cold War approach to security assistance. Because parts of this terrain were largely 
unknown to me, the Liberian case in particular, I spent several months reading up on 
relevant literature before I turned to the actual analysis. In addition to several informal 
conversations, I conducted two in-depth interviews with researchers working specifically 
on post-conflict related issues in Liberia as well as in-depth interviews with two 
practitioners who had been central in planning and executing the UN Mission in Liberia’s 
police reform. Whereas the first two can be classified as “sideline critics” and was chosen 
based on their critical writings on issues related to the Liberian SSR process, the latter 
had the important function of shedding light on the actual implementation of the process 
on the ground.11 The interviews were semi-structured, as they were neither an open 
conversation nor a highly structured questionnaire (Kvale 1996). I varied between asking 
broad questions and more specific questions, dependent on the purpose of the interview. 
All of my informants were educated and had a professional background in the subject 
under discussion. Furthermore, none of them expressed any whish to be treated 
anonymously. I therefore have no concerns regarding ethical issues during the interview 
process.  
During the analysis, I went back and forth between the policy texts and the 
broader selection of academically oriented texts. According to Thagaard (2003) the 
analysis can thus be said to be abductive, as it combines data-based inductive analysis 
with theory-based reasoning. The academically oriented literature focused on 
governmentality and various aspects of the international approach to security and 
development assistance. Its main function was to contextualize SSR and give me ideas 
about what to look for in the policy papers. Parts of this literature, including Duffield 
(2001), tend to interpret international interventions in the South in terms of neo-
colonialism. Although this view certainly is interesting, it was important for me to avoid 
simplistic representations of the North and the South because they conceal internal 
discursive struggles over identities and valid practices. For this reason I early on rejected 
the idea of a uniform “Western” approach to the South.  
As the contextual landscape surrounding SSR became clearer to me, the discourse 
theoretical framework provided me with the analytical vocabulary for identifying core 
concepts in the policy papers, as well as the meaning ascribed to them by chains of 
                                                
11 The informants are listed in the list of references  
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equivalence and difference. The finding that the UN and OECD DAC’s approach to SSR 
was highly consistent meant that I could conduct an in-depth study of a selection of 5 key 
texts12 without worrying about sacrificing the breadth of the analysis. The next step 
involved a circular process of reading and coding the policy papers, refining my 
classifications or nodes and mapping out relations between them. While not extensive, 
the direction of the analysis was centered on questions such as: 
 
What is the text’s context and who are the target group?  
How does the text construct key concepts such as security, (under)development, conflict, 
and state fragility?  
How does the text construct the relation between concepts such as security and 
development?  
What is the geopolitical rational underlying the policy of SSR? 
What are the intended outcomes of SSR and which factors are expected to impact on 
these? 
Are underdevelopment and state fragility represented as humanitarian issues or as 
international security issues?   
Which actors are constructed as relevant? 
How does the text construct the Self and the Others, and what features are they associated 
with? 
Who’s security is the text concerned with?  
What models of ownership are present in the text? 
What texts are implicitly or explicitly referred to, and what is the effect of this for the 
policy paper’s perceived authority and legitimacy?   
 
Among the discoveries I made during the process, was that the policy papers use 
underdevelopment and state fragility more or less referring to the same phenomenon. 
This notion is interesting because is reflects the state centeredness of the approach as well 
as the growing concern for international stability. I have chosen to use these terms 
interchangeably throughout my own research. 
 
3.2.2 Analytical operationalizations 
The temporal perspective of the thesis is predominantly the period following the Cold 
War’s end and up until now. This choice could be criticized, as viewing security sector 
reform (SSR) simply within a post-Cold War peacebuilding framework arguably misses 
the historical context of Western interventions in the South. Rubin (2010) has made the 
case that stronger powers for centuries have intervened along their peripheries to 
establish politically acceptable forms of order, and that peace operations represent the 
                                                
12 Located in list of references as UN Security Council (2008), OECD DAC (2004), OECD (2004, 2005, 
2007)  
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contemporary version of “the stabilization of the periphery by Great Powers” (Rubin 
2010:215).  
The contemporary global security framework, however, developed with the 
foundation of the UN system in the aftermath of World War II, which importantly had 
rendered imperialism an illegal doctrine. The principle of national sovereignty was 
enshrined in the UN’s charter and the UN’s first task was subsequently to oversee the 
decolonization process. The long-standing security task of stabilizing the periphery, as 
Rubin (2010) calls it, is now being carried out in an increasingly integrated global system 
juridically and politically organized around the principle of universal state sovereignty. 
Donors thus have to work through the institutions of post-conflict states with the aim of 
reforming them rather than absorbing them into more powerful units. Sovereignty is 
hence the guarantee that contemporary international peace operations are categorically 
different from the practice of empire (Duffield 2001). Acknowledging that security sector 
reform and the broader peacebuilding agenda could be seen as part of this historical 
context, means that my thesis should be seen as a study of a moment; the post-Cold War 
security-development nexus, rather than a study tracking historical processes of change. 
This era is an analytical construct, but the timeframe is widely accepted as relevant, since 
the Cold War’s end fundamentally changed the political and normative climate in which 
international security and development assistance is taking place.  
Another demarcation is how I have chosen the analytical object of the thesis. My 
research questions demand that I conduct two analyses: one focusing on discursive 
struggle within the security-development nexus, and one that focuses on the practice of 
SSR. Whereas the first analysis is based on SSR policy papers and a broader selection of 
texts, the latter is centered on a case study. The focus on the Liberian SSR process was 
chosen because it represents a multilateral intervention in a post-conflict setting that 
allows for an illustration and discussion of key trends and paradoxes within the emergent 
security and development architecture. Although the case is studied in detail, the 
analytical focus is on the Western construction of official foreign policy; it is hence not a 
study of the discursive encounters between the West and “the Liberians”. This framing 
reflects my analytical interest in the relation between representations and social practice, 
but it is also a pragmatic choice, since I have not conducted a fieldwork in Liberia. As the 
case is chosen for its ability to demonstrate the phenomenon of interest, it can be labeled 
instrumental (Thagaard 2003). 
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3.3 Positioning of the researcher 
Understanding knowledge as discursive and contingent implies that academic knowledge 
is neither neutral nor universal. Critical geographers have thus advocated the need to 
situate the knowledge that underpins research. I have already stated that literature on SSR 
tends to be policy-oriented rather than academic. First of all, I think that my positioning 
as a non-practitioner has enabled me to be critical and explorative of the theoretical and 
philosophical foundation of the concept, rather than having to limit my critical 
investigation to the practice of SSR. The latter tends to be the case for literature that 
exposes SSR to critical questioning. Since enhancing the efficiency of any national 
reform simply is not my job, I have remained free to think outside of the established 
“rules of the game”.  
On the other hand, the fact that I am situated outside of this discourse means that 
it is hard for me to access and understand the impact that individuals, everyday practices 
and institutional arrangements, such as hierarchies and institutionalized rationales and 
methods of work, have on SSR processes. This aspect especially holds true regarding the 
military community, which has a culture of secrecy and opaqueness. Because of lack of 
information, the discursive struggle between the security and development community is 
asymmetrically represented, biased in favor of the civilian agents. This could indeed be 
criticized as a weakness of the research. It is however far from my desire to simplify the 
social phenomenon under question by depicting it as completely determined by discursive 
representations. I follow Fairclough’s (1995) stand as I see discourses as both constitutive 
and constituted, and distinguish between discursive practices and other social practices. I 
hence acknowledge that my positionality as a civilian and a non-practitioner could imply 
that I am unaware of the workings of institutionalized social structures on the outcomes 
of reform processes. 
The fact that I am writing from an academic background is relevant for more than 
a practitioner/non-practitioner standpoint. Importantly, my academic background is in 
development studies, and this fact has without doubt shaped my approach to the topic of 
this thesis. The SSR framework aims to organize different policies being undertaken in 
the interface of traditional security and development assistance, and there is an ongoing 
tug of war between civilian and military actors over the development of the concept. My 
background is hence especially relevant in relation to normative evaluations about what 
SSR is and should be. However, in constructionist research, neutrality is neither a 
possibility nor an ideal. Although discourse analysis’ theoretical commitment of 
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discourse productivity is theoretical in nature, it also has a clear political and ethical 
significance. In explaining how a discourse produces the world, researchers can 
potentially denaturalize dominant forms of knowledge and question the practices they 
enable (Miliken 1999). Reflecting this, my thesis has a normative and political ambition 
to deconstruct taken-for-granted knowledge and expose the theoretical and philosophical 
foundation that the international donor approach to fragile and post-conflict states rests 
on.  
 
3.4 Evaluation criteria  
Academic research has traditionally been evaluated according to the criteria of reliability, 
validity and generalization (Kvale 1996). The criteria originated in quantitative science 
and rest on the premise that all knowledge is measurable. They moreover reflect a 
philosophical assumption about the possibility of achieving objective knowledge about 
the world. For these reasons, they have increasingly been challenged by the social 
sciences. This is particularly relevant to discourse analysis, which as a post-positivist 
project sees the distinction between theory and method as artificial. Thagaard (2003) thus 
instead proposes the criteria of credibility, confirmability and transferability for 
evaluating qualitative research.  
The criterion of credibility implies that the researcher should aim to make the 
research process as transparent as possible by exposing her philosophical presuppositions, 
theories and analytical strategies and discuss the choices made throughout the research 
process. By discussing how the analytical object is constructed and analyzed, I have 
aimed at letting the reader assess the theoretical and analytical choices I have made 
throughout the thesis. Moreover, by relying on official documents, referring to my 
sources and providing excerpts to support my arguments, I have made sure that the 
information I use is accessible and verifiable by others. This aspect also relates to the 
criterion of confirmability.    
 The criterion of confirmability refers to the extent to which others can confirm the 
findings of qualitative research (Thagaard 2003). Since constructionist approaches hold 
that all knowledge is situated and discursive, this criterion is not unproblematic. Does the 
multiple readability of texts mean that different analysts would come to the different 
conclusions were they working with the same selection of texts? Is any reading equally 
valid? According to Hansen (2006) this critique is misleading insofar as the methodology 
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of discourse analysis insists on readings based on explicit discursive articulations of signs 
and identities, and that careful analytical attention has to be paid to the linking and 
juxtaposing of signs, how they construct Selves and Others, and how they legitimize 
particular policies. If the analysis overlooks important signs, misinterprets the stability 
between signs, if it exaggerates or downplays the degree of difference between the Self 
and Other, or if it fails to identify the connection between identities and policy, then it 
makes a weaker reading (Hansen 2006:45).  
The criterion of transferability refers to the extent to which the results can be 
generalized and transferred to other contexts (Thagaard 2003). Human geography as a 
discipline demands a consideration of the spatial context in which political processes take 
place. Even though this thesis argues that context specificity is imperative in 
understanding social phenomena, I assert that my findings have value beyond the specific 
case in question. I believe that a theoretical approach that combines discourse analytical 
perspectives with critical geopolitics can be fruitful also for studying how geopolitical 
discourses structure broader social processes. Its strength lays in its ability to shed light 
on how discourses construct phenomena in different ways and how actors depend upon 
them as guides for social practice and as legitimizing mechanisms for political purposes. 
For this reason I see my findings as providing a starting point for other analysis.  
Having accounted for the thesis’ analytical approach, the next chapter will discuss 
the political and normative climate in the post-Cold War era, providing the backdrop and 
justification for the linking of security and development.  
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4 Contextualizing Security Sector Reform: a post-Cold 
War framework for international security assistance 
 
The fullest perspective on peacekeeping (…) is one which places it firmly in the context 
of international politics (James 1990:13-14, in Bellamy et al. 2010:13). 
 
As stated, security sector reform (SSR) is a relatively new and underresearched 
phenomenon. Aiming to investigate it as both a conceptual framework and a social 
practice, SSR has to be seen in connection to the broader context it is part of. This chapter 
will thus take a closer look at the context wherein the concepts and practices discussed 
through the thesis have emerged. Importantly, SSR reflects a post-Cold War approach to 
security and development and has become part and parcel of international peace 
operations. According to the UN Security Council it represents “(…) an essential element 
of any stabilization and reconstruction process in post-conflict environments.”13 This 
chapter will thus account for how the international approach towards security and 
development has changed in the post-Cold War era, starting with the role of peace 
operations in global politics.  
 
4.1 Peace operations in global politics  
Peace operations represent the international community’s most sustained attempt to work 
in an organized and multilateral fashion to reduce and manage armed conflict. As 
phenomenon they thus reflect trends and developments in global politics more generally 
(Bellamy et al. 2010). There is no absolute consensus about the role of peace operations 
in global politics, but all peace operations nevertheless reflect a desire to limit the scourge 
of war. Debates about what peace operations are for and what strategies peacekeepers 
should use, hence revolve around different conceptualizations of the causes and nature of 
violent conflicts, disputes about the relative value of state sovereignty and human 
protection, differences over the foundations of stable peace, and contending political 
priorities (Bellamy et al. 2010). For this reason, and even though the last decade did 
witnessed attempts to develop a common doctrine and strengthen the UN’s capacity, 
peace operations are best described as ad hoc responses to particular problems.  
 
                                                
13 www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/PRST/2007/3 (accessed 04.09.2009) 
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4.1.2 Traditional peacekeeping 
During the Cold War, the UN’s main security activity was known as “peacekeeping”, 
which required the consent of the parties involved and demanded strict neutrality 
(Heiberg 1994). Operations typically involved the deployment of a lightly armed military 
force to patrol neutral buffer zones or to monitor a cease-fire, and were strictly prohibited 
from intruding in the host nation’s domestic affairs by taking on responsibilities that were 
falling under the government of the host state. The mandate of the first major 
peacekeeping mission to Egypt in 1956 provided a template for future peacekeeping 
operations conducted in the Cold War era. It stated that the United Nations Emergency 
Force should “refrain from any activity of a political character in a Host State” and in no 
way “influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political 
balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict” (Regulations for the UNEF (1956) in Paris 
2004:14).  
The reason for this hands-off approach was multifaceted. The United Nations 
Charter and the legal basis for UN peacekeeping prohibited the organization from 
intervening in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.14 In addition, the 
parties to a conflict were normally not willing to accept a more intrusive role for 
international peacekeepers than limited tasks of monitoring cease-fires. The US and the 
Soviet Union were furthermore generally opposed to UN involvement in the domestic 
affairs of states belonging to their respective spheres of influence. Insulating allies and 
client states from outside meddling was a well-known strategy, and achieving a Security 
Council agreement for a peacekeeping mission was thus possible only when the strategic 
interests of the veto-wielding superpowers were not perceived to be threatened (Paris 
2004). In cases were internal conflict endangered the stability of client states the 
superpowers would typically prefer to deal directly with it as to better control the 
outcome. For the US this implied propping up friendly regimes, while the Soviet Union 
supported the building of socialist regimes. Last but not least, the ideological differences 
of the Cold War era left no space for the UN to promote any particular model of domestic 
governance within the borders of individual states. Even if the support for “democracy” 
was almost universally shared among the member states, there was a fundamental 
disagreement over the meaning of democracy itself. The narrow definition of 
                                                
14 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter (accessed 09.12.2009) 
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peacekeeping as a technical, ideologically neutral and predominantly military task was 
thus the direct outcome of the political and ideological conditions of the Cold War era.  
 
4.1.3 The Cold War security agenda  
Although located in the “periphery”, the Cold War’s bipolar world order had a massive 
impact on the so-called Third World countries as they were subjected to the superpowers’ 
geopolitical race for power and influence. Among the ways the East-West rivalry played 
itself out in developing countries was proxy wars and competing foreign aid projects. The 
objective of security assistance in this period was basically to garner support for the 
foreign and security policy objectives of the superpowers. Postcolonial states positioned 
themselves within these strategic relations and extracted aid by adopting, or pretending to 
adopt, structures based on the models promoted by one or the other of the contenders 
(Rubin 2010). 
Technical, financial and material support was usually delivered through the 
donor’s foreign or security ministries, and focused on transferring skills, weapons and 
other security-related equipment. In states of high strategic importance, the major powers 
also provided economic support, like balance-of-payments assistance, to reduce the 
burden of maintaining security services. This latter kind of support was more often 
directed through development assistance agencies (Ball and Hendrickson 2006). 
Democratic governance of the security sector in countries receiving security assistance 
was of little interest to the security-assisting donors, nor was it part of the Cold War 
development agenda. 
 
4.1.4 The post-Cold War political landscape  
As the Cold War was coming to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989, the East-West tensions declined considerably. With the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent shift towards political liberalization in Eastern Europe, the 
strategic priorities of the major powers started to shift. None of the former Cold War 
rivals were willing to maintain the levels of military and economic assistance to their 
allies and client states, particularly not in parts of the world like sub-Saharan Africa, now 
perceived to be strategically inconsequential (Duffield 2001, Paris 2004). As they started 
to disengage themselves from costly foreign commitments, earlier political restraints 
were lifted and more maneuvering space was offered for third parties to become more 
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directly engaged in security and development issues in countries that had been proxy 
battlegrounds for the superpower rivaling.  
The Cold War’s end presented the international community with serious 
challenges that again impacted on the practice of peace operations. While established 
international norms like the prohibition of external interference in domestic matters 
arguably had contributed to the prevention of interstate aggression, they had indeed 
produced other, less benign, consequences too:  
 
The concept of state sovereignty in security matters has often provided the rationale for 
creating powerful national military systems, justified budgetary policies that emphasize defense 
over domestic welfare, and encouraged measures that severely restrict citizens' rights and 
freedoms” (Commission on global governance 1995:2).  
 
As the superpowers pulled back, several African regimes lost the foreign aid and military 
support that had kept them in power for decades through doling out patronage and ruling 
with an iron fist. The military threshold for armed challengers to those regimes was 
consequently lowered and internal violence and brutal civil wars broke out as dormant 
ethnic tensions reasserted themselves and the regimes no longer managed to suppress 
internal dissent (Ulriksen 2006). This distinctive form of violent conflict reflected an 
ongoing erosion of the state’s monopoly on legitimate organized violence and came to be 
known as “new wars” (Paris 2004). These conflicts typically took place within states or 
were transnational in character, and the opposing sides often represented different 
nationalities living within one state. They were furthermore characterized by a new mode 
of warfare; intense brutality and deliberate targeting of civilians. In several instances rape 
and other serious human rights abuses were utilized as a weapon to traumatize civilians 
and destroy the social fabric of society (Solhjell 2010). These “state disintegration wars” 
often generated famines or occurred alongside natural disasters, creating complex 
emergencies. The demand for UN led multilateral peace operations therefore swelled 
with the end of the Cold War.  
 
4.1.5 Defining peace operations in the post-Cold War era 
Defining exactly what is implied by the term “peace operation” is a somewhat complex 
task, as it is a highly political activity and hence widely disputed. In 1992, the then UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued An Agenda for Peace.15 The report 
                                                
15 www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (accessed 10.06.2010) 
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conceptualized “peacekeeping” as one of several ways in which third parties might 
contribute to preventing, resolving and managing violent conflict and rebuilding of post-
conflict communities (Bellamy et al. 2010). The policy statement offered a new 
taxonomy of post-Cold War peace operations, since many of the UN missions conducted 
no longer fitted the traditional mould of peacekeeping interventions. The rapport 
differentiated between “peacekeeping” - which corresponded to the established principles 
and practices of traditional peacekeeping; “peace enforcement” - which resembled 
peacekeeping operations in many respects, but which were more heavily armed and 
authorized to use armed force for purposes other than self-defense; and lastly “post-
conflict peacebuilding” - which was defined as missions that would seek to “identify and 
support structures” that would tend to “strengthen and solidify peace” in the aftermath of 
“civil strife” (Paris 2004:18). Most subsequent definitions of peace operations tend to 
leave out the composition of the intervening force, since the mission’s composition does 
not determine its nature. They furthermore reject the idea that only the UN can conduct 
peace operations. Bellamy et al. (2010) hence defines peace operations as involving  
 
the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN 
authorization, with a mandate or program to: i) assist in the prevention of armed conflict by 
supporting a peace process; ii) serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation 
of ceasefires or peace agreements; or iii) enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the 
UN Security Council in order to build stable peace (2010:18). 
 
Peacebuilding, according to the same authors, furthermore involves the use of civilian 
agencies and NGOs in the reconstruction of policies, economies and societies. During the 
1990s, most of UN peace operations focused on post-conflict peacebuilding, which 
differed from traditional peacekeeping both in functional complexity and composition. 
New tasks and responsibilities were included, like disarmament of previously warring 
partners, destruction of weapons, restoration of order, repatriation of refugees, training of 
security personnel, monitoring of elections, protection of human rights, promotion of 
political participation and strengthening and reforming of government institutions (Paris 
2004). Unilateral clientelism was largely abandoned and the expansive function of these 
operations led to the involvement of a multiplicity of internal actors and external 
peacebuilding agencies that varied from one mission to the next. The short term goal of 
these peacebuilding interventions was to assist internal actors with stabilizing the peace 
process and preventing a relapse into conflict (negative peace), but the long term goal 
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was to support them in transforming the underlying causes of conflict, hence laying the 
foundation for a just social order (positive peace) (de Coning 2007, 2010). 
 
4.2 The impact of globalization on peace operations  
Explanations for the proliferation and transformation of peace operations are commonly 
external: new forms of warfare and targeting of civilians necessitated new and 
fundamentally different responses, and the post-Cold War political landscape provided 
the conditions needed for the implementation of such policies. But the operational 
activities of states and international organizations do nevertheless not occur in a vacuum. 
They are shaped by the normative and political climate in which they occur, and they in 
turn shape that climate (Johnstone 2010). The emergence of peacebuilding should thus be 
understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international 
conflict management system, and as reflecting an immediate post-Cold War optimism 
that collective third party peacebuilding could represent a new era of benevolent 
international intervention (de Coning 2010). The emerging of a “culture of protection”, 
the growing emphasis on democratic governance, development and poverty reduction has 
played fundamental roles for shaping the international security and development 
architecture. The following sections will account for some particularly influential norms 
and their impact on international peace operations.  
 
4.2.1 A culture of protection  
The post-Cold War climate’s perhaps most important impact on peace operations can be 
attributed to globalization. Globalization is an elusive concept, but can be defined as a 
process embodying a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and 
transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - 
generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction 
and the exercise of power (McGrew 2000:348). The spread of global communications on 
the one hand increased the awareness of violent conflict and humanitarian crises around 
the world, and on the other hand created a demand from civil society groups for the 
international community to assume greater responsibility for the protection of vulnerable 
populations (Bellamy et al. 2010:6).  
Starting in the early 1990s, the UN Security Council started to employ an 
expanding definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the 
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threshold for action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Johnstone 2010:193). The 
trend began with the Council’s declaration that the flow of refugees caused by Iraq’s 
repression of its minority populations represented a threat to international peace. The 
following Security Council-authorized interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti 
and Sierra Leone represented case-by-case responses to humanitarian crises that over the 
years contributed fundamentally to the evolution in applicable norms. 
As mentioned, peacekeeping operations grew in both number and scope during 
the last decade, and soon the Protection of Civilians became something close to a 
buzzword. The term was initially coined in 1998 by then UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan in his report The causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and 
sustainable development in Africa,16 in which he identified protecting civilians in 
situations of conflict as a “humanitarian imperative” (Vogt et al. 2008). The term drew on 
the construction of the civilian idea, of which the notions of distinction, restraint, non-
combatance and innocence are key elements (Lie and de Carvahlo 2009). The report 
reflected the recognition that new modes of warfare had made civilians the main casualty 
of war, not only due to collateral damage from being caught up in the fighting, but 
because they increasingly were deliberately targeted by warring parties. The Protection of 
Civilians accordingly aimed at establishing a robust normative framework for how to act 
in order to secure the protection of civilians in armed conflict and during post-conflict 
reconstruction. Rather than stipulating concrete actions or providing a once size fits all 
format, the aim of the term was to seek to nurture a “culture of protection” both in the 
drafting of peacekeeping mandates as well as in the execution of these. The Secretary-
General’s call for a “culture of protection” also brought about the development of a 
similar and related, yet distinct, term, namely “The Responsibility to Protect”. The term 
has its origin in the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention and is hence 
interventionist, in negation to the more ambiguous Protection of Civilians, which is 
meant mainly as a guide to how to act, not as a trigger on whether to act (Vogt et.al. 
2008:14).17  
 
                                                
16 www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/report.htm (accessed 03.06.2010) 
17 The Responsibility to Protect was endorsed in the World Summit in 2005, although in a watered-down 
language implying a right but no obligation to react to massive human rights violations. 
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4.2.2 Democratic governance and popular sovereignty 
The emergence of a “culture of protection” went hand in hand with a modification of 
state sovereignty. Especially after the Cold War’s end, sovereignty has increasingly come 
to be seen as a property of the “people”, not of the state. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights18 affirms that:  
 
The will of the people shall be the basis for the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures (in Joffe 1994:76). 
 
With the elevation of this declaration as the foundation for the post-Cold War liberal 
word order, it became a moral duty for the international community to protect the rights 
of poor and vulnerable people around the world, no matter what citizenship they hold. 
The signing of the Millennium Development Goals, seeking to make available the 
opportunities and benefits of globalization to all peoples, and to “create a shared future, 
based upon our common humanity in all its diversity”, further committed the UN member 
states to their “collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, 
equality and equity at the global level”.19 Liberal democracy has thus in the post-Cold 
War era come to be generally perceived as the most appropriate model for organizing 
human societies, or as the most legitimate form of governance.20 As a result, governments 
are now perceived to have sovereign power if they are legitimized through popular 
support, not because, as in the past, of their independence or administrative and 
legislative competence (Joffe 1994). The notion of a global humanity apparent in the UN 
declaration functions as a moral justification for a more hands-on approach to violent 
conflicts. In conjunction with this, the legitimacy of democracy promotion by 
international organizations was established. According to Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for 
Democratization21 the legal foundation for democracy promotion lies within the UN 
Charter itself (Johnstone 2010). 
Beyond facilitating “new wars” and creating a “global humanity”, the Cold War’s 
end furthermore brought about new and increasingly relevant non-state actors like NGOs 
                                                
18 www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed11.12.2009) 
19 www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm (accessed 11.12.2009) 
20 Fukuyama argued in “The End of History and the Last Man” that as mankind approached the 
millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning had left only one option for an 
ideology of potential universal validity - liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular 
sovereignty (Fukuyama 1992) 
21 www.un.org/en/events/democracyday/pdf/An_agenda_for_democratization%5B1%5D.pdf (accessed 
15.12.2009) 
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and warlords, who play important roles in maintaining or disrupting international peace 
and security. In combination, these factors functioned as a backdrop for and provided 
both supply and demand for the proliferation and transformation of peace operations.  
 
4.2.3 From a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian conception of peace 
operations  
The abovementioned developments had an enormous impact on security and 
development policies towards the countries in the South, and although there is no 
conclusive consensus about the role of peace operations in global politics, there are 
arguably more points of agreement today than at any time previously (Bellamy et al. 
2010). Generally speaking, conceptualizations of peace operations have tilted in favor of 
a post-Westphalian conception. In classical Westphalian terms, the primary function of 
peace operations is strictly to assist peaceful settlement between states. Internal political 
organization and relationship between state and society falls under the domestic affairs of 
the conflict ridden state, in which peacekeepers should not meddle unless it directly 
represents a threat to the international order. In contrast, the post-Westphalian conception 
suggests that in the long term, peaceful relations between states, depends on certain 
regimes and societies within states. The underlying assumption is that domestic peace and 
the way a state conducts its foreign relations is inextricably linked to the nature of its 
society and political system (Bellamy et al. 2010). Threats to international peace and 
security are thus not limited to acts of aggression between states, but might also result 
from illiberal governance and or violent conflict within states. The post-Westphalian 
view supports a moderation of state sovereignty, and takes on the ambitious task of not 
only maintaining order between states, but also promoting peace, security and societal 
reconstruction within states, in addition to protecting the local population. 
The basic idea of the post-Westphalian approach to peace operations holds that 
states emerging from war and conflict are best approached through the creation of 
domestic conditions capable of stabilizing and securing lasting peace. Although there in 
principle is no intrinsic reason for it, advocates of this view in practice have been 
committed to the creation of stable and lasting peace in war-shattered states through the 
building of liberal democracies (Paris 2004). The relationship between liberalism and 
peace has been extensively studied, and there is a general consensus about the finding 
that democracies rarely go to war against one another (Paris 2004, Rummel 1997). This 
tendency for liberal democracies to be more peaceful than non-democratic states is 
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known as democratic peace or the liberal peace thesis, and has become the conceptual 
foundation for contemporary peacebuilding. It is commonly argued that democracies 
foster the evolution of a social contract that lasting peace can be build upon and that 
democratic peace therefore is more just and more stable than autocratic peace (Hegre et 
al. 2001). As governments are freely chosen by their citizens and held accountable 
through periodic elections, they are more likely to promote the rule of law, respect 
individual and minority rights, cope effectively with social conflict or unrest, and respond 
to the needs of marginalized groups. The idea that runs through UN reports on peace 
operations is that strengthening democratic institutions has the effect not of doing away 
with all conflicts, but of ensuring that the natural conflicts of any society are resolved 
peacefully (Johnstone 2010). Through democratic processes, the people is given the 
ability to channel competing interests into “arenas of discourse” thereby reaching 
compromises which can be accepted by all participants in debates, hence reducing the 
risk of violent conflict (Hegre et al. 2001). 
The tension between the Westphalian and the post-Westphalian conception of 
peace operations reflects on the one hand the tension in the UN Charter over whether 
states or human beings should be the referent point for security policies, and on the other 
hand different concerns about legitimacy in peace operations (Bellamy et al. 2010). The 
adoption of a general strategy of democracy promotion in peace operations hence reflects 
a broader shift in post-Cold War international politics towards political and economic 
liberalization. According to Paris (2004), the commitment to the liberal paradigm reflects 
a historic shift in the global culture defining the formal and informal rules of the 
international system; which the principal and relevant actors in international politics are, 
how they should organize themselves internally and how they should act. The Western 
definition of democracy has been established in world politics, and the belief that 
liberalism promotes peace has been institutionalized. The stabilization realized under the 
current hegemony of neo-liberalism is thus practically unchallenged. The status quo has 
become naturalized and made into the way “things really are” (Mouffe 2000), paving the 
way for new policies such as security sector reform (SSR). The next section will explore 
the post-Westphalian approach to peace operations in more depth, by looking at the SSR 
paradigm. 
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4.3 What is security sector reform? 
Security sector reform (SSR) was first introduced to a larger public in 1998 in a speech 
by Claire Short, Britain’s first Minister for International Development in the Department 
for International Development (DFID) that was created by the Labour government in 
1997. The SSR concept was initially most welcomed in academic circles, but has grown 
increasingly influential among practitioners and policy-makers. The meaning of the term 
is still evolving as it is rapidly spreading throughout international discourses. Brzoska 
(2003) has argued that the popularity of the term indicated that the time was ripe for it. 
Security related issues had been on the development community’s agenda since the early 
1990s, although on an ad-hock basis, but the SSR concept was innovative in the sense 
that it organized the different donor approaches under an overarching objective, thus 
functioning as a conceptual umbrella.  
“Security sector” is a broad term used to describe the structures, institutions and 
personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a 
country.22 Its conceptualization can be understood in narrow or broad terms, but the 
internationally endorsed OECD DAC guidelines on SSR define the security sector as 
comprising: Core security actors (armed forces, police, gendarmerie, paramilitary forces, 
border guards, customs and immigration, intelligence and security services); security 
management and oversight bodies (the Executive, ministries of defense, foreign and 
internal affairs, national security advisory bodies, financial management bodies, public 
complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (the judiciary, justice 
ministries, prisons, prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, 
traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (liberation armies, private 
security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia) (OECD 2007). In broad terms, 
the security sector comprises all those responsible for protecting the state and 
communities within it. Other definitions would thus also include civilian representatives 
such as non-governmental organizations, civil society organization and the media. 
The UN lists five common features of effective and accountable security sectors: 
(i) a legal and/or constitutional framework providing for the legitimate and accountable 
use of force in accordance with universally accepted human rights norms and standards, 
including sanctioning mechanisms for the use of force and setting out the roles and 
responsibilities of different actors; (ii) an institutionalized system of governance and 
management: mechanisms for the direction and oversight of security provided by 
                                                
22 www.ssronline.org/edocs/SG report SSR.pdf (accessed 03.04 2009) 
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authorities and institutions, including systems for financial management and review as 
well as the protection of human rights; (iii) capacities: structures, personnel, equipment 
and resources to provide effective security; (iv) mechanisms for interaction among 
security actors: establishing transparent modalities for ordination and cooperation among 
different actors, based on their respective constitutional/legal roles and responsibilities; 
(v) culture of service: promoting unity, integrity, discipline, impartiality and respect for 
human rights among security actors and shaping the manner in which they carry out their 
duties (UNSC 2008:6). The UN holds that “no single model of a security sector exists” 
and that states and societies must define and pursue security according to their particular 
contexts, histories, cultures and needs. 
Security sectors are subjected to a constant and gradual process of transformation 
in response to changing needs and conditions. The term security sector reform however, 
implies a large scale and deliberate alteration of the security sector itself and its relations 
to society (Møller 2007). Caparini (2004) argues that SSR is to be understood as a 
comprehensive reform process with the aim of making the institutions responsible for 
protecting society more accountable to individual citizens and communities and more 
responsive to their security needs. It shall on the other hand ensure that the institutions 
become or remain effective and efficient in their providing of security (Bendix and 
Stanley 2008). OECD DAC’s SSR policy agenda is built on four main pillars: i) 
developing a clear institutional framework for providing security that integrates security 
and development policy and includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vulnerable, 
such as women, children, and minority groups; ii) strengthening the governance and 
oversight of security institutions; iii) building capable and professional security forces 
that are accountable to civil authorities and open to dialogue with civil society 
organizations; and iv) promoting the sustainability of justice and security service delivery 
(OECD DAC 2005, OECD DAC 2007). These interrelated challenges face all states, and 
SSR has thus in principle universal relevance. 
  
4.3.1 SSR’s normative framework  
The security sector reform (SSR) agenda extends way beyond the narrower focus on 
traditional security assistance to defense, intelligence and policing, but the aspect really 
distinguishing SSR from earlier models of security assistance is the normative framework 
informing it. SSR is concerned with the well-being and security of individuals and 
communities and has become prominent as a means to promote both human security and 
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human development. It moreover places security assistance within a framework of 
poverty reduction: “The overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure 
environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy” 
(OECD DAC 2005:16). The normative aspect is important for both the success of the 
concept itself and the legitimacy of SSR processes.  
 
4.3.1.1 Development and poverty reduction  
The dominant rationale for today’s development policy is poverty reduction, as reflected 
in the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals. Targets number 
one and three of the first Goal read: “Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than one dollar a day” and “Halve, between 1990 and 2015, 
the proportion of people who suffer from hunger”.23 The SSR agenda has an explicit 
normative and practical commitment to development and reform should be planned and 
implemented so as to maximize its contribution to development (Brzoska 2003).  
The initial connection drawn between the security sector and development was a 
fact when international development donors like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) started to condemn what they termed “excessive military 
expenditures” perceived detrimental to economic growth (Brzoska 2000). Their basic 
idea was that reduced expenditures in the security sector would release capital that could 
be relocated and invested to promote economic growth and poverty reduction - a so-
called peace dividend. Since it was recognized that there was no automatic link between a 
reduction in unproductive military expenditure and an increase in social spending, the 
issue was included in a broader good governance agenda. Based on that, donors began to 
encourage developing countries, also by the use of conditionality, to drastically reduce 
their military expenditures. Importantly, this initial approach stemmed from an economic 
rational. It did not aim to tackle the deep-rooted and highly political reasons underlying 
these peculiar resource allocations, but instead sough to provide a technical solution to it 
(Ball and Hendrickson 2006).  
Open conflict is furthermore one of the major causes of poverty. It has been 
recognized as one of the surest and fastest routes to the bottom of the Human 
Development Index table - and one of the strongest indicators for a protracted stay there 
(OECD DAC 2007). Collier et al. (2003) has found that countries tend to grow around 
                                                
23 www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml (accessed 04.03 2010) 
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2.2% slower during civil war than during peace, which accumulates to a 15% loss in GDP 
and an approximately 30% increase in the incidence of absolute poverty over an average 
civil war period of 7 years. Preventing violent conflict through the creation of a security 
sector able to manage conflict is hence seen as an investment in development itself. 
Thirdly, insecurity about personal security and the safety of property reduce confidence 
in savings and investments and hence inhibits economic growth. Enhanced security for 
individuals and societies on the contra heightens the incentives for investments and 
facilitates economic growth. Lastly, greater participation in decision-making is 
imperative to make any policy more pro-poor. In the security sector, traditionally 
dominated by military actors, the issue of civil oversight and control is especially relevant 
in this regard (Brzoska 2003). To sum up, a badly managed, abusive and autonomous 
security sector is conceived to hamper development and perpetuate poverty, and SSR 
therefore aims to create a security sector which is human centred and promotes 
development (Bendix and Stanley 2008). 
 
4.3.1.2 Democratic governance 
The concept of “good governance” emerged as an influential topic in the development 
community in the 1990s as part of the broader democratization debate. The role of the 
state was reassessed and focus was redirected from cost reductions and downsizing24 to 
reformation of the state and the ways that public goods were delivered (Smith 2001). 
Accountability and legitimacy of governments, and the role of the state as a sound and 
effective manager of resources were hence introduced as prerequisites for economic and 
political development and effective development assistance. The good governance 
agenda has been further developed by the UNDP, and today goes well beyond the initial 
“good economic management” to include an emphasis on the political and civic 
dimensions of governance (Johnstone 2010). Security sector reform has been 
incorporated in this broader good governance approach, and is founded on a strong 
commitment to consolidation of democracy, good governance and promotion of human 
rights (Hendrickson 1999). This notion is clearly enshrined in the UN’s approach to SSR: 
 
  (…) the United Nations continues to search for effective responses to address insecurity 
based on its Charter. Two related central themes have emerged. The first is that security, human 
                                                
24 Characteristic of the so-called “Washington Consensus” fronted by the IMF and the World Bank during 
the 1980s - a neo-liberal practice of structural-adjustment programs which comprised market liberalization, 
administrative reform, privatization of state-owned enterprises and rolling back of the state 
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rights and development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable 
peace. The second is the recognition that these fundamental elements can be achieved only within 
a broad framework of the rule of law (UNSC 2008:3).  
 
The document goes on to define rule of law as:  
 
(…) a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, including the 
State, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated and that are consistent with international human rights norms and standards (UNSC 
2008:5).  
 
SSR aims at establishing accountable and responsive states able to ensure the livelihoods 
and safety of their people. OECD DAC further emphasizes that they should “meet the 
range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic 
norms and sound governance principles, including transparency and the rule of law” 
(OECD DAC 2005:3). 
 
4.4 Procedural principles  
Whereas the sections above have accounted for the substantial elements inherent to the 
SSR framework, the following section will turn to the procedural principles that stipulate 
how SSR should be performed, and why these procedural principles matter. SSR is a 
comprehensive undertaking involving a multitude of internal and external actors. OECD 
DAC has in that regard enunciated that SSR should be seen as a framework to structure 
thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their 
populations through more integrated security and development policies and greater 
civilian involvement (OECD DAC 2005).  
 
4.4.1 Holistic approach   
Taking a broader approach to security makes it apparent that security sector problems are 
not fundamentally about the military, but more generally is a question of governance 
within states. This suggests that a narrow focus on professionalizing the armed forces at 
the expense of efforts to strengthen the rule of law or the role of civilians in managing 
and monitoring the security sector would be counter-productive and potentially 
dangerous (Hendrickson 1999). In a similar fashion, establishing a well-functioning 
police force able to enforce law and order would do little good for society if the penal 
system does not have the capacity to carry out criminal procedures. The SSR framework 
thus calls for a holistic approach encompassing all institutions of the security sector, 
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actors from civil society, oversight bodies and others. It is recognized that an effective 
reform of security institutions needs to encompass the different components of the 
security sector in an integrated fashion – all relevant stakeholders have to be included in 
the reform process and reform in different areas has to be sequenced and coordinated to 
function optimally (Bendix and Stanley 2008). Its implementation therefore not only 
requires close cooperation between relevant institutions in the recipient country, but also 
between the relevant bodies and government ministries in donor countries. This is 
commonly referred to as a whole-of-governance approach. 
 
4.4.2 Accountability and transparency  
Security agents commonly have a tradition of opaqueness and are often highly skeptical 
towards letting civilians into the security discourse. In post-conflict societies where the 
armed forces have been politicized and deployed against the civilian population it is 
especially important to establish civil oversight of the security agents. Only strong 
legislative input and oversight and activism from civil society and the press can provide 
the checks to prevent abuses from reoccurring (ICG 2009). To contribute to institutional 
capacity building, the SSR process should thus itself be carried out in accordance with the 
principles it seeks to establish, emphasizing accountability, transparency and democratic 
means. From the perspective of OECD DAC, SSR is a democratic project and a 
democratizing project. According to Nathan (2007:9) “It has technical components but it 
is not a technical endeavour and it is not simply concerned with making the security 
services more efficient and effective”. One of SSR’s main objectives is thus to ensure that 
governance of the security sector conforms to broader democratic norms.  
 
4.4.3 Local ownership and local context sensitivity  
There are a number of inherent dilemmas to SSR. Perhaps the most fundamental one is 
represented by the fact that the reform process is carried out under the supervision and 
guidance of external agents, whereas the outcome is supposed to reflect the security 
concerns of the local population. It thus follows that the reform process has to be firmly 
embedded in the local context. “Local ownership” or “national ownership” is part of 
standard development donor vocabulary and has been incorporated in the SSR paradigm. 
Local ownership of the reform process is seen as essential for two main reasons: First of 
all, experience has shown that lack of local involvement and commitment endangers the 
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success of the reform process when it comes to efficiency and sustainability. OECD DAC 
(2005) emphasizes that the most critical task facing countries embarking on a SSR 
process is to build a nationally owned and led vision of security. A nationally owned 
concept of security is the very foundation for the development of appropriate security 
system policy frameworks and the institutional mechanisms required to implement them. 
Central to this assumption is the idea that participation of local actors ensures that the 
process responds to the unique needs of the local context and therefore guarantees its 
quality. Local ownership of SSR is hence a prerequisite for the reform’s context 
sensitivity. It is also presumed that local ownership implies approval or at least 
acceptance of SSR, so that potential resistance and opposition to the process can be 
avoided, and recipient’s commitment to and trust in the security sector simultaneously 
enhanced (Bendix and Stanley 2008).  
The second aspect is connected to legitimacy. Sovereignty is considered the 
enabling concept of international relations and implies a double claim: autonomy in 
foreign policy and exclusive competence in internal affairs. The security sector is 
traditionally viewed as the symbol and upholder of the defining element of modern 
statehood - the monopoly on the use of legitimate violence. Given the central role of the 
security institutions in maintaining state power and controlling political and criminal 
violence, the transformation of them is an essentially political process (Luckham 2009). 
Because of its highly politicized nature, SSR has been a contested concept, especially 
among countries in the developing world, which trends to be skeptical of more intrusive 
interventions by the North in the South (Johnstone 2010). Local ownership is hence 
imperative to help relieve SSR of a possible perceived neo-colonial taint. It can justly be 
argued that SSR derives its legitimacy precisely from its normative foundations that 
differentiate it from earlier models of security assistance, and local ownership is certainly 
a cornerstone in that regard.  
The importance of building and assisting locally owned and led reforms is 
repeatedly enunciated in policy papers: The UN points to states as the central providers of 
security, as this is their “sovereign right and responsibility” (UNSC 2008:3) and OECD 
DAC emphasizes that “assistance should be designed to assist partner governments and 
stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining that path and 
leading them down it” (OECD DAC 2005:13). Assistance should hence be provided in a 
manner that enhance domestic ownership of the reform process and strengthen 
institutional frameworks and human capacity for managing the security sector in a 
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manner consistent of sound democratic governance practices. Dialog with relevant 
stakeholders and the integration of the security sector into governance planning and 
public sector management are essential steps in this process of capacity building (OECD 
DAC 2005). 
 
Model 1: Security sector reform  
Aim: Enhance state and human security. Make security institutions more accountable to 
individuals and communities. Facilitate democracy and development.  
 
Normative foundations:  Core security sector actors:  
Human rights  
Democratization  
Good governance  
Poverty reduction 
Military  
Police  
Penal system  
Intelligence 
 Other relevant actors:  
Legislature, NGOs, CSOs, media  
Violent actors 
Procedural principles: Local ownership, local context sensitivity, holistic approach, 
accountability and transparency  
 
4.5 Summary 
The break-up of the bipolar world opened up new maneuvering space to the international 
community, simultaneously demanding and allowing them a more hands-on approach in 
international conflict management. The Cold War’s end also represented a window of 
opportunity for revisiting the security agenda, reflected in a widened understanding of 
security and a shift from traditional peacekeeping to more comprehensive peacebuilding. 
Security sector reform is a post-Cold War phenomenon and a part of a discourse linking 
human and state security to development and poverty reduction. It represents a break with 
prior security assistance approaches in three important respects (OECD DAC 2005): first, 
security and development are perceived as mutually conditioned; second, it is concerned 
not only with state security but also human security; and third, it frames security as a 
broader governance issue. SSR should hence be understood as a normative, liberal and 
human centered framework for security assistance, aiming to enhance the state’s capacity 
to provide for the populations broader security needs in a democratic fashion and to 
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create conditions conducive to development and poverty reduction. SSR thus clearly 
reflects a post-Westphalian approach to peace operations. The holistic approach opens up 
a space for new non-military security agents, whereas the focus on partnership and local 
ownership is supposed to guarantee legitimacy and sustainability of the reform process.  
The next chapter will take a closer look at the so-called “security-development 
nexus” which has become principal in the debate on development assistance and 
international conflict management. The chapter will investigate how the conceptual 
linking of security and development has changed how local conflict, poverty, 
underdevelopment and state fragility are understood in an international context and 
responded to.  
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5 The Security-Development Nexus 
 
The most important reason why the development community should engage with security 
issues is that they are far too important to be left to security specialists alone (Luckham 2009:2).  
 
The nexus between development, peace and security has become principal in the debate 
on international conflict management since the mid-1990s, and their mutual conditioning 
lies at the heart of today’s international policy consensus (Duffield 2007). An important 
consequence of the merging has been that external agents have become increasingly 
engaged in institution building and state building, attempting to create stable 
environments for sustainable democratic peace. This chapter will focus on the emergence 
of the so-called security-development nexus and its impact on the international approach 
to fragile and post-conflict states. It will address certain issues in particular: the 
redefinition of concepts like underdevelopment, local conflict and fragile states in a 
globalized world. The chapter will focus on answering the question of how the merging 
of security and development has influenced Western donors’ geopolitical rational for 
engaging with fragile states. 
 
5.1 Bringing security into the development discourse 
Security sector reform (SSR) is a donor-driven concept, and was initially championed by 
the development assistance community. The UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) in particular took a leading role in shaping the international donor 
debate on SSR and its normative framework. Successful international lobbying has been 
reflected in the OECD DAC’s Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance 
(2005) and in the UN’s adoption of the concept, which emphasizes development and 
democratic governance of the security sector. During the Cold War, the development 
community generally refrained from getting involved in security-related issues and 
especially issues concerning the military. Security was equated with military security and 
the protection of the state, and development donors therefore mostly chose to turn a blind 
eye to war and insecurity, treating them as exogenous shocks which might disrupt 
development, but were not intrinsic to it (Luckham 2009). Over the last decade, however, 
donors increasingly started to recognize the ways in which the overall security 
environment contributes to or undermines development. The World Bank’s participatory 
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research Voices of the poor25 initially drew attention to poor peoples’ security concerns, 
shedding light on the poor’s disproportional suffering from insecurity. Poor and 
marginalized groups are the ones worst affected by violent conflict because it causes 
societal breakdown, impede economic growth, discourage foreign direct investment and 
domestic economic activity. In other words “wars kill development as well as people” 
(DFID 2005). The poor also suffer the most from direct forms of violence and physical 
abuse, be it from rebels or other armed factions, or security agents like the police or the 
army (Bellamy et al. 2010). Seeking to promote the wellbeing of the poor, it became 
increasingly harder for the development community to ignore the direct impact of 
insecurity on development.  
 
5.1.2 The Human Security agenda 
As alluded to, the Cold War’s end represented a window of opportunity for revisiting the 
security agenda. Perhaps the most striking outcome of this process was the radical 
transformation of the security concept itself, as this period witnessed the merging of two 
previously autonomous fields - that of development and security. The twin concepts of 
human development and human security contributed to the transformation of the narrow 
state centric conceptualization of security and played vital enabling roles in bridging the 
gap between the security discourse and the development discourse. The human security 
concept was first introduced in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report and aimed 
at complementing the already well-established concept of human development. The 
human development concept was innovative in that it recognized that growth in a 
country’s GDP not automatically lead to poverty reduction for the marginalized and 
instead insisted on a more holistic way of describing and measuring the multileveled 
aspects of poverty and development. The concept of human security combined two ideas; 
first, that threats to security not only included classical military threats, but also threats 
like hunger, ecological disasters or epidemics; and second, that the security of 
individuals, not the state, should be the main unit of concern in security policy (Brzoska 
2003:19). The concept of human security had an enormous impact on the security 
discourse. The focus of security policy was broadened from an almost exclusive focus on 
state security to include the well being of their populations and human rights (OECD 
                                                
25www.web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20613045~is
CURL:Y~menuPK:336998~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html (accessed 
16.12.2009) 
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DAC 2005). Through this process, security’s complementarity with development was 
established, paving the way for new policies in the interface of traditional security and 
development assistance.  
Born out of the security-development nexus, security sector reform (SSR) aims to 
establish a comprehensive conceptual framework for these practices and to provide them 
with a common vision - one of a security sector that guarantees human rights, promotes 
human development, contributes to democratization and helps reduce poverty (Brzoska 
2003). Looking at SSR policy documents, the link between security and development is 
made explicit:  
 
Security from violence is fundamental for reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and, more broadly, for sustainable economic, social and political 
development (OECD DAC 2004:2).  
 
Similar assertions are that “security is a vital concern for development” and that “where 
violent conflict breaks out, within or between countries, development is arrested” (OECD 
DAC 2004). Hence, the SSR framework and the broader security-development nexus 
hold as a core assumption that development is impossible without security and security is 
unsustainable without development (Duffield 2001).  
 
5.1.3 Redefinition of underdevelopment  
The merging of security and development has further implications than the 
acknowledgement of insecurity’s impact on development. If security and development 
are conceptually interlinked, it implicitly follows that insecurity and underdevelopment 
also are. When underdevelopment as a term originated in the development discourse 
during the 1970s, its meaning was mainly economic and political. It was seen as a 
condition created by unfavourable links to the developed world, and the solution to it as 
delinking from the capitalist system. Its interpretation has however undergone a 
transformation, especially since the Cold War’s end.  
Castells (1998) has made the argument that a ”Fourth World” characterized as 
”black holes of social exclusion” has arisen alongside contemporary globalization. In 
these excluded areas, a ”void of scarcity” leads to enhanced competition over resources 
and power, resulting in chaos and power struggles between different ethnic groups, clans 
and tribes, fighting to control the state. Competition over resources is hence constructed 
as the source of chaos, crime and conflict and the “breakdown of normative order”, and 
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the root cause of it is seen as stemming from a developmental malaise (Paris 2004). 
Clapham (1996) has on the other hand argued that “zones of statelessness” historically 
has coexisted with the “civilized” part of the world. In an increasingly globalized world, 
however, these ungoverned spaces have imposed themselves as issues that cannot be 
treated as isolated from the rest of the world. The reason is twofold. First of all, 
normative developments like the emerging of a “culture of protection” have established 
the protection of civilians as a humanitarian imperative, and the signing of the 
Millennium Development Goals has further committed the international society to tackle 
the root causes of violent conflict. Whereas this first reason is framed as a moral 
obligation to protect human security, the second reason is founded upon the notion that 
the security of people and the security of states are intrinsically connected. This idea is 
reflected in the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sergio Vieira de Mello’s 
speech Security for Peoples, Security for States, held in 1996: 
 
The narrow definition of security as it is applied to states is inadequate for present 
realities and therefore misleading. One must go deeper into the structure, into the ethnological 
strata, as it were, of states, and broaden the notion of security to include that of people. The 
security of states and the security of peoples are clearly intertwined, for the insecurity of peoples 
inexorably leads to the disintegration of states and to regional and international instability (OECD 
DAC 2004:2). 
 
The excerpt reflects a clear shift away from the tradition of seeing the state as the sole 
referent object for security, but the most important aspect is perhaps the suggestion of a 
casual explanation from one level to another. If people’s security is threatened, be it by 
military threats or “soft” threats like pervasive poverty or hunger, it follows that national 
and international security is endangered too. This assumption rests on a specific 
interpretation of “conflict”. Conflict could, in theory, be seen as productive, as sites of 
social transformation and reordering resulting in new types of legitimacy and authority. 
The international community tends, on the other hand, to see conflict as essentially 
negative. They are understood in terms of social regression and as having causes that 
mechanically lead to chaos and societal breakdown (Duffield 2001): 
 
SSR (…) is relevant to all partner countries. It is particularly important to those exposed 
to violent conflict (…). These countries need help to address their severe weakness in governance 
systems and civil society in order to prevent them from falling into – or relapsing into – armed 
conflict or state failure (OECD DAC 2004:3).  
 
 Consulting the SSR literature, various problems associated with places experiencing 
violent conflict are listed:  
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Related problems – such as trans-national crime and corruption, terrorism, the emergence 
of ‘war economies', arms and drug trafficking, and the illicit proliferation of small arms and 
weapons of mass destruction – pose increased threats to people, nations and international security 
(OECD DAC 2004:2).  
 
According to Fairclough (2000), the function of lists is on the one hand to associate 
different concepts with each other while on the other hand avoiding explaining the actual 
relations between them. The same is apparent in this list, as the mechanisms through 
which local conflict causes international drug trafficking or terrorism remains 
unexplained. In a globalized world, however, the local has become global. Ó Tuathail 
(1998) has argued that threats are diffuse and post-territorial in the contemporary world, 
and that state fragility is a general rather than regionally specific problem. Basically, what 
the excerpts reveals is an underlying fear of violent, underdeveloped and ungoverned 
spaces and their potential function as abodes for international crime and terrorism. The 
next section will account for the issue of state fragility in more depth, as the geopolitical 
aspect of the security-development nexus is elaborated on. 
 
5.2 The Geopolitical aspect of the Security-Development Nexus  
The security-development nexus holds as a central or hegemonic assumption that security 
and development are dependent on each other. The main threat identified within this 
nexus is underdevelopment. The notion of underdevelopment as a threat is fundamentally 
geopolitical since it rests upon the assumption that the developed world, or the West, is 
threatened by “the outside world”. The section will start by accounting for the 
construction of geopolitical identities, before it turns to how geopolitical visions guide 
states in their choice of foreign policies.  
 
5.2.1 Geopolitical identities  
Geographically, the West, the North, the First World or the developed world are 
customarily associated with the countries of North America, Western Europe, Australia 
and New Zealand, with Japan being classified as both First World and North, although 
clearly more East than West (Slater 2004). Globalization has brought with it an 
increasingly horizontal segmentation of the workforce in both rich and poor countries 
alike, into winners and losers from global capitalism. It has hence created new patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion that transcend the binary geographical division of global 
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economic space (McGrew 2000:354). It could thus be asked if the categories of First 
World/Third World, West/non-West and North/South26 are becoming increasingly 
obsolescent. In response to this, Slater (2004) has borrowed Derrida’s term “under 
erasure” to illustrate how these categories are questioned in an increasingly interrelated 
and globalized world, while at the same time retain a broad usage: The classification of 
three worlds of development dates back to the early 1950s, and the First world/Third 
World division is used even though the so-called Second World was dissolved with the 
end of the Cold War.  
 
5.2.2 Interrelations between the Self and the Other 	  
Processes of identity formation always occur somewhere and always occur relationally. 
As accounted for in the theoretical framework, subjects are ascribed meaning through 
processes of linking and differentiation, and identity is hence understood as socially 
constructed and contingent. Discourses are furthermore constructed in terms of binary 
oppositions where certain signs are granted primary identity in relation to secondary and 
subjugated others.  
Post-war modernization theory provided the West with its current identity, an 
identity that depended on a relation of difference with another time and another space to 
be effectively constructed (Slater 2004). The first differentiation was a separation in time 
- the contrast between a modern now and a traditional, backward past. This break in time, 
or temporal segregation (Nustad 2003), located Third World societies in a previous time 
and erased their co-presence in modern time. Second, there was a differentiation in space, 
separating the modern societies of the West from the traditional and hence pre-modern 
societies of Africa, Asia and Latin-America. The latter separation hence reflects a 
geopolitical distinction.  
Although based on the Western experience, modernization was conceptualized as 
a benevolent and universal process. The First World or the West was granted a primary 
identity in relation to the secondary non-Western Other, as modernization theory 
constructed it as a model of social progress for the world as a whole. Whereas the West 
was constituted as the primary, the internally independent and the universal, the Third 
World27 was perceived as constituted through the interrelated features of non-alignment, 
                                                
26 I will use the abovementioned terms interchangeable throughout the thesis 
27 The original meaning of the term is rooted in the notion of the ”Third Estate” – the dispossessed 
– current during the French Revolution 
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poverty and a colonized status (Slater 2004). Being the subject of imperial exploitation, 
the Third World was defined in terms of stagnation, hardships, inflammability and 
political instability. This negative portrayal of “traditional societies” was rooted in the 
geopolitical turbulence in the societies of the periphery. Few Third World countries went 
through the post-1950 period without revolution, military coupes to suppress, prevent or 
advance revolution, or some form of internal violent conflict. Hobsbawm (1994) has for 
this reason described it as “a worldwide zone of revolution – whether just achieved, 
impending or possible” (Slater 2004:6). However, problematically, the narrative ignores 
the history of colonial penetration and treats instability and conflict as inherent features of 
developing countries.  
From the initial focus on the positive diffusion of modern Western 
democratic ideals, practices and institutional arrangements, the fear of the Third World’s 
possible “communist subversion” brought about a re-focusing of priority to a subsequent 
concern with political order and institutional control (Slater 2004). According to Rostow 
(1971), modernization was thought to diffuse according to a stage-like trajectory of 
economic growth, but he also argued that the West’s political “global mission” was to 
reconcile liberty and order in the periphery. The meanings and practices of modernization 
should thus be seen as intimately connected to the geopolitics of intervention. 
 
5.2.3 The Third World threat  
The construction of the West’s geopolitical identity includes not just the positing of 
difference as inferiority but also as danger. The representation of the South in relation to 
instability, disorder and war has lent itself to a notion of the South as a threat. Already in 
the early 1970s the “Third World Threat” was discussed in relation to US foreign policy, 
and in the post-Cold War era, issues of immigration, organized crime, drug trafficking 
and terrorism have led to the perception of an “increasing Third World threat” to 
American and European interests (Duffield 2001, Slater 2004, Buur et al. 2007). This 
notion is mirrored in the following quote: 
 
The problems that dog Third World governments – building coalescent societies, winning 
legitimacy, and meeting the basic needs of citizens – will neither respect borders nor be quietly or 
easily resolved. In point of fact, it is a safe bet that the global agenda for the 1990s will be shaped 
largely by the imperative of responding to crises originating in the Third World (Northon 
1991:31). 
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In an increasingly global world, Luckham’s concept of ladders of (in)security is a useful 
metaphor for the multiple interconnections across national boundaries and spanning 
North and South. These ladders do not bridge neutral spaces - they span vast, but shifting, 
asymmetries in power and wealth, giving rise to different discursive constructions of 
security (Luckham 2009:8). It is against this background that terms implying an erosion 
of state capacity, such as “state weakness”, “state fragility” and “state failure”, have 
become important terms in security and development lingo. The term “fragile state”28 is 
essentially used referring to a state whose central government lacks control over 
significant parts of the territory and is unable to fulfill key functions associated with a 
modern state like providing security, safety and law and order. In a more development-
oriented language, fragile states can be defined as states where the government 
 
cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of the people, including the poor. 
The most important functions for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, 
capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services and the ability to protect and 
support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves.29  
 
According to Wyler (2008) most countries in the developing world fall along this 
spectrum, as they exhibit at least some elements of weakness. Because fragile states lack 
effective control of their territory, they are commonly states that have been or currently 
are the sites of violent conflict. Such states may thus also be called “ungoverned spaces” 
or seen as the concrete manifestation of “underdeveloped spaces”.  
 
5.2.4 Geopolitical visions and the practice of state-building: the 
construction of sovereignty for security 
It can be argued that any discussion of threats to order and stability must be linked to 
discourses of identity and difference (Slater 2004). Geopolitical visions are defined as 
“any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, involving feelings 
of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or 
foreign policy strategy” (Dijink 1996:11). As stated, contemporary political theory 
portrays the West as the primary haven of democracy, economic development, human 
rights and enlightened thought. Following the constructionist school however, identities 
as “democracy” or “developed” are not intrinsic; they are constructed as privileged 
                                                
28 The term most commonly used by the development community. I have chosen to use this term 
since it is somewhat broader than the term “failed state”, which is favoured in foreign and 
security policy circles 
29 www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/fragilestates-paper.pdf  (accessed 20.01.10) 
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identities through a process of linking and differentiation, and situated within a 
construction of temporal and spatial difference (Hansen 2006). Foreign policy makers 
aim to construct a link between policy and identity that makes them appear consistent 
with each other and legitimate to the relevant audience. This process might be thought off 
as a system of equilibrium where identity and policy is constructed by mutually adjusting 
the two. Identity and foreign policy are hence seen as ontologically interlinked: it is 
through the discursive enactment of foreign policy; the performance of it, that identity 
comes into being (Hansen 2006).  
Remembering Lacleu and Mouffe’s discourse theory (2001), subjects seek after 
and “find themselves” through discourse. Discursive identity thereafter provides the 
subject with specific guidelines for action. As stated in earlier chapters, the liberal 
discourse has become hegemonic in contemporary global politics, including the approach 
to fragile and post-conflict states. It hence functions as repertoire guiding Western states 
in the formation of national identity and choice of foreign policy. The United Nations’ 
influential report An Agenda for Development30 insists on a mutually reinforcing dynamic 
between peace and development. It argues that peace is the foundation and a fundamental 
element of development and that economic and social development is of crucial 
importance for securing lasting peace. The report thereby categorizes countries in conflict 
as countries in need of development (de Carvalho & Sciha 2008). This idea has 
fundamental implications for the post-Cold War approach towards fragile states: Since 
states in a globalized world cannot isolate themselves from threats originating in other 
states, it follows that they effectively have to create development abroad to achieve 
security at home (Andersen 2006). Because underdevelopment is seen as representing a 
threat to both the local populations’ human security and to international state security, 
development is an investment in both. Duffiled (2007) hence uses the term “enlightened 
self-interest” to refer to practices related to the security-development nexus.  
Although the security-development nexus is concerned with both human 
development and human security, this does not imply a departure from the basic 
assumption that states are the fundamental units in international politics. According to the 
liberal peace thesis, peaceful relations between states are best guaranteed by stable 
democratic regimes within states. Liberal democracies are furthermore expected to 
promote economic and social development within their borders. The underlying idea is 
                                                
30 www.un.org/Docs/SG/agdev.html (accessed 15.01.2010) 
 66 
that whereas democratization will shift violent societal conflicts into peaceful political 
competition, marketization will help reduce tensions by enhancing human wellbeing 
through the creation of sustainable economic growth. Criticizing the liberal peace thesis, 
Huntington’s main argument in Political order and changing societies (1968) was that 
the process of modernization has a destabilizing effect in itself, and that Third World 
Countries’ essential problem was the failure of political institutions to keep up with the 
pace of economic and social change. Instability and political disorder was hence not 
caused by the absence of modernization, but rather the efforts to achieve it. The global 
diffusion of modernization hence paradoxically increased the prevalence of violence 
(Huntington 1968). Huntington’s book remains an influential contribution to the 
peacebuilding discourse. His thoughts are reflected in Paris’s (2004) arguments that 
fragile and post-conflict states are poorly equipped to handle the societal tensions 
associated with the transition from conflict to market-democracy. Paris’ argument is that 
it is not the desire to transform war-torn states into market democracies that is 
peacebuilding’s essential problem; rather, it is the methods used to effect this change 
(Paris 2004). He proposes the adoption of a strategy called Institutionalization before 
liberalization, and argues that peacebuilders should “delay the introduction of democratic 
and market-oriented reforms until a rudimentary network of domestic institutions, 
capable of managing the strains of liberalization, have been established” (Paris 2004:7). 
According to Paris’ strategy, the democratization and marketization process should only 
be initiated through a series of deliberate and externally managed steps, after these 
institutions are in place.  Peacebuilders’ most immediate task should thus be the building 
of robust governmental institutions.  
Mirroring both Huntington’s and Paris’ ideas, the international donor community 
has incorporated institutional capacity building, democracy and the rule of law into the 
practice of peacebuilding, as they are perceived as the remedy through which effective 
and legitimate governance can be obtained in fragile and post-conflict states (Andersen 
2006, Bellamy et al. 2010). The source of state fragility is believed to be “bad 
governance” - meaning ineffective and illegitimate governance. According to the United 
States Agency for International Development’s Fragile States Strategy 
 
Effectiveness refers to the capability of the government to work with society to assure the 
provision of order and public goods and services. Legitimacy refers to the perception by 
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important segments of society that the government is exercising state power in ways that are 
reasonably fair and in the interests of the nation as a whole (my emphasis added). 31 
 
States where both effectiveness and legitimacy are weak are expected to be especially 
vulnerable to internal conflict, instability and state fragility. OECD has in keeping with 
the reasoning of the liberal good governance paradigm advocated that state-building 
should be the central objective for international engagement in fragile states. State 
building is understood as the creation of new governance institutions and the 
strengthening of existing ones. Because the aim is to make states more effective agents of 
control over their own territories and population, Rubin (2010) has referred to this 
reformative practice as “constructing sovereignty for security”. This policy approach 
towards fragile states emphasizes the need for prioritizing and focusing assistance to the 
basic security and justice functions of the state, paving the way for policies like security 
sector reform (SSR). It hence follows that SSR is part of a liberal state centric discourse 
founded upon the universal appropriateness of “Weberian” statehood. This is reflected in 
the UN’s guide to SSR,32 which enunciate the state’s sovereign right and responsibility to 
provide for order and security. 
Geopolitical visions, understood as the translation of national identity into models 
of the world, enable states to define their interests in the world, potential threats and 
feasible responses (Dijkink 1996). They hence provide geopolitical subjects with 
guidelines for geopolitical practices. As accounted for above, the West’s identity as 
democratic, developed and enlightened, is contrasted with the Outside world as a 
traditional, volatile and underdeveloped Other. The West’s elevated status in relation to 
the Outside world on the one hand causes the Third World to be seen as a threat and on 
the other hand invoke an idea about the West’s civilizing mission. This mission is 
expressed through the Western foreign policy strategy, and includes large-scale attempts 
to “stabilize the periphery” through the promotion of liberal ideas and democratic states. 
Geopolitical identity hence functions as the foundation for and the product of foreign 
policy (Hansen 2006), and as fragile states have been identified as particular threats to the 
West, they have become the main targets of international security and development 
assistance.  
 
                                                
31 www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdfn (accessed 20.01.10) 
32 www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/MUMA-7BT9VE?OpenDocument  (accessed 
02.10.2009) 
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5.3 The Security-Development nexus as an Order of Discourse 
Having accounted for the geopolitical aspect of the security-development nexus, this 
section will proceed by investigating it as an order of discourse. Fairclough (1995) uses 
the term order of discourse to refer to the limited number of relevant discourses that 
compete over the construction of meaning within a specific domain. As stated, the 
security-development nexus rests on the assumption that development and security are 
interlinked, and sees underdevelopment as a geopolitical threat which should be 
responded to in a certain way. Going beyond the macro level however, the security-
development nexus reveals itself as a field of discursive conflict where different 
discourses compete over meaning and strategies. It would thus be a mistake to interpret 
the geopolitical approach towards the Third world as uniform and consistent. Even if 
policies are founded upon the liberal peace thesis and react to the same security 
environment, interventions consist of different agents operating with different rationales 
and methods (Rubin 2010). This understanding is pertinent because it enables a more 
refined analysis of the approach towards fragile states from the formulation of policies to 
the actual implementation and the outcome that is produced on the ground.  
The security-development nexus establishes state-building as the bedrock of the 
international approach towards fragile and post-conflict states. Taking this geopolitical 
prescription as a starting point, the thesis will proceed to identify different discourses 
within the SSR paradigm. The following sections will analyze how they construct the 
relation between security and development and how international actors should respond 
to the issue of state fragility. The thesis draws from the Copenhagen School of security 
studies as the discourses within the order of discourse are organized as politicized and 
securitized. 
 
5.3.1 Competing discourses within the SSR paradigm 
As argued throughout the thesis, security sector reform (SSR) is a holistic state-of-the-art 
term in the international donor community which joins together related concepts such as 
peacebuilding, governance and public sector reform, previously pursued as separate 
efforts. SSR is a highly ambitious concept involving a wide range of agents, and its 
objectives are thus inevitably not without inherent contradictions. Previous sections have 
hinted at these frictions, and they shall now be elaborated and analyzed in more depth. 
The main friction, as I see it, exists between a discourse that prioritizes the oversight and 
 69 
control over security forces, and one that prioritizes the provision of physical security 
(Brzoska 2003). I will call them the good governance discourse and the security first 
discourse, and I see them as politicized and securitized accordingly. 
The security first discourse emphasizes the provision of physical security and 
constructs this aspect as a precondition for any advances in the direction of creating 
social and economic development or building civil capacity for oversight. The majority of 
SSR undertakings take place in volatile post-conflict settings where both time and 
resources are limited. When pressed to choose, advocates for the security first discourse 
would prioritize the strengthening and professionalization of the security sector, even if it 
is unclear whether effective civil oversight exists or not (Brzoska 2003). This discourse 
centers on security and is principally associated with the military and other agents 
belonging to the security community, hereunder certain states in particular. 
 The good governance discourse on the other hand identifies security agents like 
the police or the armed forces as major sources of insecurity in themselves, and hence 
prioritizes the strengthening of democratic governance and civil oversight and control 
over the security sector. According to this view, SSR is the quintessential governance 
issue (Luckham 1998, Ball 2006), as a police or army reform separated from the 
strengthening of governance capacity is likely to fail to produce the desired outcomes of 
enhanced human security and economic, social and political development. The good 
governance discourse rests on the liberal peace thesis, and is generally associated with the 
so-called development community and especially international institutions such as the 
UN and OECD.  
 
5.3.2 The complexity of identity – otherness, difference and the 
construction of Selves 
Having sketched out the two main contending discourses within the SSR paradigm, this 
section will investigate the process of identity construction. Since identity is produced 
through and constitutive of foreign policy, the process of identity construction is situated 
at the ontological and epistemological center of discourse analysis in foreign policy.  
David Campbell argues in Writing security (1998), that states need to articulate 
threats and radical Others to construct their identities. There is hence a drive within the 
ontology of national identity for constructing difference as radical Otherness. Threats, 
danger and deterrence is however not the only modality through which states meet the 
world. Viewing identity in foreign policy in a simple Self-Other duality hence represents 
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a limiting approach that would fail to shed light on important aspects of foreign policy, 
including diplomacy, peacebuilding and SSR. As argued earlier, the construction of 
identity is not accomplished through the designation of one particular sign for the Self or 
Other, but rather through the situation of this sign within a larger system of resemblance 
or difference. This implies that the construction of “the Third World” or “the South” as 
different from “the First World” or “the West” does not create much meaning unless it is 
situated within a discourse that links “the Third World” to a chain of interlinked terms 
such as underdeveloped, primitive, irrational and violent, and differentiate it against a 
developed, civilized, rational and controlled “Western” identity (Hansen 2006). Stepping 
beyond the classical security discourse, it is hence necessary to adopt an analytical 
perspective that allows for degrees of Otherness. The following analysis will seek to map 
out discursive differences between the security first and the good governance discourse 
by analyzing identity as spatially, temporally and ethically situated.  
 
5.3.3 Identity as a spatial, temporal and ethical construct  
Space, time and responsibility are the fundamental concepts through which all political 
communities are thought and argued. All foreign policy discourses construct relations 
between Selves and Others based on these categories, and the overriding goal of foreign 
policy discourse is to articulate them in such a manner that they draw upon and reinforce 
each other (Hansen 2006). While the discursive strive for stable links between them are 
constant, there is always more than one possible constellation. Taking each of the three 
dimensions in turn, I will analyze how the good governance discourse and the security 
first discourse construct the same signs to different effects. 
To understand identity as spatially constructed implies an understanding of 
identity as relationally constituted, thereby involving the construction of boundaries and 
the delineation of space. Historically, the delineation in foreign policy discourse has 
centered on the nation state, abstractly through the privilege granted to national security 
and concretely through the construction of particular identities of other states, regions and 
peoples (Hansen 2006:47). The security first and the good governance discourse both 
construct underdevelopment as a problem that has to be dealt with, and fragile states as 
the space for intervention. As such, the fragile state is constituted as the Other, as an 
entity which is conceptually different from and located outside of the Self. It is hence 
both a territorial and a political identity.  
 71 
The notion of the Self in the security first discourse is defined as a national Self in 
relation to the Other as a threat, invoking a national security discourse. The operating of 
the security first discourse is particularly present in the US interest in state fragility, 
which has become increasingly substantial since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11, Fukuyama (2004), among others was central in arguing that 
problems related to state fragility far from being local construed as a serious international 
security issue. American foreign policy discourse articulates fragile states as “safe 
havens” harboring US national security threats. Reflecting this tendency, former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has emphasized how weak and failing states pose 
“unparalleled” danger to the United States, serving as “global  pathways” that facilitate 
the movement of criminals and  terrorists” and “proliferation of the world’s most 
dangerous weapons” (Wyler 2008:5).  
The articulation of the Other is however not uniformly the state in question, and it 
is not constructed as a radical enemy which should be eliminated. As part of the 
construction of “fragile states” as radically different from Western states, a destabilizing 
fragmentation of the Other is evident in that the local population tends to be defined as 
victims of repressive regimes and violent armed factions. A recurrent notion is one of 
fragile states as threats to “poor people”, “women” and “civilians” – locals threatened by 
the fragile state and in need of protection. The term “spoilers” is furthermore frequently 
used referring to various groups such as government officials, soldiers or rebellions, 
which are hostile to or do not cooperate with the state building agenda as they see 
themselves as better off with the current situation. The Other is hence a fragmented 
construct, which is seen as constituting a threat to both international security and the local 
populations’ security. 
In the good governance discourse, the Self is constructed as the international 
community. The dominant notion of the Other is on the other hand “the locals”; the 
population in the state of intervention.  
 
Development agencies cannot ignore the impact that security threats at all levels – local, 
national and global – have on poor people. At the same time, the world community cannot ignore 
the critical role of poverty and inequality in increasing risks for us all. We need to ensure that, as 
an international community, we make progress on both security and development (DFID 2005:8) 
(my emphasize). 
 
The notion of the Self as “the international community” is interesting because it depicts 
the good governance discourse as a universal discourse. As such, it does in principle 
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articulate the Self as a boundless political subject. I have, however, argued that identity 
always is relationally constituted, and the construction of policies to be undertaken “to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals” or “in defense of universal human rights” is 
indeed made in response to the violations of these rights. It can therefore justly be argued 
that the good governance discourse also constructs particular political subjects, such as 
fragile or undemocratic states, as the Self’s opponent. The discourse is nevertheless more 
human centered than the security first discourse: The fragile state is identified as the 
target for assistance and intervention, but the policy is aimed at enhancing the local 
population’s safety and well-being, and also protecting international values such as 
democracy and human rights. 
As a universal discourse, the good governance discourse constitutes spatial as well 
as temporal identities. Temporal schemes such as development, transformation, 
continuity, change, repetition or stasis are crucial in the construction of identity in foreign 
policy discourse, and discourses can be classified based on political, religious, 
civilizational or other forms of progress on the one hand and intransience on the other 
(Hansen 2006:48). One might therefore ask how the temporality of the Other is 
constituted in relation to the temporality of the Self. In the good governance discourse, 
fragile and underdeveloped states are articulated as objects with a different temporal 
identity than the Self, as located behind it on the temporal scale. The idea of the Other as 
temporally progressing towards a superior Self is also central in the discourse: 
 
OECD government strategies to help developing countries reform their security systems 
can provide a critical step on their path towards democracy and the protection of the people and 
the state (OECD DAC 2004:6).  
 
The notion of progress towards a Western ideal is blatant in this SSR policy excerpt. It 
reveals an underlying developmental ambition in that it portrays the underdeveloped 
Other as capable of liberal political transformation, although clearly in need of “a push” 
from the West. The notion of fragile states having different temporal identities than the 
Western Self is shared by the security first discourse. Both discourses operate on the 
assumption that the Western modern state represents the standard against which fragile 
states should be measured. Against this ideal, fragile states are perceived as “lacking 
capacity” to control and govern its territory, society and population. The role of the Self 
in both discourses is hence constructed as a helper or facilitator of the transformation of 
the Other into an almost-Self (Hansen 2006).   
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The transformation of the Other is in the good governance discourse constructed 
as falling within the moral responsibility of the Self. It is a compassionate response to 
human suffering and an act of solidarity:  
 
Development co-operation is one way that people from all nations can work together to 
address common problems and pursue common aspirations. Sustainable development expands the 
community of interests and values necessary to manage a host of global issues that respect no 
borders (…) (OECD 1996:6).  
 
The spread of liberal values such as democracy, human rights, gender equality and good 
governance, is constructed as part of the Self’s ethical identity. This specific set of values 
are advocated by international organizations like the UN and OECD, but the agents 
belonging to the good governance discourse interestingly enough tend to understand 
themselves as de-politicized helpers facilitating the implementation of universal values 
(Friis 2010). This point is remarkable, since the strengthening of state institutions and 
capacities hardly can be perceived as anything but political. SSR, in addition, explicitly 
seeks to transform the society’s power relations by professionalizing the security agents 
and subjecting them to civilian oversight and control. In such a process, some people will 
gain power and influence, while others will loose theirs. It is hence an inherently political 
activity (Stanley 2008).  
The security first discourse is more national security oriented than the good 
governance discourse, and the construction of the Self’s responsibility is hence mainly 
applicable towards the national body politics. The construction of fragile states as 
international threats invokes a moral force of protecting the national Self. According to 
the security first discourse, it is in the national interest of the US or any other western 
state to target state fragility. The notion of a moral obligation to protect the locals are to 
some degree apparent, but it is basically founded upon the perception of poverty and 
human rights abuses as long term risk factors associated with terrorism and radicalization 
of groups: 
 
Attempting to draw neat, clean lines between our security interests and our democratic 
ideals does not reflect the reality of today's world. Supporting the growth of democratic 
institutions in all nations is not some moralistic flight of fancy; it is the only realistic response to 
our present challenges (Rice 2005). 
 
The ethical dimension to the construction of the Self in the security first discourse is 
hence first and foremost the stabilization of fragile states to protect national security, and 
secondly, to protect the local population.  
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5.4 How geopolitical visions affect the rules of the game 
The security first and the good governance discourse share conceptual terrain, as they 
coexist within the donor community’s hegemonic approach to fragile states. The previous 
section has investigated which Selves and Others and the degrees of Otherness that are 
constructed in the security first and good governance discourses. The discourses 
articulate specific spatial, temporal and ethical identities and focus on different aspect of 
the Other. As a result, they construct different geopolitical rationales for engaging in 
state-building in fragile states. The discursive struggle is essentially about the definition 
of the geopolitical situation; whether underdevelopment and state fragility should be 
conceptualized and responded to as a threat, and whether it represents a threat to Us or to 
Them. This friction is visible in the internal struggle over the priorities and “rules of the 
game” of state-building.  
 
5.4.1 Security First as a securitized discourse 
Within the security-development nexus as an order of discourse, the signs 
underdevelopment/state fragility and security hold central positions in competing 
discourses, but their meaning and hence effect, depend on the specific discourse. Within 
the “security first” discourse, underdevelopment is a fixed moment. It is seen as a source 
of instability, chaos and unrest. As such, underdevelopment is constructed as an 
international security threat and as representing a threat to the local populations’ security. 
Security is thus the nodal point which the other signs crystallize around:  
 
Security for “Us (the United States), Them and the World” should be the guiding 
principle of US foreign policy, trumping democracy, in the event of conflict (Kuok 2008:1405). 
 
The argument draws on Etzioni, a profiled American intellectual and former Senior 
Adviser to the White House. The article it is taken from is written in support of his basic 
idea that a “security first”, rather than “democracy first” approach to fragile states 
provides a better outcome for democracy to take root in. They hence follow Huntington’s 
(1968) view in that order, authority and institutional control should precede 
democratization. Because meaning in the security first discourse is structured around 
security, it represents a securitized discourse. As indicated above, the ethical 
responsibility of the Self is principally constructed around the protection of national 
security, but there is also a notion of responsibility to protect segments of the local 
population that are being targeted by the Other in question. Security is hence a floating 
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signifier, which interchangeably refers to “international security” and the local 
populations’ “physical security”: 
 
Security refers to basic security, that is, the conditions under which most people, most of 
the time, are able to go about their lives, venture onto the street, work, study, and participate in 
public life (politics included), without acute fear of being killed or injured (Etzioni 2007:2).  
 
The meaning of security is thus conceptualized in a narrower sense than in the good 
governance discourse where the term is more oriented towards broader social security, 
encapsulating human rights and development aspects. Insofar as a certain level of 
economic security is included in the security first definition, it is due to its potential effect 
on physical security: 
 
It makes sense to include within basic security a certain level of economic security, 
because a failure to achieve this could have consequences as dire as the lack of physical security 
(such as if people are dying of starvation). The difficulty, of course, lies in ensuring that 
economic security is not so widely construed that it goes beyond subsistence. A development-first 
foreign policy, like one based on democracy first, is unrealistic in the short term and 
counterproductive insofar as it detracts from achieving security, which must precede development 
(Kuok 2008:1435).  
 
The excerpt effectively argues that “if we do not tackle insecurity first, everything else 
will be irrelevant”. This is a securitizing move, and clearly reveals the structuring impact 
of security on the discourse. Although democratization is regarded as a positive 
development, security should take absolute priority and democratization should only be 
gradually phased in after security has been established. Democratization is thus reduced 
to the means to an end; firstly, as an investment in international security, and secondly, to 
the protection of the local population’s physical security.  
By “speaking security”, an actor claims the right to break the normal political 
rules of the game and handle the issue through extraordinary means. “Security” is thus 
according to the Copenhagen School a self-referential practice, because it is in this 
practice that the issue at hand becomes a security issue – not necessarily because it 
represents a real existential threat, but because it is presented as such. Securitization is 
furthermore understood as the construction of a shared understanding of what is to be 
understood as a threat and collectively responded to as such (Buzan et al. 1998). The 
“remarkable consensus” that has emerged among Western governments on framing 
diverse issues like terrorism, organized crime, human rights violations, migration, 
poverty and violent conflict in a discourse of state fragility (Andersen 2006), shows that 
the articulation of fragile states as an international security issue has been a powerful 
 76 
securitizing move. Underdevelopment and state fragility have been constructed as threats 
to us, the West, to our security, something which has changed the geopolitical rational for 
donor engagement in fragile states.  
 
5.4.2 Good governance as a politicized discourse 
The good governance discourse also sees underdevelopment/state fragility as a threat, but 
in contrast to the security first discourse not primarily in relation to international security. 
Within the good governance discourse fragile states are understood as limited threats to 
state security; as states that “cannot or will not deliver core functions” to the poor, hence 
principally representing a threat to its inhabitants’ security. Security is thus not perceived 
as the main structuring sign, or as the nodal point, but is rather fixed as a moment. The 
meaning of security is broader defined than in the security first discourse, encompassing 
human rights and social and economic dimensions in addition to physical security. 
Underdevelopment is hence not primarily understood as a security threat, but as a moral 
and political issue. The nodal point within this discourse is democratic governance. The 
Self is understood as the international community, and the ethical dimension to this 
identity centers on the protection of universal rights and the transformation of the Other 
into a democratic almost-Self. The good governance discourse can thus be understood as 
a politicized discourse. It frames underdevelopment and state fragility as issues falling 
within the realms of public or other communal policy,33 requiring government decision 
and resource allocation (Buzan et al. 1998). Such a framing affects the strategy towards 
the perceived geopolitical threat in a different way than in the security first discourse. The 
following sections will elaborate on the discursive struggle between the security first and 
the good governance discourse.  
 
5.4.3 Discursive struggle over the rules of the game 
The term interdiscursivity refers to exchange between discourses – how borders between 
discourses move when fixed moments from one discourse enter another (Jørgensen and 
Phillips 1999). The development community’s insistence that insecurity matters for 
development has increasingly brought (in)security and violent conflict into the 
development discourse. As part of this process, security was rearticulated as a broader 
concept than the traditional definition centered on the state, military means and the 
                                                
33 In this case also within the international community’s realm  
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provision of physical security. The new human-centered concept of human security 
moved the borders between the security and development discourse by producing a 
common ground for interaction and intervention. 
The construction of security and development as inextricably linked, brought 
about several important changes. The construction was in many ways a tactical attraction 
for the development community, since development’s relation to security contributed to 
enhancing its perceived importance in international politics. Development went from 
being about “doing good”, to being constructed as an important aspect of foreign policy 
agenda. The re-articulation of security can hence be understood as an attempt to 
“positively securitize” underdevelopment, so to speak, to attract more resources to 
classical development activities like poverty alleviation, reconstruction and capacity 
building. As part of this re-articulation however, the borders between security and 
development became increasingly blurred. Underdevelopment existed as a fixed moment 
in the development discourse, referring to various aspects of deprivation and human 
suffering. It was, however, rearticulated as a threat and securitized as it entered the 
security discourse. The conceptualization of (under)development as a security issue 
furthermore caused fragmentation of the traditional division of labor between traditional 
security and development agents, reflected in notions such as the comprehensive “whole 
of government” approach and the “3Ds” of security - defense, diplomacy and 
development. 
The blurring of distinctions between security and development has not been 
unproblematic. The security community’s increased involvement in traditional 
development activities in places such as Afghanistan has been heavily criticized as a 
“mission creep” by NGOs who argue that the military’s use of quick-impact projects 
causes development and humanitarian workers to be perceived as part of the conflict and 
hence legitimate targets.34 Humanitarian NGOs are in particular dependent on being 
perceived as neutral, impartial and separate from military operations to conduct their 
work. For them, it is imperative that the humanitarian space is left unpoliticized (Friis 
2009). Quick-impact projects furthermore aim at responding to immediate needs and 
winning the local population’s “hearts and minds”, rather than facilitating long-term 
structural transformation. It can hence be justly argued that the security community’s 
“mission creep” has reduced development aid to a means to political and military ends.  
                                                
34 www.flyktninghjelpen.no/?aid=9066312 (accessed 05.05.2010) 
 78 
The security community’s increasingly dominant role can partly be explained by 
the fact that the post-Cold War approach to fragile and war-torn states has made donors 
embark on programs to create societal transformation in highly insecure environments 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where military actors naturally have a comparative 
advantage in relation to civilian actors (Patric and Brown 2007). Most civilian agencies 
are simply not fit to operate in situations of active insurgency, where their security cannot 
be guaranteed. The outcome of comprehensive approaches has thus been that security 
agents have become increasingly dominant in traditional development activities. This 
however, also holds true beyond situations of large-scale armed conflict. A worrying 
tendency exists in relatively stable post-conflict states, that military actors are expanding 
their spheres of influence beyond their conventional domains, hence marginalizing 
development actors in the process. This tendency points to important and unforeseen 
structural aspects, causing difficulties and imbalances within the post-Cold War approach 
to fragile states. As mandates and programs have been broadened, the asymmetries 
between civilian and military resources and capacities have become increasingly obvious. 
This tendency is illustrated in the following quote by Lieutenant Colonel David 
Kilcullen: 
 
At present, the US defense budget accounts for approximately half of total global defense 
spending, while the US armed forces employ about 1.68 million uniformed members. By 
comparison, the State Department employs about 6,000 Foreign Service officers, while the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) has about 2,000. In other words, the Department 
of Defense is about 210 times larger than USAID and State combined - there are substantially 
more people employed as musicians in Defense bands than in the entire foreign service (Patric 
and Brown 2007:3). 
 
The massive imbalance in capabilities and resources reflects a chronically under-
investment in non-military state-building agents, and it exerts a constant pull, tugging at 
civilian leadership in SSR in general and in US foreign policy in particular. As an 
institution, the military reflects a different intertextual history than the development 
community and is associated with the security first discourse. The security community’s 
approach to SSR activities is hence not surprisingly of a military rather than political or 
social nature.  
 
5.4.4 Securitization of policies 
The security-development nexus has impacted on the international donor community’s 
geopolitical rationale for engaging with fragile and post-conflict states in the South. 
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Importantly, fragile states have in the post-Cold War era come to be constructed as spaces 
of underdevelopment and instability, causing them to become increasingly securitized in 
an international context. It can be argued that fragile states in fact are double securitized, 
as they moreover are perceived as threats to their local population. The linking of local 
and global (in)security has had far-reaching consequences. As underdevelopment and 
state fragility are perceived as threats to local populations, regions and the broader 
international community, a new justification for intervention in fragile states have 
emerged (Duffield 2001). Because international security is perceived to be at stake, 
western states now have a moral responsibility to intervene in fragile states to protect 
their own population’s security. Underpinned by the liberal peace thesis, Western donors 
have embarked on a mission to create stability and development abroad through the 
construction of liberal democratic states. 
Successful securitization consists of three interrelated steps: articulation of 
existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free 
of rules (Buzan et al. 1998:26). The sections above have argued that underdevelopment 
and state fragility have been constructed as existential threats in the post-Cold War era, 
and that the international community has accepted them as such. This notion is both 
evident in the formulation of policy documents and in practice, as military actors are 
becoming increasingly involved in traditional development work. What effect does the 
new geopolitical rationale have on inter-unit relations then? The bare fact that foreign 
donors are in charge of the transformation and building of the security sector in fragile 
and post-conflict states does in itself reflect a “breaking free of the rules” of traditional 
relations between states. The security sector is traditionally regarded as the cornerstone of 
state sovereignty. For this reason, the practice of SSR would have been unthinkable only 
few years ago, as it would have resembled earlier colonial practices and relations too 
much. It can thus be argued that the post-Cold War approach to fragile states reflects a 
process of securitization. This effectively means that the issue of underdevelopment/state 
fragility has come to be framed in a specific way, as a security issue, providing 
international security as the rationale for intervention. The fact that security actors have 
become increasingly involved in development practices underscores the relation between 
discourse and materiality. Moreover, because the security community’s capacity and 
resources exceeds civilian agents’, the military is constantly called upon to “fill the 
vacuum” after the civilian actors (Patrick and Brown 2007). This situation causes security 
actors to become increasingly dominant in security and development related work, where 
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they bring in their specific methods and rationales for action, which are centered on 
security.  
 
5.5 Summing up  
This chapter has accounted for the security-development nexus and its geopolitical 
impact on the international approach towards fragile and post-conflict states. By 
constructing security and development as interlinked and pertinent for both human 
security and international security, the security-development nexus has legitimized 
international donors’ venture into the security sector of fragile and post-conflict states.  
The SSR paradigm explicitly aims to make security a development issue by 
providing a conceptual framework for donor policies in the interface of security and 
development assistance. Paradoxically, it has simultaneously made (under)development a 
security issue, causing the security community to become increasingly dominant in 
development related work. How this situation plays out in practice will be addressed 
shortly. The next chapter will elaborate on the relation between discourse and materiality 
as I turn to the implementation of the security sector reform agenda in Liberia. 
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6 Implementing the SSR Agenda - the Case of Liberia 
 
The previous chapters have accounted for the security-development nexus and 
contextualized security sector reform (SSR) as a post-Cold War framework for 
international security assistance. The internationally endorsed OECD DAC guidelines on 
SSR emphasize that security sector reform should reflect individual and societal security 
needs and facilitate “development, poverty reduction and democracy” (OECD DAC 
2005:16). According to its foundation, SSR is a democratic project, and one of its main 
objectives is to ensure that governance of the security sector conforms to broader 
democratic norms. The framework moreover stipulates certain procedural principles for 
how to conduct SSR to ensure that the reform is efficient, sustainable and legitimate. The 
principles emphasized are local ownership, local context sensitivity, accountability and 
transparency and holistic approach (OECD DAC 2005).  
Establishing a policy agenda is however only the first step in the development of 
an approach to any issue era. According to Bellamy et al. (2010), peace operations have 
had a clear and positive effect on the number and intensity of armed conflicts in the post-
Cold War era. Deployment of peacekeepers has reduced the risk of armed conflicts 
reigniting by as much as 86% where operations are deployed with the consent of the 
belligerents and above 50% where operations are deployed in regions with unstable 
consent and lingering violence. Studies on the long-term effectiveness of peacebuilding 
efforts, have however found that the failure to build sustainable peace range from 30% of 
countries relapsing into conflict within two years (Doyle and Sambanis 2006) to 44% 
within five years (Mack 2007). These findings indicate that external peacebuilding efforts 
need to be well adjusted to the local situation if they are to succeed in building a peace 
that will remain also after the peacekeepers have left. A “one-size fits all” approach to 
fragile states is counterproductive and could easily end up reproducing or exacerbate the 
societal conditions leading up to violent conflict.  
Following this stand, this chapter will seek to investigate the SSR framework’s 
impact on donor policies in post-conflict states. For this purpose, I have chosen the case 
of Liberia. The Liberian SSR process represents a highly internationalized process, 
heavily dependent on external donors, most importantly the UN and the USA. 
Undertakings have been unprecedented in ambition, but with mixed results (ICG 2009), 
and the success of the reform process is thus a disputed topic. After 14 years of brutal 
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civil war ending with a peace agreement in 2003, Liberia is a relatively stabile country. 
However, the prevailing peace and stability remains extremely fragile and vulnerable to 
disruption, partly owing to weak national security institutions (UNSC 2009:20 b). Lack 
of employment and economic opportunities furthermore contribute to the fragility of the 
situation. Liberia thus remains heavily dependent on the presence of the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL is one of 15 current UN peacekeeping 
operations,35 and the peace process follows the pattern of the UN’s modus operandi that 
has been emerging since the end of the Cold War. It is characterized by a sequence of 
activities in the order of a peace agreement, followed by deployment of peacekeepers, a 
disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programme (DDRR), 
security sector reform (SSR) and ending with elections (Ebo 2005:ii). The UN mission’s 
strength as of 30 July 2010 was 9,399 personnel, including 7837 troops, 1347 civilian 
police and 128 military observers (UNSC 2010 b). Based on the Secretary-General’s 
recommendations, the mission’s mandate has been extended until the 30 September 2011 
to assist the Liberian Government with the upcoming 2011 general presidential and 
legislative elections. The chapter will start off by accounting for the background of the 
Liberian civil war, since it provides the context and conditions wherein the SSR process 
is being implemented and carried out. It will thereafter turn to the ongoing SSR process 
and the results it has produced on the ground. The questions guiding my analysis are as 
follows: What characterizes the Liberian SSR process, and do the elements of the OECD 
DAC framework inform the implementation of the reform process? 
 
6.1 Background to SSR in Liberia 
(…) a major source of the dysfunctionality of the security sector in Liberia is that the 
armed and security forces have all through the country’s history functioned as instruments for 
regime interests as opposed to the interests of the general populace. As such, their role has 
essentially been repressive, given the wide gap between regime interests and popular interests 
(Ebo 2005:14).  
 
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 18th August 2003 marked 
the end of fourteen years of brutal civil war. The signatories were the Government of 
Liberia (GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the political parties in Liberia. The 
CPA outlined the principles to which the parties would commit themselves, established 
                                                
35 www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/ (accessed 15.03.2010) 
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the National Transitional Government of Liberia and requested that the UN deployed a 
force to support the interim government and assist the implementation of the peace 
agreement (Bøås 2009, Stig 2009). In 2006, after the initial transition period, Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf was elected president, becoming Africa’s first female elected head of 
state. Since then, reconstruction has taken place with security sector reform high on the 
priority list. The post-conflict environment in Liberia is, however, one of the most 
challenging SSR environments the international community has ever faced, as a 
wholesale rebuilding of the security sector is required.36  
To grasp the challenges facing the Liberian SSR process, it is essential to 
understand that they arise from over a century of deficient security sector governance. 
Retracing parts of the country’s history is thus imperative for current attempts to 
reconstruct Liberia, especially because the problem of Liberian security forces abusing 
civilians from the early twentieth century on has been intimately linked to interventions 
by other governments (ICG 2009). This is a crucial point to an externally driven attempt 
to reform the security sector with the ultimate aim to avoid a repetition of the country’s 
violent past.  
 
6.1.1 State exclusion and the historical failure of the security sector 
Liberia is Africa’s oldest republic. It was founded in 1822 for the resettlement of freed 
American slaves. After 25 years of settlement, the Liberian legislature declared its 
independence on July 26th 1847. The Constitution of Liberia was based on the ideals of 
democratic governance and popular sovereignty. It called for a tripartite state structure 
based on the US model consisting of three co-equal branches of government: the 
Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary (Jaye 2009). However, the constitution 
delineated sharply between the repatriates and the so-called “native tribes”, consisting of 
16 major indigenous groups37 of people, each possessing its own languages, traditions, 
customs and religious beliefs. The latter were not eligible for election and voting, laying 
the foundation for entrenched alienation between the different ethnic groups and the 
America-Liberians (Bøås 2009). During the last decade of the nineteenth century, the 
American-Liberian settlers began to move inland and assert claims over a broadening 
swathe of territory. The True Wig Party was established in 1870, and for more than a 
                                                
36 www.ssrnetwork.net/topic_guides/liberia.php (accessed 14.04.2010) 
37 These are the Bassa, Belle, Dey, Gbandi, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Loma, Mandingo, 
Mano, Mende and Vai (Adebajo 2002:21) 
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century, post-independence Liberia was governed by the small American-Liberian elite38 
as “a single-party state with a strong, almost “imperial” presidency” (Jaye 2009:1). Both 
military force and the creation of administrative boundaries helped sustain the 
hegemony.39 The True Wig Party ruled the hinterlands through direct commissioners who 
in turn ruled through local chiefs. The administrative boundaries thus sharpened and 
cemented differences between the different ethnic groups, which prior to the Americo-
Liberian rule had had a more flexible and inclusionary character. The result was 
widespread political repression, nepotism, economic mismanagement and political and 
socio-economic marginalization of indigenous ethnic groups (Bøås 2009, Ebo 2005).  
The structure of the colonial militia, the Frontier Force, resembled the rest of the 
Liberian society in the 1910-1960 period. Officers were typically from the settler 
Americo-Liberian elite, and Loma and Kpelle speakers from the centre and north-west of 
the country were disproportionally represented in the ranks. Clan and paramount chiefs in 
each locality organized recruitment and were supported by the Frontier Force in 
collecting taxes and rounding up local men for forced labour on public works projects. 
Provincial officials and chiefs from the central areas were rewarded for cooperating with 
the government with positions in the hinterland administration and Frontier Force. This 
situation led Sawyer (2005) to describe the military as “a patrimonial organization linked 
to both the Monrovia-based oligarchy as well as the indigenous social order” (ICG 
2009:2). It was from this period that the armed forces traced a kind of ethnisized 
geography of violence. Irregularly paid, the army was encouraged to “pay itself”. Having 
to live off the land and the local populations, the Frontier Force soon earned a reputation 
for brutality and looting, and it inflicted considerable violence on the Kru, Glebo, Bassa 
and Krahn-speaking regions in the south-east of the country.  
Personalization of power was prevalent in the decades preceding the civil war, 
and the shaping of the security sector became the individual prerogative of the president. 
Juxtaposed to the powerful presidency was a very weak parliament. Liberia’s decision-
making process was dominated by party-loyalty, subverting legislative and judicial 
checks and balances as envisioned in the constitution. Members of the Legislature were 
handpicked by party factions dominated by the President and his associates, which meant 
that it would not challenge the security legislatures crafted by the Executive through the 
                                                
38 3-5% of the total population in Liberia 
39 It is questionable if Liberia could have survived as an independent state without the diplomatic and 
military support of the USA 
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exercise of its oversight responsibilities. Any process that could ensure transparency and 
accountability was thus removed (Jaye 2009). The Judiciary was also weakened by the 
single party rule, as the removal of judges only required an easily achieved “Joint 
Resolution” by the Legislature, firmly under control of the Executive. The judiciary thus 
functioned as an instrument of manipulation and a means of legitimizing the activities of 
government. The exercise of legislature oversight of the security sector thus suffered 
immensely in pre-war Liberia.   
 
6.1.2 Coup d'état and downturn in stability  
Partially successful reforms to bridge the gap between the settlers and the indigenous 
groups regarding educational access and political participation were launched under 
president Tubman (1944-1971) and continued under president Tolbert (1971-1980) 
(Adejabo 2002). The infamous Frontier Force changed its name to the Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL) in 1962, and recruitment began to resemble that of other modern armies. A 
military academy was established and recruits were required to have some formal training 
(ICG 2009). The AFL acquired an increasing reputation for professionalization, although 
the officer corps nevertheless continued to be heavily dominated by men of settler 
background. 
The situation that provided the backdrop for the coup d'état staged on 12 April 
1980 by the young Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe (Adebajo 2002), was characterized by 
gross economic inequalities, food crisis and president Tolbert’s serious mishandling of 
the economic recession that Liberia was in.40 The president had unwittingly alienated and 
politicized the army by using it to crush the various students and labour demonstrations 
opposing the regime. On the day of the coup, Doe and sixteen low-ranking soldiers 
forced their way into the Executive Mansion in Monrovia and killed the president along 
with twenty-six others, before announcing their coup over the radio. The brutality to 
come from Doe’s regime was demonstrated by the following assassination of Tolbert’s 
family and thirteen members of government, the latter broadcasted by Liberian television 
(Adebajo 2002). Doe was nevertheless celebrated by Liberians, who considered the 
removal of the True Wig Party regime a blessing liberating them from 133 years of settler 
dominance.  
                                                
40 In the midst of the crises, president Tolbert decided to host an African Union summit in 1979, spending 
an estimated $200 million on a new hotel and conference centre (Adebajo 2002:22). 
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Adebajo has described the new government, the People’s Redemption Council, as 
a “marriage of convenience” as “the intelligentsia had experience and expertise but 
lacked power; the soldiers lacked experience and expertise but had power” (Adebajo 
2002:25). It soon became clear that the new rulers were neither willing nor able to 
dismantle the neo-patrimonial state. Doe had inherited an economic crisis from the 
former administration, and the People’s Redemption Council became a vehicle for the 
enrichment of its members and the elite of the ethnic groups to which they belonged. 
Doe’s rule accordingly came to be characterized by corruption, theft of state resources, 
murder, rape and other human rights violations (Bøås 2009). The coup thus marked the 
beginning of a rapid downturn in stability. Potential rivals were eliminated through 
assassinations or forced exile, and human rights abuses proliferated against groups that 
challenged his rule (Adebajo 2002). Peaceful avenues for dissent were closed off, causing 
several military challenges to the regime.  
The rigging of the 1985 presidential elections is known as Doe’s “second coup”.41 
The election was staged to lend a veneer of legitimacy to his autocratic rule, but instead 
sparked a coup attempt. The coup attempt was lead by General Thomas Quiwonkpa, a 
native Dan. The coup attempt failed, and was followed by retributive killings of 2000-
3000 persons belonging to minority groups42 in an area known as the Nimba county (ICG 
2009, Adebajo 2002). The events resulted in an increased militarization of society and 
ethnicization of the army43 which was turned into a praetorian guard protecting Doe’s 
power. The Nimba county massacre more than any other incidence ignited the civil 
uprising, which culminated in Charles Taylor’s invasion in 1989. The incident hence sat 
the stage for the civil war to come. 
 
6.1.3 Taylor’s invasion and civil war 
Up to the 1990s Liberia had been an American protégé, and it was hence unthinkable that 
the US would allow the country to fall into a full-scale civil war. But the combination of 
shifting geopolitical considerations and the actions of Doe’s undisciplined Krahn-
dominated army, which committed horrendous atrocities towards both military and 
civilian Manos and Gios, removed any chance of gaining critical support from the former 
ally in Washington. The withdrawal of American support clearly had a destabilizing 
                                                
41 The two most formidable opponents, the United Peoples Party (UPP) and the Liberian People’s Party 
(LPP) were banned only three months before the October 1985 election (Adebajo 2002) 
42 Gio, Manu and Dan people 
43 This time by the Krahns 
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effect on Liberia, leaving a security vacuum to be exploited (Adebajo 2002). On 
Christmas Eve 1989, the 168 men strong National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led 
by Charles Taylor crossed into Liberia’s Nimba County from Côte d’Ivoire. The rebel 
group mainly consisted of anti-Doe Liberian exiles in West-Africa as well as Burkinabès, 
Gambians and Sierra Leoneans. It had no clearly defined political identity beyond 
toppling the Doe regime. Presented as a continuation of the Quiwonkpa led coup attempt, 
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia had little difficulty recruiting new members among 
the revengeful Nimba population (Adejabo 2002).  
As the National Patriotic Front of Liberia marched into the capital of Monrovia in 
July 1990, it consisted of an estimated 10,000 fighters. The Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL) was by then reduced to about 2,000 fighters. Led by Nigeria, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) hastily deployed a peacekeeping force 
known as the Ecowas Cease-fire Monitoring Group (Ecomog) to Liberia. With Monrovia 
under heavy artillery, Doe was forced to offer a cease-fire. A stalemate occurred: Doe 
insisted the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) give up its guns before talks, 
whereas the latter insisted Doe give up his presidency before talks (Ellis 1999).  
Shortly prior to the attack on Monrovia, one of the NPFL’s commanders, Prince 
Johnson, had defected from the rebel force forming the splinter group the Independent 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia. 9th September 1990, this splinter group captured and 
abducted president Doe from the Ecomog base at Freeport and killed him shortly after. 
Johnson did seek to take over as president, but had little political support apart from the 
fighters he had recruited when he formed the splinter group (Ellis 1999). Just a few days 
in advance of Doe’s murder, a conference of Liberian politicians meeting in Banjul, 
Gambia, had elected Amos Sawyer, a prominent academic and political activist, as the 
interim president of Liberia. Taylor blatantly refused to accept this decision. He 
denounced Ecomog as illegal and established a rival Governance in Gbarnga, declaring 
himself president of Greater Liberia. After the Ecomog mandate was changed from 
peacekeeping to peace enforcement and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia was 
pushed out of Monrovia, a cease-fire allowing humanitarian assistance to the capital was 
established in November 1990. Taylor nevertheless continued to provide a huge 
challenge to the Ecomog mission by controlling 90% of the country and huge natural 
resources. The continued conflict also destabilized neighboring countries. Sierra Leone 
was pushed into a decade long civil war, causing internal displacement of people and 
spilling refugees into Guinea and Liberia. The stalemate was a fact: Taylor could not 
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defeat Ecomog military in Monrovia, and Ecomog lacked the troops, logistics and 
political support to defeat Taylor in the countryside (Adebajo 2002:102). The problem 
was exacerbated by internal conflicts among the Ecomog members, and lack of external 
logistical and financial support from the US and the UN. The following years, peace 
agreements were signed and broken, and several new armed factions joined the war, 
fighting to gain control over natural resources such as timber, rubber, gold, iron and 
diamonds. These warlords had much to lose and nothing to win from a peace agreement, 
and human rights violations and ethnicized targeting of civilians were widespread 
(Adejabo 2002, Ellis 1999).  
 
6.1.4 The making and breaking of the Abuja II peace accord 
Following the eleventh peace agreement in the Liberian civil war, the 1996 Abuja II,44 a 
disarmament process of the warring parties was initiated. In the following election in 
1997, Taylor was elected president with a landslide.45 Taylor initially embarked on a 
policy of national reconciliation, inviting members of rival parties to join the cabinet. 
However, the new president quickly started cracking down on opposition and 
institutionalizing his dominance. He failed to permit UN or Ecomog peacekeepers any 
role in restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), instead filling it with his own 
fighters from the former National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and building the 
notorious Anti-terrorist Unit as his own private army. In the words of Gompert et.al 
(2007:xiii):  
 
The security institutions, forces, and practices of the regime of Charles Taylor, (…) were 
meant to serve the regime, not the nation, and were controlled and used - rather, misused - by one 
man, mainly against Liberia’s people and neighbors. 
 
Following Ecomog’s departure in 1998, insecurity also along Liberia’s borders increased. 
Liberian dissidents known as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) launched an attack from Guinea in August 1999, mainly consisting of former 
Mandingo and Krahn fighters. This incident marked the beginning of Liberia’s second 
civil war in a decade. Krahn leaders in Côte d’Ivoire similarly formed the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and became the second main rebel group in the second 
round of the Liberian civil war (Bøås 2009). The situation was thus back to that of pre-
                                                
44 Abuja I was signed in 1995 but broken shortly thereafter 
45 It is likely that Liberians’ fear of a return to war if Taylor was to loose the election, contributed largely to 
his victory 
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war Liberia: “widespread insecurity, a weak economy, patronage-fuelled corruption, 
government harassment of the press and civic groups, interethnic clashes, trumped-up 
coup plots, and external sanctions” (Adebajo 2002:238).  
 
6.2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement  – from peace keeping 
to post-conflict reconstruction 
From 2001, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Liberia, including 
travel sanctions and an arms embargo. The sanctions, combined with the rebel groups’ 
military offensive and an indictment for war crimes46 eventually forced Taylor into exile 
in August 2003 (Jaye 2009), and the Comprehensive Peace agreement was signed later 
that year. The National Transitional Government of Liberia was established under the 
chairmanship of Gyude Bryant to oversee a two-year period of transition, which was to 
end in democratic elections in 2005. The government reflected a compromise between the 
three main factions from the second phase of the civil war: Taylor’s forces; in the interim 
government known as the Government of Liberia (GOL), and the two main rebel forces, 
the Krahn-dominated MODEL and the Mandingo-dominated LURD. According to Bøås 
(2009) this compromise was essential to end the war, but also meant that it was 
impossible for the factions to “win the peace” in a longer perspective. As a result, many 
government members saw this as a last chance of benefiting from power, causing 
corruption to be widespread also under the interim government.  
 
6.2.1 From DDR(R) to SSR  
The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) took over peacekeeping duties from ECOWAS 
forces on October 1st 2003. In collaboration with the Joint Monitoring Committee it was 
responsible for the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and 
reintegration (DDRR47) program for all armed parties.48 By November 2004, when the 
process officially was declared ended, the total number of former combatants disarmed 
and demobilized was roughly 104,000, among those 24% female and 11% children (von 
Gienanth and Jaye 2008:8). Moreover, UNMIL peacekeepers had collected a total of 
28,314 weapons and 33,604 heavy munitions of other categories. In addition, 6,486,136 
                                                
46 The trail is currently ongoing in the International Criminal Court (ICC), where Taylor is being tried for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity 
47 Commonly referred to as DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) 
48 www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/mandate.shtml (accessed 20.04.2010) 
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rounds of small arms ammunition had been surrendered.49 According to Bøås (2010) this 
comprised an estimated 50-60% of the weapons used during the war. The process was far 
from comprehensive, hampered as it was by urban biases, lack of capacity to absorb ex-
combatants, corruption in the transitional government and very limited employment 
opportunities. By the end of the program, only 1 in 8 of ex-combatants was engaged in 
reintegration and rehabilitation activities. Ebo (2005) has referred to the gap between 
disarmament and demobilization on the one hand and rehabilitation and reintegration on 
the other as a DD-RR gap. As von Gienanth and Jaye (2008) have pointed out, successful 
reintegration was largely dependent on factors outside the control of the DDR(R) actors, 
like the economic recovery of the country, but the DD-RR gap was also partly due to the 
handing out of too many demobilization packages to people with dubious claims, which 
left little left for reintegration efforts (ICG 2009). According to Jennings (2010), the 
DDR(R) program was designed on wrong expectations. The number of people affected 
after the civil war was largely underestimated,50 and the requirements for entering the 
program were lowered too much during the process. Jennings (2010) has therefore 
questioned whether DDR(R) actually was a good solution to the Liberian post-war 
situation. The conflict left no clear winner, and whereas the whole society had suffered 
for years, the DDR(R) program only rewarded the ex-combatants who had terrorized the 
population. It thus “missed the boat” and created incentives for civilians to “cheat” the 
system by entering the program to gain from it.  
Normally, DDR(R) and SSR are somewhat separated in time and sequencing and 
carried out by civilian and military personnel respectively. In the Liberian case, however, 
they constituted two completely separate undertakings. DDR(R) was conceptually 
divorced from the wider SSR process, which only started after the DDR(R) process had 
ended (Jennings 2010). This approach meant that soldiers demobilized during the 
DDR(R) process were not automatically recruited into the vetting process associated with 
the subsequent SSR reform, creating thousands of unemployed ex-soldiers. The DDR(R) 
process thus impacted directly on the climate for the following SSR process, as it 
undercut and created an imbalance between the short-term goals of demobilization and 
                                                
49 www.unmil.org/1content.asp?ccat=ddrr&zdoc=1 (accessed 20.04.2010) 
50 Initial estimation of ex-combatants was 34 000, whereas the program ended with 103 000 having been 
processed (Malan 2008) 
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medium- and long-term institutional reconstruction.51 SSR thus had to be set against the 
background of unaddressed legacies of the DDR(R) exercise (Ebo 2005).  
 
6.2.2 The post-conflict landscape 
As stated, the transition period ended in 2006 with the democratic election of Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf. The international community immediately recognized her government as 
essentially different from the previous ones. As president of Liberia she embarked on the 
country’s post-war reconstruction process, which took place within volatile, uncertain 
and fragile internal and external security environments (Jaye 2006). Externally, they 
included the insecurity posed by West African transborder crime in general and the 
political instability in Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea in particular. Internally, the break-down 
in governance structures and rule of law, a contracted economy coupled with high 
unemployment and pervasive poverty, posed enormous challenges to the new 
administration. Among the issues it was facing was the politicization of security agencies, 
overlapping responsibilities, budgetary constraints, lack of infrastructure, poor human 
resource capacity and skewed civilian oversight (Jaye 2006:9). Fourteen years of civil 
war had moreover displaced nearly one-third of Liberia’s population and killed 
approximately 250,000 people (Malan 2008). Historical problems of poor civil-military 
relations had been intensified, and the Liberian people had completely lost confidence in 
a security sector that was bloated in terms of both size and number of agencies and 
employees.52 
Recognizing that improving the security environment was fundamental for 
pursuing development and democratic policies, the new government prioritized key 
development issues into four pillars under the Liberia Reconstruction and Development 
Committee: enhancing national security; revitalizing economic growth; strengthening 
governance and the rule of law; and rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic 
                                                
51 The ICG (2009) rapports that SSR specialists encountered potential new recruits who saw enrolment in 
the army as an entitlement to be turned into short-term advantage, much like the demobilization packages 
used to ”buy peace” 
52Apart from the legislature and judiciary, the core state security agencies included: the Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL); Special Security Service (SSS); Liberia National Police (LNP); Monrovia City Police 
(MCP); National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); the National Security Agency (NSA); Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization (BIN); the Roberts International Airport Base Security (RIA); National 
Port Authority–Liberian Seaport Police (LSP); Bureau of Customs and Excise – Financial Security 
Monitoring Division (FSD); Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); the Ministry of National Security (MNS), 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Ministry of National Defense (MoD), the National Security Council; the security 
forces of the Liberia Petroleum Refining Corporation (LPRC), the Forestry Development Authority (FDA), 
and Liberia Telecommunications Corporation Plant Protection Force; and National Fire Service (NFS) 
(Jaye 2009:3). 
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services (IPRSP 2006:iv). Security sector reform was regarded a core policy in the pursue 
of these goals. The following section will briefly account for the legal framework, before 
I turn to the implementation of SSR in Liberia. 
 
6.2.3 The legal reference for SSR in Liberia 
Liberia’s SSR program is pursued and implemented within an environment of conflicting 
legal frameworks. The 1986 Constitution of Liberia, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) of 2003, and the 2003 United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1509 together provide the legal framework for implementation of SSR (Jaye 2006:3). 
Until January 2006, the CPA functioned as the key source of legal reference for the 
Liberian SSR process. ECOWAS, the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) and 
Liberian stakeholders constituted central actors presiding over the crafting of the peace 
agreement, and the issue of security sector reform constituted an integral part of the peace 
dialogue (Jaye 2009). Part four of the CPA53 considers SSR in particular and enshrines 
the conditions under which SSR should be implemented. Article VII, section 1a) 
stipulates that:  
 
All irregular forces shall be disbanded and b), that The Armed Forces of Liberia shall be 
restructured and will have a new command structure. The forces may be drawn from the ranks of 
the present GOL forces, the LURD and the MODEL54, as well as from civilians with appropriate 
background and experience. The Parties request that ECOWAS, the UN, AU, and the ICGL55 
provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the security reform 
effort. The Parties also request that the United States of America play a lead role in organising 
this restructuring program (CPA 2003). 
 
The CPA further stipulates that the AFL’s mission shall be to defend Liberian “national 
sovereignty and in extremis, respond to natural disasters”. Article VIII calls for the 
restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and the deployment of an interim 
police force until the new police force is operative:  
There shall be an immediate restructuring of the National Police Force, the Immigration 
Force, Special Security Service (SSS), custom security guards and such other statutory security 
units. These restructured security forces shall adopt a professional orientation that emphasizes 
democratic values and respect for human rights, a nonpartisan approach to duty and the avoidance 
of corrupt practices (CPA 2003). 
                                                
53 www.trcofliberia.org/scholarly-resources/documents/liberia-comprehensive-peace-agreement/view 
(accessed 15.04.2010) 
54 the Government of Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia 
55 the Economic Community of West African States, the United Nations, the African Union, the 
International Contact Group on Liberia 
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The other document that provides the legal framework for the Liberian SSR process is the 
UN Resolution 1509, adopted by the Security Council in September 2003. The resolution 
determines that the situation in Liberia represented a threat to the Liberian peace process, 
to stability in the West Africa sub-region and to international peace and security in the 
broader region. The framing of Liberia as a fragile state hence provides for the 
involvement of UNMIL in the SSR process. The resolution states that UNMIL shall:  
 
(…) assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the 
police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training 
programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with 
ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States, and moreover: 
(…) assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian 
military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States.56  
 
The CPA (2003) stats that “(…) the provisions of the present Constitution of the Republic 
of Liberia, the Statuses and all other Liberian laws, which relate to the establishment, 
composition and powers of the Executive, the Legislative and Judicial branches of the 
Government, are hereby suspended”. The democratic election of and subsequent 
inauguration of Johnson-Sirleaf have nevertheless made the Constitution of Liberia57 
relevant to the SSR process (Malan 2008). As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
of Liberia, the President clearly has a role to play in the restructuring of the country’s 
security sector. The Constitution also empowers the legislative branch on security issues. 
These three documents together constitute the legal frameworks for the SSR process in 
Liberia. So far, the question regarding which of these is supreme has not emerged (Jaye 
2006). 
 
6.3 The practice of SSR  
Having accounted for the background to security sector reform (SSR) in Liberia, this 
section will focus on the practice of SSR. The Liberian SSR process is commonly 
referred to as a bold “root and branch” process. And indeed, under cover of the 15,000 
strong UNMIL force, Liberia has drawn down its army and defense ministry to zero, 
aiming to rebuild the security institutions from the ground (ICG 2009). The Liberian case 
represents a highly internationalized and externally dependent undertaking. The SSR 
                                                
56http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/525/70/PDF/N0352570.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 
16.04.2010) 
57 www.liberianlegal.com/constitution1986.htm (accessed 19.04.2010) 
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process has been ambitious, taking place in a challenging environment, and its results are 
disputed. Much remains to be done, and an adviser to President Johnson-Sirleaf has 
estimated that “we are about 40 per cent of the way there with the police and 55 per cent 
with the army” (ICG 2009:i). As evident in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the 
Liberian SSR agenda focuses on reforming the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the 
Liberia National Police (LNP). The following analysis will focus on these undertakings 
as I look closer at the implementation of the SSR paradigm in the context of Liberia.  
 
6.3.1 Reforming the Armed Forces of Liberia  
According to the International Crisis Group’s 2009 report on Liberia, “army reform 
appears to be a provisional success” (2009:i). The vetting process is proclaimed a success 
in particular, resulting in a pool of 2000 rigorously vetted and trained privates. However, 
the AFL reform has been one of the most debated issues of the Liberian SSR process for 
several reasons, and the ICG report further states that “Had this report been written a year 
earlier, it would have evaluated the training program as deeply unsatisfactory” (ICG 
2009:13).  
 
6.3.1.1 Mandates 
As stated, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) envisioned a restructuring of the 
armed forces and called upon the US to “play a lead role” in organizing the restructuring 
process (CPA 2003). ECOWAS, the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and 
the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) were also requested to assist. The 
USA nevertheless exclusively took charge for the implementation of the AFL reform 
process, an incident which has been heavily debated by Liberian and international 
representatives. The American position as sole donor in charge of reforming the AFL 
does not reflect the mandates as provided by the CPA or the UN Resolution 1509. The 
CPA is specific about the central role of the USA in the restructuring of the army, but it 
simultaneously requests the assistance of ECOWAS, the UN, the African Union, and the 
ICGL to “provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers”. The UN 
Resolution 1509 is specific about the role of UNMIL in training the police, but only 
refers to “Interested States” with regards to the army reform. Hence, no special role is 
assigned to the US (Jaye 2006). Moreover, contrary to the terms and conditions of the 
CPA, which requested a systemic effort to balance representation of faction members in 
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the AFL, the US decided to fully disband the army and rebuild it from scratch. The 
implications of this latter point will be elaborated on shortly.  
 
6.3.1.2 Recruitment and vetting  
The US signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Transitional Government of 
Liberia, formalizing USA’s role and commitment to the Liberian SSR program and the 
reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia. The American private military company 
DynCorp58 was awarded the contract to train the army in 2004. The company’s proposal 
was to put 2,000 men through boot camp and supplement the training with a rule of law 
and human rights component emphasizing principles like respect for humanitarian law 
and the law of war, separation of army and police responsibilities and the imperative of 
civilian oversight of the security sector (ICG 2009). Another private military company, 
the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), was later awarded a separate contract for 
refurbishment of military bases, forming and structuring the army and its component 
units, and for providing specialized and advanced training, including mentoring of 
officers. DynCorp’s role was thus to “recruit and make soldiers” while PAE was 
employed to “mentor and develop” them into a fully operational force (Malan 2008:29). 
DynCorp designed and managed the following recruiting and vetting program. 
After extensive news media campaigns, a nation-wide recruitment process was launched 
aiming to rectify the historic lack of representation from rural areas and create a truly 
national army. New recruits were drawn from all 15 Liberian counties and from every 
ethnic group. Recruiting standards to the AFL were high, and all applicants were held to 
the same standards. To qualify, they had to be Liberian citizens between 18 and 45 years 
old; free of HIV, TB and drug use; and able to pass basic fitness and knowledge tests 
(Malan 2008). The recruits were rigorously vetted in a process termed by the 
International Crisis Group as “the best one witnessed anywhere in the world”. Each 
applicant was vetted by Australian, Gambian, US, UK, Ghanaian and Liberian 
researchers, who interviewed them, visited their home villages, schools and talked to their 
family members and acquaintances. In addition, posters with photos of the applicants 
were distributed so that people could call in anonymously to lodge accusations of former 
human rights abuses (ICG 2009). 
                                                
58 Owned by Veritas Capital 
 96 
President Johnson-Sirleaf’s target of 20% female soldiers has, however, proved 
hard to accomplish due to both fitness tests and schooling requirements.59 The process’ 
total rejection rate was about 75%, most of them at the initial reading test (Malan 2008). 
Recruits who successfully passed through the vetting process were then offered a 5-year 
service contract, with a one-year probation period allowing for dismissal from the AFL 
for misconduct. The absence of any data on the current army makes it difficult to evaluate 
the outcome of the process, but that it is likely that the process has provided the Armed 
Forces of Liberia and the Ministry of Defense with new legitimacy in the eyes of 
Liberians (Jaye 2009). 
 
6.3.1.3 Training  
Whereas the vetting process has been deemed as highly satisfactory, the AFL training 
program has been hampered by unexpected delays, with timelines specified in contracts 
slipping badly. The first class of 110 trainees began their basic training in August 2006 
and graduated three months later, but the process picked up pace only in mid-2007.60 
Weak and unpredictable funding from Washington is said to be the main cause of the 
slow pace of the AFL development, but funding from the Liberian government has also 
proved unreliable. The high cost involved in forming the army has also been heavily 
criticized. It mainly results from DynCorp’s high instructor salaries to expatriate staff 
from the US Marine Corps and US Army. The delays to the process have thus repeatedly 
caused DynCorp to burn through its budget without being able to provide training. 
According to Malan:  
 
The truth is that the SSR program was never fully funded, that funding to date has fallen 
far short of this figure, and that money, even when forthcoming, has been disbursed in dribs and 
drabs (Malan 2008:41). 
 
The new Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) is being trained according to US Army doctrine. 
Every soldier is trained as an infantry rifleman during an Initial Entry Training (IET) 
course, irrespective of ultimate branch. During the initial intake the IET lasted 11 weeks, 
but faced with irregular funding and high cost of basic training, the period was reduced to 
8 weeks (ICE 2009). This was achieved by cutting 3 weeks of training devoted to human 
rights and education in rule of law and civil-military relations in a democracy. According 
                                                
59 The 2003 literacy rate estimates for Liberians of age 15 and over were 57%, 73.3% for males and 41.6% 
for females (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html) (accessed 05.05.2010) 
60 Only 5% of the force had completed the basic Initial Entry Training course by August 2007. One month 
later the figure increased to 32% (Malan 2008) 
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to the International Crisis Group this development constituted “a significant retreat from 
the original concept” (ICG 2009:14). 
The tendency to prioritize technical training and efficiency over the “soft” 
dimensions of the security sector reform program has raised concerns about the US’s use 
of private military companies (PMCs) in training the AFL. While a discussion of the 
appropriate role of PMCs in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction lies outside 
the realms of this thesis, the use of them certainly has had major implications for the 
Liberian SSR process. Malan (2008:69) has stated that 
 
While contractors may be good at providing basic and even advanced infantry training, 
they answer to private sector bosses whose bottom line is profit and are therefore not the ideal 
role models to instill in the AFL the notion of duty to country and military subordination to a 
democratically elected government. Indeed, in a country and region where recent history has been 
shaped by warlords and mercenaries, the US Department of State has shown remarkable 
insensitivity by sending in contractors to shape the new army. 
 
The issue of civilian governance and oversight of the security sector is imperative for 
ensuring the sustainability of the Liberian peace process, and PMCs might not be the best 
suited agents to carry out this type of work. Upon facing delays, DynCorp did not only 
speed up the process by cutting rule of law and human rights related training; it 
furthermore laid off its Liberian staff to reduce costs, naturally implying a loss of 
valuable local knowledge. 
 
6.3.1.4 Pursuing army reform without strategic objectives  
A central critique of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) reform is that the restructuring 
of the AFL does not result from, or reflect, a comprehensive review of Liberia’s security 
environment. According to Jaye (2006:13), the decision to train 2,000 soldiers for the 
army was “influenced by the purse and not by any threat assessment”. Strategic issues 
were only addressed well after the USA had determined how much it was willing to put 
up and how much the Liberian government would be able to pay in monthly salaries to 
soldiers (ICG 2009). This problem is intimately related to a lack of a national security 
strategy. A national security policy is a government-wide analysis of the strategic level 
concerns a country faces, and addresses how the government plans to deal with these 
concerns. A national security strategy (NSS) is a government’s overarching plan for 
ensuring the country’s security in the form of guidance for implementing a country’s 
national security policy (Boucher 2009:1). A NSS is essential for the integration and 
coordination of activities by various national security actors, since it defines each national 
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actor’s role in dealing with national security needs, determines processes and chain of 
command for making decisions when response to threats is required, and delineates 
conditions for using security forces (Boucher 2009).  
National security policies are commonly determined by a National Security 
Council structure. Liberia does however not have an operational national security council 
in place. In March 2004, however, the Defense Advisory Committee (DAC)61 of the 
Liberian Ministry of Defense conducted a workshop in Monrovia, with the purpose of 
updating the 1998 AFL Restructuring Plan and affirming a national consensus with 
regard to army reform. The Defense Advisory Committee consisted of the Chiefs of Staff 
of the parties GOL, LURD and MODEL (Ebo 2005). According to the workshop’s 
visions, the new force would be known as the Liberian National Defense Force and 
consist of 6,500 soldiers. It would furthermore be composed of the army, the Air 
Reconnaissance Unit, the Liberian National Coast Guard and the Reserve Unit (Ebo 
2005). The workshop’s contribution was however not acknowledged by the donor 
community. Instead, the US military, the US State Department and DynCorp conducted 
an unrelated exploratory mission in spring 2004 to assess Liberia’s security needs. After 
the mission, the Pentagon decided to train 2,000 soldiers – a far cry from the number 
envisaged by the DAC. It was furthermore decided that the army was to be known as the 
New Armed Forces of Liberia. The outcome of the process did not reflect any Liberian 
consensus.  
Because of the lack of a comprehensive and authoritative national security 
strategy, the US Government two years later commissioned RAND to conduct a study on 
Liberia’s security needs. The RAND Report stated that the primary mission of the Armed 
Forces of Liberia is  
(a) to safeguard the country against possible external threats and (b) to support internal 
security forces in defeating any insurgency or other internal threat for which Liberia’s internal 
security forces prove inadequate on their own.62  
 
The report was according to Malan based on international “best practices” and clear, 
logical analysis, rather than in-depth understandings of Liberia and the West African 
region (2008).  
 
                                                
61 Not to be confused with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD 
62 www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG529.pdf (accessed 19.04.2010) 
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6.3.1.5 Lack of transparency and local ownership 
The Governance Reform Commission has expressed that the lack of transparency and 
accountability of the Liberian SSR process is deeply worrying. US Federal Acquisition 
Regulations determine that the details of the contracts between the US Department of 
State and the two PMCs, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers, may not be 
revealed to the Liberian parliament or otherwise made public (ICG 2008). DynCorp has 
moreover refused to appear before the Liberian Parliament, as it is contracted to the US 
Government. This marginalization of the Liberian parliament runs back to the transitional 
period. Due to certain members’ questionable record and allegations of corruption and 
other malpractices, the interim government was perceived as “lacking credibility”. The 
opportunity to lay the basis for effective parliamentary oversight of the post-war security 
sector was hence missed (Ebo 2007).  
The Liberian SSR process is nonetheless currently being undertaken within a 
democracy. Civil society organizations have expressed frustration at the lack of 
information, consultation, transparency and accountability with regard to external donors’ 
SSR activities. After an organized attempt by several NGOs to establish an independent 
advisory committee to evaluate the SSR process, the groups were told by government 
officials that “it would be difficult to bow down to civil society’s views because the 
international community have already developed their own plans and have committed a 
lot of resources to the process” (Ebo 2007:82). This ongoing exclusion and opaqueness 
has led representatives from civil society to state that “Civil society has not been involved 
in any meaningful sense in security sector reform in Liberia. In fact, not only is civil 
society not involved, there is no public debate on these matters” (Ebo 2007:81). 
 
6.3.1.6 Technical solutions to political issues 
The tendency described in previous sections, demonstrates that Liberia’s state fragility is 
conceptualized as a security problem to be solved by technical reform, rather than as a 
political issue of exclusion and repression. In practice, the conceptualization means that 
focus is put on the professionalization of the army, rather than on broader societal 
transformation of civil-military relations. This can be cited in support of the notion that 
the security community is associated with the security first discourse. The SSR 
framework, as represented by the OECD DAC, has the creation of democratic institutions 
and civil oversight of the security sector as its core aims. The Liberian Governance 
Reform Commission has however stated that the army reform is being done in a very 
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insular way, where only lip service is being paid to the concept of SSR and without links 
to a broader security sector policy (ICG 2008). The tendency for opaqueness surrounding 
the reform is especially worrisome since the malfunctioning of the security sector is 
directly related to the lack of governance. The challenge for Liberia lies not just in 
reforming its security agents, but also in defining their roles in the post-conflict society 
and ensuring their effective oversight and management (Malan 2008).  
It can be argued that the way that the army reform currently is being conducted 
both reflects and reinforces a lack of context sensitivity. The US’s decision to completely 
disband the Liberian Army failed to take a number of practical challenges into 
consideration. With Liberia’s broken economy, it proved extremely difficult to provide 
demobilized security personnel with employment opportunities. The result was that 
17,000 former soldiers were thrown into the street with non-sustainable retirement 
packages, posing a potential risk to current and future societal stability. The crime rate 
and periodic threats of violence have posed major problems to UNMIL and the police, 
which have had to contain several violent uprisings by discontent ex-combatants (Jaye 
2009). Had the DDR(R) process been used to absorb ex-soldiers not tainted by past 
civilian abuses into the new army, much of this problem could have been avoided. A 
related challenge is the new army’s complete lack of expertise and institutional 
knowledge. The US’s viewed the former leadership as “bad to the bone” and so seriously 
compromised that a total disbanding of the army was a necessity (Jennings 2010). 
Because of the repressive and abusive history of the Liberian army, the institutional 
knowledge that was lost in the process was not considered worth keeping. This has left a 
gap when it comes to senior command positions in the AFL, where the already trained 
brigades cannot be declared operational until the posts are filled. This in practice means 
that although the stated quantitative goals regarding recruits are fulfilled, Liberia will 
have to remain dependent on external leadership for years to come. Finally, Ebo (2005) 
has questioned whether the decision to simply remodel the AFL after the American 
model is in fact the best way of utilizing the opportunity provided by post-conflict 
reconstruction. He holds that the structure of the new AFL should reflect the threats that 
face Liberia, and should go beyond the country’s historical links with the US 
 
6.3.1.7 Summing up  
The reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) is progressing, although it has been 
hampered by serious delays caused by lack of resources and lack of an overall strategy. 
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The two battalions of the AFL completed the United States Army Training and 
Evaluation Program in September and December 2009, marking the conclusion of the 
initial training phase of the new army. The current phase consist of intensive mentoring 
under the Liberia defense sector reform program, supported by 61 United States serving 
military personnel, who arrived in Liberia in January 2010 (UNSC 2010 a). On 1 January 
2010, the Government of Liberia officially assumed responsibilities for the development 
of the new army. The US also handed over Armed Forces of Liberia equipment to the 
Ministry of Defence. It is nevertheless assessed that the army will not be independently 
operational before 2012 the earliest, given that the Force’s officer corps is in need of 
significant additional experience before it is able to take command (UNSC 2010 a, b). 
The slow pace of implementation of the security sector reform program and the build-up 
of the Armed Forces of Liberia have left different security agencies competing to prove 
their relevance, which have contributed to the tension, rivalry and refusal to co-operate 
which is apparent at this point (Baker 2007, UNSC 2010 a). The situation represents a 
concern also for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) since an operational army capable 
of assuming responsibility for Liberia’s territorial integrity is a precondition for the 
withdrawal of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) forces (Malan 2008). Having 
accounted for the Army reform, the next sections will take closer look at the UN led 
police reform.   
 
6.3.2 Reforming the Liberia National Police 
The Liberia National Police (LNP) grew heavily politicized and militarized under Charles 
Taylor’s regime, and used weapons indiscriminately against civilians. Reform of the 
police force was hence of high priority in post-conflict Liberia, and an important aspect 
of UNMIL’s mandate. The comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) called upon and 
mandated the United Nations Police (UNPOL) to “assist in the development and 
implementation of training programs for the LNP” (CPA 2003). Again, in the absence of 
a comprehensive national security strategy and policy, the RAND Corporation’s report 
provided the clearest guidance on the role and functions of the new police force:  
 
The primary missions of the LNP are (a) to prevent and fight crime and (b) to maintain 
public safety. These missions call for a light but sizable, community-friendly police force that can 
earn the confidence and cooperation of the Liberian people. Anticipating occasional civil 
disorder, the LNP should also have a branch capable of riot control - e.g., the police support unit 
(PSU) (Gompert et al. 2007:xv). 
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6.3.2.1 Recruiting and vetting 
When UN Police began its work in 2004, some 5,000 people claiming to be members of 
the Liberia National Police (LNP) were registered. Few had uniforms and none had been 
paid for the past few years. Police officers had survived by extracting bribes from the 
public, causing public confidence in the LNP to be “zero” (Malan 2008). The UN Police 
embarked on an extremely difficult task; it did not have an executive mandate granting it 
powers of arrest, as this was reserved for the LNP, the same police force they were 
required to reconstitute. UNPOL consequentially had to recruit and vet a few hundred 
new LNP officers from the already registered ones and work alongside them to try and 
maintain law and order. New recruits were drawn from both inside and outside the 
Liberia National Police. The reform hence diverted from the “root and branch” approach 
to rebuilding the army (Ebo 2005). The selection and vetting criteria were agreed by 
UNMIL and the Government of Liberia: Candidates had to be between 18 and 35 years 
old, have a high school education, be physically fit and mentally competent, with no 
criminal record or pending charges, and hold no positions in political organizations 
(Malan 2008). The vetting process was vigorous, but due to restricted resources, 
admittedly not perfect. The applicant’s background checks were less thorough than 
DynCorp’s vetting of the Armed Forces of Liberia, with only a list being passed on to 
NGOs for scrutiny and comments. By comparison, UNMIL rejected only 10% of the 
police recruits, compared to a 75% rejection rate in the army reform process (Malan 
2008:32). Nevertheless, 2,700 registered police officers failed to meet the selection 
criteria and were not admitted to the Police Academy for training. Because UNMIL 
lacked resources to deactivate them and provide them with severance packages, many 
returned to the streets and the extorting of bribes for a living, until a year later, when the 
UK provided the necessary money. 
 
6.3.2.2 Training 
The National Police Training Academy was reopened in July 2004. A Basic Recruits 
Training Program based on a post-conflict training model used by the UN to address 
emergency situations in post-conflict societies was implemented. The philosophy behind 
the program was to mass-produce police graduates for rapid deployment to restore law 
and order (Dahlen 2007). During this initial reform process, police recruits received a 
general 29-week training course consisting of 13 weeks at the academy and 16 in-service 
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into the streets. The approach was thus satisfactory for an interim period, but as graduates 
were criticized as “inefficient, ineffective and corrupt”, the need to review the course of 
the program soon was recognized (Dahlen 2007).  
 UN Police Training and Development Officer Dag R. Dahlen arrived at the Police 
Academy in September 2006. He initiated a new program extending the training to 6 
months at the academy and 6 months supervised in-service training. The curriculum and 
instructional methods were also revisited. As the new program favored quality over 
quantity, it was necessarily more time-consuming and delayed the deployment of new 
police officers. The program aimed at introducing the recruits to the police as a 
profession, and consisted of classroom lecture and outdoor demonstrations. It consisted 
of four modules covering i) general policing; (democratic policing, human rights), ii) 
Liberian legislation; iii) criminal investigation; v) tactical training; (modern policing 
techniques, limited firearms training63) (Dahlen 2010). In addition, “in service programs” 
were implemented to try and update the skills of the officers educated during the initial 
program. The training at the Academy was supervised by international UN instructors, 
but mostly performed by Liberians, many of whom where selected from within the old 
LNP and retrained.  
The second phase of the program was field training, designed to give the recruits 
practical training experience in real situations. After successful completion of the first 
phase of the Basic Recruit Training Program, the recruits were deployed at police stations 
nearby Monrovia, and supervised by a Field Training Officer. Core police policing skills 
to be practiced was covered by areas like patrolling, civil disturbance, investigation, 
traffic and charge of quarter (Dahlen 2007). After 16 weeks of field training, the recruits 
then returned to the Academy for four final weeks of training upon graduation. This 
phase was designed to be a time of reflection and validation of theoretical and practical 
knowledge, preparing the recruits for graduating as LNP officers.  
 
6.3.2.3 Police performance  
UN Police (UNPOL) was committed (but not limited) to provide a proper basic police 
training program for 3,500 law enforcement personnel. This target was achieved by June 
2007, by which time 3,522 (3,319 male and 203 female) LNP personnel had graduated 
from the Basic Recruits Training Program (Malan 2008). The police training program 
                                                
63 Liberia is under a weapon embargo, and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) is the only armed wing of 
the LNP, dealing with armed insurgences, robberies, and such   
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initially focused on meeting numerical targets, with UN Police gauging success by the 
number of recruits graduating from the Police Academy. Kari Marie Kjellstad (2010), 
former team leader for the UNPOL Donor Aid Coordinating Team in Liberia, confirms 
the tendency for measuring the police reform’s success in output rather than outcome, 
with great significance being ascribed to the number of police stations built and the type 
of equipment provided to the units. The need to address the issue of police performance 
has however become increasingly obvious. Even though the training program has been 
prolonged and enhanced, the Liberia National Police (LNP) is still far from being an 
effective police agency for the prevention and prosecution of crime. The rates of armed 
robbery, mob violence, rape and gender based violence remain unacceptable high 
throughout the country. A security assessment conducted by the Liberian Government, 
UNMIL and the UN country team in May 2008 found that “most Liberians felt their 
security was more precarious than at any time since the war ended and that police 
presence in the counties was negligible” (ICE 2009:19). 
The Liberia National Police (LNP) thus continues to face serious constraints to its 
operational effectiveness. According to Malan (2008) LNP’s biggest problem is on the 
one hand low morale and poor discipline, and extremely poor leadership and management 
on the other. Among other things, for a long time, the LNP did not have a standardized 
system of how to operate and manage police stations, leaving it up to the individual 
commander to conduct business the way he pleased. The process of implementing a 
national system is however ongoing, aiming to enhance discipline and accountability. 
There is also a worrying tendency for new police recruits to pick up former 
institutionalized habits such as soliciting bribes. This tendency has frequently been 
attributed to the recruitment and training process. Isolating this initial process as the key 
reason for underperformance is nevertheless misleading, since it neglects the impact of 
resource scarcity on police performance. According to Dahlen (2010), Liberia faces a 
fundamental lack of police infrastructure, implying critical shortages of essential police 
equipment, such as vehicles, fuel, phones and radios, generators to light stations and so 
on. According to the LNP’s 2009-2013 Strategic Plan: 
  
Although the LNP budget has increased, it still falls some way short of providing the 
necessary funding for the substantial institutional and operational capacity building needed to 
enable the LNP to achieve its mission. The LNP still lacks basic resources, such as 
communications and mobility, to enable officers to perform the essential function of receiving 
and responding to calls for assistance from members of the public (LNP 2009:2).  
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The lack of basic infrastructure in Liberia causes the police reform to be both inefficient 
and very expensive. Police stations remain dependent on costly generators, and Dahlen 
estimates that a total of US $500,000 every year is spent on electricity alone. There are 
neither the resources nor competence to fix broken police cars or to ensure that they have 
fuel, rendering the LNP an immobile police force with a huge area to police. Throughout 
Liberia, the LNP, as an institution, thus remains critically weak (Stiernblad 2008). The 
immobility of the police force poses a huge challenge, particularly in rural areas (Baker 
2007, ICE 2009). Lack of resources also feeds back into the low moral among the LNP 
officers. Poor working conditions, no assurances and poor and unreliable payments 
means, that, for many of the low paid officers, corruption is a necessity. Crime scenes 
investigation and case preparation are also extremely poor, with the only expertise 
available located in Monrovia. Thus even when arrests are made, successful prosecutions 
remain rarities (Malan 2008).  
 
6.3.2.4 Lack of holistic approach 
LNP’s lack of operational capacity is being exacerbated by the disconnected manner in 
which the police reform has been pursued without proper linkage to the wider justice 
system (Jaye 2009). Judicial reform has not been an area of commitment within the SSR 
process, and is thus lagging behind the army and police reforms. Building the justice 
sector is a time-consuming process and its poor condition is seriously hampering the 
efficiency of the police reform. In many cases, suspects are sent to jail after being 
arrested by the police, but because of the prosecuting authority’s lack of capacity, the 
process becomes delayed or even stops completely at this point (Dahlen 2010). As a 
result, the correction facilities face major security concerns related to overcrowding and 
escapes. The situation is again exacerbated by a lack of funding, infrastructure and 
staffing (UNSC 2010 a, b). For these reasons, many Liberians are unwilling to pursue 
cases for fear of reprisal, and storming of jails and police stations to mete out mob justice 
remains widespread. The mob tendency cannot be seen in isolation from Liberians’ 
disillusionment with and lack of trust in the judicial system, since the police are the 
implementing agent of the criminal justice system (Ebo 2005).  
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6.3.2.5 Top-down implementation of donor policies  
Kjellstad (2010) confirms that insufficient budgets, financial shortcomings, poor 
infrastructure and logistics represent main challenges to the efficiency of the police force, 
but she furthermore brings up the issue of how donor policies affect the reform process. 
Donors have overarching agendas which steer their priorities and earmarking of funds 
and this represent huge challenge on the ground. The desire to control in detail how and 
on what their contributions are spent has repeatedly delayed and hampered the 
implementation of the SSR process. As an example, Kjellstad (2010) explained how the 
UN’s “green policy” prevented the improvement of sanitary and security conditions at a 
police station downtown Monrovia. Liberian correction facilities generally face serious 
security concerns related to overcrowding and lack of infrastructure (UNSC 2010 a, b). In 
this specific case, the cells did not have any toilet facilities and inmates therefore had to 
be escorted out of the station and down to the river for this purpose. This process was 
considered a pressing security issue, since dangerous inmates frequently tried to escape 
during the outdoor toilet visits, putting themselves, the guards and people living nearby in 
considerable danger. The only quick and viable solution to the situation was to utilize the 
pipe system going from the cells and down to the river. This system was already in place, 
but it was not operate. This solution was, however, perceived as “not green enough” to 
live up to the UN’s standards. It was hence not implemented, causing both the insecurity 
and the pollution of the nearby river to proceed exactly as before (Kjellstad 2010).  
In another example, resources were donated to the building of a police station in a 
rural area outside of Monrovia. Because of the location, it was necessary to build 
barracks to house the officers that were to be deployed there. However, the resources had 
been earmarked to fund only the building of the actual police station, and could not be 
used to build barracks. As a result, the police station was not built (Kjellstad 2010). The 
incident was not an isolated event. In similar cases, it was reported that police officers 
had to use their offices to sleep in.  
The top-down implementation of donor policies have created a rigid, fragmented 
and incoherent process which is unable to respond flexible to the many unforeseen 
expenditures and problems destined to occur in a post-conflict society where the basic 
infrastructure simply is not present (Kjellstad 2010). Other examples include donations of 
computers to police stations without regular power supply, printers to stations unable to 
provide for ink and paper, and vehicles that the police cannot afford to repair or buy fuel 
for. What these examples have in common is that they show how poorly some policies 
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are adapted to local standards. Some of them also represent clear examples of donor 
agendas taking precedence over local security needs. 
According to Dahlen (2010), it is usually easy to attract donors and funding at the 
beginning of a peacebuilding or SSR process, but it is considerably more complex 
committing them to stay on a long term basis as new and pressing situations emerge in 
other places. Donor fatigue is a common problem and it hence gets increasingly harder to 
attract funding to complete the ongoing process. Even though security sector reform 
should be seen as a long term and time consuming process, donors typically plan their 
exit strategies from the very beginning. A prolonged stay is costly and donors tend to 
prefer supporting projects which are easy to justify to a potentially critical audience back 
home (Bøås 2010). Some donor areas, such as “Training and Development”, are 
considered less charged and are hence more popular among donors (Dahlen 2010). Others 
do not attract resources that easily. This tendency have also been present in Liberia’s 
case, where very few donors wanted to get involved in the training of the armed wing of 
the police, the Emergency Response Unit. The US eventually stepped up and took 
responsibility for this project, which aimed at training and equipping up to 500 LNP 
officers.64 Also this time the contract was awarded to the private security company 
DynCorp.65  
 
6.3.2.6 Summing up 
According to the UN’s latest report on the Mission in Liberia, the Liberia National Police 
continues to make progress towards becoming operationally independent, although it 
continues to face a number of serious challenges (UNSC 2010 b). Standard Operating 
Procedures for police stations and policies on professional standards have been finalized 
and are currently being introduced nationwide, something which over time should 
improve the quality of the LNP’s work. However, both the Police Support Unit and the 
LNP’s armed unit, the Emergency Response Unit, continues to face serious constrains to 
their operational effectiveness. To build up the Police Support Unit to its desired strength 
and to maintain the Emergency Response Unit, substantial additional donor support for 
training, equipment and infrastructure is needed (UNSC 2010 a, b). After the new LNP’s 
Strategic Plan was presented in New York in September 2009, several donors did express 
interest in continued support, but so far little support has materialized. Lack of sustained 
                                                
64 Expected strength as of March 2010 was 334 officers (UN SC 2010) 
65 http://ir.dyn-intl.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=302437 (accessed 09.06.2010) 
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political will on behalf of the donor community thus constitutes a serious challenge to the 
success of the police reform. The situation on the ground remains that the police is not 
able to respond effectively to the security needs of the Liberian population. 
 
6.4 Marginalization of SSR’s core principles  
Security sector reform in Liberia has been unprecedented in ambition but has produced 
mixed results. Major concerns regarding the reform are competing demands on the 
attention and resources of both donors and the Liberian government, lack of long-term 
commitment and a lack of a holistic response to Liberia’s security needs (Ebo 2005). To 
improve the ongoing intervention, the UN Security Council has emphasized the need for 
additional resources, political commitment and longer timeframes. According to 
Andersen (2006) there clearly is a mismatch between international ambitions and 
resources allocated to the task, and this situation naturally impacts on the chances of 
successful reform.  
But what about the broader reform efforts, the performance of it? As stated, the 
OECD DAC framework stipulates certain procedural principles for how to conduct SSR 
and assure that the reform is efficient, sustainable and legitimate. The principles 
emphasized are local ownership, local context sensitivity, accountability and 
transparency and holistic approach (OECD DAC 2005). To start with the latter, holistic 
approach, the Liberian SSR agenda is narrowly conceptualized in the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) and focuses primarily on reforming the Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL) and the Liberia National Police (LNP). These two reforms have been conducted as 
separate undertakings, with the US leading the army reform and the UN taking 
responsibility for the police reform. Work on both reforms has been undertaken in 
isolation from the other and wider governance reforms. The CPA briefly refers to the 
restructuring and professionalization of “other security services”, but this aspect has to 
date been neglected in practice. The problem of a multitude of agents with duplicating 
and overlapping mandates with respect to internal security thus still remains a reality. 
This situation causes considerable confusion regarding responsibility, perhaps mostly 
among civilians who are unsure about where to turn for help and protection (Dhalen 
2010). The situation moreover causes tension between security agents that are forced to 
prove their continued relevance (Baker 2007). Related to this issue, the lack of holistic 
approach to Liberia’s security needs is also reflected in the disconnected manner in which 
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the police reform has been conducted without proper linkage to the wider justice system 
(Jaye 2009). The police are the implementing agent of the justice system, but since 
reform on this area has made little progress, it risks sabotaging the wider security sector.  
The SSR program was, moreover, initiated only after the disarmament, 
demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDR(R)) program had ended. SSR and 
DDR(R) hence constituted two completely separate undertakings. This approach created 
thousands of unemployed ex-soldiers, as soldiers demobilized during the DDR(R) 
process were not automatically recruited into the vetting process associated with the 
subsequent SSR reform. The DDR(R) process hence impacted directly on the climate for 
the following SSR process by laying the foundation for up-risings to come (Jennings 
2010). The Liberian case thus illustrates the problem of regarding these reforms as 
sequential and separable activities, rather than as a dynamic whole (NMFA 2008).  
The next procedural principle is accountability and transparency. According to 
OECD DAC (2005), one of SSR’s main objectives is to ensure that governance of the 
security sector conforms to broader democratic norms. To contribute to institutional 
capacity building, the SSR process should itself be carried out in accordance with the 
principles it seeks to establish. All countries face the paradox that an army trained to act 
only under civilian control can be manipulated by elites to act against the national 
interests, and Liberia confronts the problem more acutely because of its post-conflict 
fragility (ICG 2009). The SSR process and the army reform in particular, have 
nevertheless been characterized by secrecy and opaqueness. The Memorandum of 
Understanding between the US Government and the Interim Government still remains 
inaccessible to both Liberian officials and civil society, and so do the outsourced 
contracts between the US Government and the private military companies DynCorp and 
Pacific Architects and Engineers. DynCorp has moreover refused to appear before the 
Liberian Parliament (ICG 2009, Ebo 2007). It should be obvious to anyone that such 
practices neither conform to democratic norms nor contribute to institutional capacity 
building in the host country. 
The next procedural principle is local context sensitivity. The security review 
which provided the basis for the Liberian SSR process was undertaken by the American 
think tank RAND, and reflected international “best practices”, rather than in-depth 
understandings of Liberia and the broader West African region (Malan 2008). The reform 
of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was planned with economic considerations in the 
forefront, and did not reflect any Liberian consensus about size or composition of the 
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army (Ebo 2005). The US decision to dismantle the AFL and rebuild it from scratch was, 
furthermore, contrary to the mandate provided by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
and failed to take a number of issues into consideration. Most importantly, with Liberia’s 
broken economy it was extremely difficult to provide deactivated soldiers with 
employment opportunities. Consequently, 17,000 former soldiers were thrown into the 
street with non-sustainable retirement packages, posing a risk to the current and future 
stability of the Liberian society (Jaye 2009, Jennings 2010).  A second result of the 
strategy was that the new army now lacks expertise and institutional knowledge. The 
AFL will thus have to remain dependent on external leadership for years to come.  
Regarding the police reform, the policies of the donor’s involved have created a rigid, 
fragmented and incoherent process that is unable to respond in a flexible manner to 
unforeseen expenditures and problems. This is mainly due to overarching agendas and 
earmarking of resources to specific programs. Many donations, moreover, reflect a 
disregard for the lack of basic infrastructure on the ground (Kjellstad 2010), with the LNP 
receiving equipment they simply cannot afford to utilize.  
The last procedural principle, local ownership, is intimately related to the 
principle of context sensitivity. OECD DAC (2005) stresses that the most critical task 
facing countries embarking on a SSR process, is to build a nationally owned and led 
vision of security. A nationally owned vision of security is the very foundation for the 
development of appropriate security sector policy frameworks and the institutions 
required to implement them. Despite this, the degree of genuine local ownership of the 
Liberian SSR process is far from impressive. Most importantly, the reform process is 
being pursued without a locally produced national security strategy. The Liberian 
government has been marginalized because of a perceived lack of credibility and capacity 
and repeated attempts by civil society groups to contribute to and impact on the process 
have been ignored, with reference to decisions already made by the donor community 
(Ebo 2007, Bendix and Stanley 2008). According to Ebo (2005:55) “there is a general 
consensus among Liberians - public officials and civil society alike - that the international 
community (…) has failed to emphasize local ownership of the reconstruction process. 
 
6.4.1 Conceptual-contextual divide 
Compared to the OECD DAC framework on security sector reform (SSR), the Liberian 
case clearly depicts a conceptual-contextual divide in that the procedural principles are 
endorsed in theory but not adhered to in practice. By reducing SSR to police and army 
 111 
reform and not adhering to the procedural principles for how to carry out the reform, the 
efficiency, sustainability and legitimacy of the reform is endangered. The Liberian SSR 
agenda is framed as a technical exercise responding to a narrow security problem, and has 
thus been far more rudimentary than what the OECD DAC envisages. Although the 
police and the military forces clearly are part of the problem, they are seldom the 
underlying cause of violence, but function as an instrument in violent conflicts (Wulf 
2004). According to Ebo: “All efforts to reconstruct Liberia and ensure a durable peace 
hinge on the provision of adequate security which in turn requires the right governance 
environment” (2005:57). The notion of insecurity as a broader governance issue lay at the 
very heart of the SSR framework as envisaged by the OECD DAC. SSR should not 
merely be a technical exercise of restructuring the security agents, but rather a 
transformation of broader civil-military relations, to ensure that the security sector respect 
the populations’ human rights and respond to their security needs. Because of its limited 
and security oriented focus, the Liberian SSR process is moreover not embedded in any 
overall development agenda:  
 
Reintegrating the ex-service personnel and ex-fighters into “civil” society is not a narrow 
military-security issue; it is a social and economic development issue as well. Thus, while the 
emphasis on guaranteeing physical security by addressing irregular and regular security structures 
is important, this goal cannot be pursued separate from the human security needs of the people 
(Jaye 2009:19). 
 
Due to the conceptualization of SSR as a security issue, the security community has 
remained reluctant to include civilians in the security discourse, as they are perceived as 
lacking capacity and military expertise. In other words, they have not been considered 
necessary or relevant to the reform process. The dangers of this tendency, is that the 
donor community in effect are implementing a reform that does not correspond to the 
needs and realities on the ground. The ongoing army reform is taking place outside any 
shared vision of national security (Jaye 2006), and the process is only paying lip service 
to the principles of security sector reform. This situation is a paradox, in as much as 
development and democratic governance are considered the very foundation for the 
creation of sustainable peace in fragile and post-conflict states.  
 
6.4.2 The paradox of implementation: securitization of SSR? 
The Liberian SSR process reflects a disproportionate level of assistance going to 
traditional security agents such as the police and the military in comparison to 
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governance and justice institutions. Does this tendency move SSR away from its original 
development roots? Is the concept of SSR becoming securitized?  
What seems to be the case is that the concept of security sector reform remains 
true to its core values. SSR continues to evolve conceptually as the debate on it becomes 
more sophisticated in both policy and academic discourses. The practical implementation 
of the concept is on the other hand lagging behind to the degree where it is even 
contradicting the conceptual progress.66 Brzoska (2003) has argued that the SSR 
framework itself is a part of the underlying reason for the conceptual-contextual divide. 
He argues that while the poverty reduction framework provides a useful framework for 
security related activities, it gives little indication when it comes to prioritizing and 
sequencing them. This situation has caused different agents to embark upon different 
projects falling under the umbrella concept of SSR, and as a result the activities on the 
ground are becoming specific and fragmented. The different components are only pieced 
together as parts of a “holistic” approach once they are placed into the broader SSR 
framework and interpreted as such (de Coning 2010). Such an understanding can explain 
the tendency why the security community has been able to “hijack” the implementation 
of the SSR agenda to serve traditional military or geo-strategic interests.  
 
6.4.3 Technicization and non-politicization of policies 
The conceptual-contextual divide cannot however be fully explained by the security 
community’s venture into development related work. Nor can it be adequately explained 
by a lack of resources. Whereas the military’s capacity and securitized rationale goes a 
long way in explaining the lack of government dimensions and that SSR is becoming 
militarized in practice, it cannot explain the reason why core principles like local 
ownership and local context sensitivity are neglected also by civilian agents. Are the 
principles not considered important in practice?  
The fact that the normative framework has been internationally endorsed indicates 
that they indeed are considered important. Perhaps is something more fundamental at 
stake; perhaps is it the foundation underlying the international approach to fragile and 
post-conflict states that falls short. I have previously referred to state-building and 
security sector reform (SSR) as belonging to a liberal paradigm aiming to enhance human 
security and facilitate development. Such practices challenge traditional state sovereignty, 
                                                
66 www.ssrfuture.org/blogs/day1concep/discussion (accessed 05.05.2010) 
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and have more then anything else been legitimized by the liberal hegemony in 
international politics. According to Malmvig (2006), sovereignty has not only been open 
to different constructions over time, but also across space. The liberal hegemony in global 
politics has facilitated a movement from absolute sovereignty to sovereignty conditioned 
by respect for liberal principles like democracy and human rights. Consulting the SSR 
literature, this notion is widely displayed: 
 
The political sensitivity of security issues can create developing country resistance to 
external assistance. National defense and internal security are the traditional cornerstones of state 
sovereignty. However, when security is seen in its wider sense, as involving human security and a 
range of development issues, donor engagement in this domain becomes more relevant and 
legitimate67 (OECD 2004:4) (my emphasis added). And moreover:  
 
OECD members recognise that development and security are inextricably linked. This 
perception is opening the way to treating security in developing countries as a public policy and 
governance issue, inviting greater public scrutiny of security policy (OECD 2004:1). 
 
The excerpts reflect the naturalization of liberal democratic values as the fundament in 
the international approach to fragile states and its geopolitical impact on state 
sovereignty. They furthermore reflect a de-securitizing move. Although the policy 
document at first glance seems to frame security issues as belonging in the political 
realm, the insistence on “security in developing countries” constituting a “public policy 
and governance issue” for international donors to decide on, reflects a clear attempt to 
establish it as a technical and hence non-political issue. Security issues in the South are 
hence moved directly form securitization to non-politicization. Hansen (2006) has argued 
that when foreign policy discourses articulate an explicit international responsibility, such 
as combating “humanitarian disaster” or protecting “human rights”, a powerful discursive 
move is undertaken in that “the issue is moved out of the realm of the strategic and 
“selfishly national” and relocated within the “higher grounds” of the morally good” 
(Hansen 2006:50). Donor activities are hence legitimized based on universal values and 
the Self’s moral responsibility to help and transform the Other. The dominant perception 
of security sector reform as a necessary and largely technical matter of “right-sizing” and 
“professionalization” may further facilitate the tendency for donors to define local 
ownership in pragmatically terms (Andersen 2006). This tendency mirrors the argument 
made by Huntington (1968) and Paris (2004) about the need for institution building to 
precede democratization. The marginalization of local ownership and related procedural 
                                                
67 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/47/31642508.pdf 
 114 
principles are hence legitimized by referring to the local population’s human security 
needs. The normative framework hence functions as a legitimating force for the 
international community’s venture into the security sectors of fragile states.   
Importantly, the linking of security and development has thus opened up for 
treating security in development countries as a governance issue. The underlying 
geopolitical rationale is fundamentally related to the issue of state fragility. The 
international community tends to see fragile states as “terra nullius”; places characterized 
by chaos and anarchy, where nothing works. Fragile states are perceived as failing to 
meet the normative Weberian ideal of the modern state. These countries are hence 
collectively perceived as lacking the necessary institutional capacity and as in need of 
external guidance and help to become stable democracies. In this respect, fragile states 
are effectively perceived and responded to as “pseudo-states”, as holders of a 
qualitatively different and weaker form of sovereignty than modern Western states. In the 
Liberian process, this is repeatedly illustrated in the marginalization of the Liberian 
Government and civil society, which are perceived as lacking competence and capacity. 
In the contemporary world, the label “fragile state” brings about a specific 
technical response or “cure”, known as liberal state building. As a project, post-conflict 
peacebuilding has in the post-Cold War era become synonymous with the advancement 
of liberal democratic principles. As a result, the authority of external actors engaged in 
activities such as security sector reform (SSR), is not only derived from their legal or 
humanitarian mandate. It also stems from their knowledge and experience in what liberal 
principles are, how they can be made operational and how they should be implemented 
(Sending 2009 a, b). This specific framing of liberal state-building as being about the 
implementation of pre-defined and essentially non-negotiable principles about democratic 
rule, human rights, liberal economic policy and the rule of law, elevates western donors 
to “experts” on how to best establish sustainable security and development in the South. 
The solution to state fragility is hence perceived as pregiven and ahistorical, resulting in 
the implementation of “universal principles” (Sending 2009 a). This technical and top-
down approach essentially implies that universal knowledge about how to build liberal 
democracies is considered more important than local knowledge. This can explain why 
competence in functionally specific tasks, such as SSR, again and again takes precedence 
over local and context specific knowledge. 
Sending (2009 a, b) moreover argues that the donor community assumes that the 
internationally established legitimacy of liberal principles they advance, automatically 
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translates into local and domestic legitimacy. The legitimacy of the intervention in 
question is hence perceived as flowing from a set of international sources, rather than a 
local source. These sources include conformity with the liberal human rights paradigm 
and the UN’s authorities. Such a conceptualization entails a perception that the “actual” 
legitimacy of the intervention is unrelated to the “perceived” legitimacy of the 
intervention in the local population (Sending 2009 a). As such, the process will be 
“locally owned” as soon as the local population accepts the foundation for the new 
institutions and transforms into a liberal, democratic almost-Self. 
 
6.5 Summing up  
The Liberian case has illustrated the implementation of SSR in practice. The process 
clearly reflects that the security community’s entry into the development domain has 
skewed the implementation of the SSR paradigm in a military and state centric direction. 
Previous chapters have argued that this is due to it outmatching the civilian development 
community with regards to resources and capacities. The result has been that the 
governance and broader democratic dimensions of SSR has become marginalized in 
practice. This chapter has moreover argued that the conceptual-contextual divide 
illustrated by the Liberian process, not necessarily is caused by the fact that donors 
disrespect the procedural principles or consider them as insignificant. Their ongoing 
conceptual development and the international endorsement of them by UN and OECD 
member states indicate that they do. Rather, it seems that the conceptual-contextual 
divide is intimately related to the implicit assumptions of universal knowledge and 
external legitimacy operating within the liberal peacebuilding discourse. As fragile states 
are perceived as “lacking capacity” when it comes to building liberal democracies and 
modern state institutions, donor’s tend to act based on the idea that the process is better 
performed top-down by external “experts”. The illiberality of the process is thereafter 
legitimized by referring to the institutionalized system of liberal democratic values, 
including the broader need to protect human security and development. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has focused on the emergence of the post-Cold War security-development 
nexus and its impact on donor policies towards fragile and post-conflict states in the 
South. My research rationale has been to address the knowledge gap at the intersection of 
security and development, and contribute to the body of critical literature on the 
underresearched concept of security sector reform (SSR). For this purpose, I have applied 
a theoretical framework comprising Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, combined with the Copenhagen School’s security 
theory and geopolitical theory. 
The main research question guiding the thesis has been: How has the international 
approach towards fragile and post-conflict states changed in the post-Cold War era? 
Two related sub-questions have further functioned to structure my thesis: How has the 
merging of security and development influenced Western donors’ geopolitical rationale 
for engaging with fragile states? And finally, related to my case: What characterizes the 
Liberian SSR process, and do the elements of the OECD DAC framework inform the 
implementation of the reform process? 
The research questions have been answered throughout the thesis by investigating the 
impact of the liberal hegemony in post-Cold War politics on the international security and 
development architecture. Chapter four situated SSR in global politics and contextualised 
it as a post-Cold War liberal approach to security assistance, centred on liberal state 
building. Chapter five proceeded to investigate the conceptual merging of security and 
development, providing the backdrop and justification for SSR. It argued that state 
fragility and underdevelopment has been constructed as international security issues in a 
globalized world, hence changing Western donors’ geopolitical rationale for engaging 
with fragile states. The chapter moreover accounted for SSR as a policy area of civil-
military cooperation, encompassing actors with differing intertextual histories, working 
methods, priorities and rationales. As such, the thesis identified an ongoing discursive 
struggle between the security first and the good governance discourse over the definition 
and appropriate response to the issues in question. Chapter six investigated the relation 
between discourse and materiality by looking at the relation between the 
OECD DAC framework and the implementation of SSR in the Liberian context. It 
depicted a fragmented and militarized reform process, and moreover identified a 
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conceptual-contextual divide, where the normative principles of the SSR framework are 
committed to in theory but not adhered to in practice. 
 
Main findings of the thesis are that the reconceptualization of underdevelopment and 
state fragility as international security issues has caused the international donor 
community to become increasingly involved in state building in post-conflict and fragile 
states. The underlying foundation is the liberal peace thesis, which holds that national and 
international peace and stability is best guaranteed through the building of liberal 
democracies. Because of the merging of the previously separated concepts of security and 
development, new policies such as security sector reform (SSR) have emerged in the 
interface of traditional security and development assistance. The SSR framework aims at 
joining together these efforts and to provide them with a common vision of a democratic 
security sector that facilitates development and protects the security interests of the local 
population. Although the framework as represented by the OECD DAC and the UN, 
explicitly frames security as a development issue, the security-development nexus’ has 
caused the security community has become increasingly dominant on traditional 
development domains. Because the security community largely reflects a securitized 
discourse, it has approached SSR in a traditional state centric and security oriented 
fashion, causing the implementation of the concept to become skewed in a militarized 
direction.  
The currently reality is that SSR remains more conceptually than institutionally 
developed, and that actual undertakings on the ground remains fragmented and 
incoherent. As the thesis has illustrated through the Liberian SSR process, there is a 
tendency for a conceptual-contextual divide, where the procedural principles of local 
ownership, local context sensitivity, accountability and transparency and holistic 
approach are adhered to in theory, but marginalized in practice. I have argued that the 
security community’s venture into development related work has contributed to the 
marginalization of the procedural principles, but also that this tendency in itself is not a 
sufficient explanation for the gap between theory and practice. Drawing from Sending 
(2009 a, b) I have argued that part of the problem is to be found in the ideas underpinning 
the liberal peacebuilding regime. Essentially, the solution to state fragility is seen as 
ahistorical and pregiven, hence resulting in top-down implementation of “universal 
principles”, further contributing to the marginalization of the SSR framework’s 
procedural principles. Related to this aspect, the thesis has argued that it is misleading to 
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speak of the international approach to post-conflict and fragile states as a uniform 
“Western” approach, even if it responds to the same security climate. Rather, it has 
pointed to discursive splits within the Western Self, illustrating the importance of spatial, 
temporal and ethical representations in foreign policy. As accounted for, the security first 
and the good governance discourse importantly construct the same signs to different 
results, hence making different policies and approaches relevant and legitimate.  
Related to these competing discourses, two processes that contribute to the 
conceptual-contextual divide have been identified. The most obvious one is the process of 
securitization, which frames underdevelopment and state fragility as international 
security issues and legitimize that policies directed at post-conflict states are lifted above 
normal politics. The process of depoliticization or technicization on the other hand, 
frames security issues in the South as governance issues, hence contributing to moving 
them out of the political domain. This process of technicization is intimately related to the 
fact that the liberal paradigm has become hegemonic in the post-Cold War era. Illiberal 
and undemocratic donor activities are hence legitimized based on universal liberal values 
and the Western Self’s moral responsibility to help and transform the Other. The thesis 
has argued that taken together, these two processes, securitization and technicization, 
help explain the tendency for a conceptual-contextual divide.  
 
Reforming the security sector and subjecting it to democratic oversight and control is 
critical to the consolidation of peace and security in any post-conflict state. The SSR 
framework recognizes civil-military relations’ potential impact on both security and 
development, and aims to make the security sector more responsive to the populations’ 
security needs. As such, the SSR framework holds enormous potential. Nevertheless, if 
SSR is to live up to its own ambitions, donors need to be held to higher standards 
regarding accountability, local context sensitivity and respect for local ownership of the 
processes. This aspect is imperative for the legitimacy, efficiency and sustainability of the 
reform process, and ultimately, for long-term peace and stability. The UN’s role in SSR 
activities must also be strengthened to guarantee that the reform process is carried out in a 
coordinated and holistic fashion. In this I concur with Ball and Hendricks (2006) in that it 
would be counter-productive to abandon the concept, even if it falls short of its own 
ambitions. There is, however, a strong case to focus on re-energising the concept by 
stimulating greater debate on the core principles which underpin SSR, and how these 
principles apply to specific contexts in host countries. If SSR is to produce the desired 
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outcomes, SSR thinking furthemore needs to be institutionalized in the practice of 
international assistance in both the development and security spheres (Ball and Hendricks 
2006). With regard to both human and state security, we simply cannot afford to fail with 
failing states.  
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